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ABSTRACT
The story of Louisiana's railroads has for too long boon shroudsd by half-truth, myth, oral tradition, lnaoouraoy and glib general
ity.

Actually, in ths period bstvaan 1830 and 1850, Louisiana's

railroad buildors accomplished nors than was gansrally believed, al
though the railroad nilaags was snail compared with tha whole nation,
or even tha South.
Almost all of Louisiana's prs-1850 railroads wara planned, ohartared and built in tha daoada between 1830 and 1840.

This faot alone

suggests tha inextricable bond between the railroads and the busin
ess oyde of that era.

Railroad fever came to a clinax at tha height

of the econonio cycle, in 1837, and practically ended after the panic
of that year.

Prior to tha panic of 1837, shortages of supplies,

labor and capital continually hindered the railroad companies in ac
complishing their objectives.

A few of the railroads that survived

the panic continued their construction during the depression years
between 1837 and 1841*

They were aided in this pursuit by state

loans enacted after the panic, a fact little known up to this tine.
Nevertheless, in spite of state aid, the most important source of
capital was the private stockholder.
The pre-1350 railroads of Louisiana could be classified into
three groups*

rural railroads, local New Orleans railroads, and

one, long-distance, interstate railroad, projected from Hew Orleans

iv

to Nashville, Tennessee.

Tha three all-rural railroad# war* each

under thirty miles in length, and acted as appendages to the major
waterways of the state, connecting the interior with the rivers.
New Orleans' looal railroads were built to conneot waterways, to
provide better pert faollltles for the city, and to aid In the ex
pansion of Mew Orleans' growing population into the suburbs.

Two

of these local railroads developed into the Hew Orleans street rail
way system during the latter part of the Nineteenth century. The
interstate railroad to Nashville was planned in orderto meet the
challenge of the eastern ooastal cities to New Orleans' monopoly
of the western trade.

This project failed because the state was

unwilling to beeone a partner in the venture.
The early period of railroading In Louisiana was an Inglorious
saga of nany plana, numerous failures and few successes, \Aile the
mileage constructed was unimpressive.

Nevertheless, valuable exper

ience was gained in construction techniques, company organisation
and railroad financing whioh could be put to good use in the decade
of railroad building during the 1350's.
Host of the secondary sources dealing with the early railroads
of Louisiana were generally inadequate.

Caroline MaoGill, in a short

section on Louisiana railroads before 1360, gave the best overall
picture of railroad developsuat in the state.

Most of the writers

of the standard histories of Louisiana and New Orleans, with the

v

exception of Hanry Rlghtor, gave little attention to railroads, ihile
Rightor's history — roly listed the railroads chartered with the dates
and capitalisation figures.

Among the histories of the state, a near

pethetie treatment of Louisiana's railroads appeared in the wore re
cently published hi storyoof Louisiana by MoCinty.

This writer told

his readers that two railroads ware ahartered before 1850, and than
proceeded to list three —

but only tliree of the twenty-fire rail

roads chartered before 1350.

The best treataent of the New Orleans

and NashriUe railroad appeared in an artlole by R, 3. Cotterill,
iho placed the railroad and its relationship with Louisiana's econ
omy and the western trade in proper prospective,

Generally speak

ing, however, there was little information on early Louisiana rail
roads to be gleaned from secondary sources.

In preparing this the

sis, the author has relied chiefly upon federal and state documents,
and newspapers and periodicals, supnlenented with various manuscript
material such as family papers and railroad collections.

vA

Introduction
A |1u

m

at a relief nap of tha United States la a fitting

prelude to tha study of transportation in Louisiana.

Between tha

Appalachian Mountains to tha east, and tha Rocky Mountains to tha
vast, a vast inland plain stratchas northward from tha Qulf of Mexico
to Hudson Bay.

In the United States, this plain is drained by two

great water systems.

Tha Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River system

flows northeastward into tha northern Atlantic Ocean.

Tha Mississ

ippi River, fad by its tributaries, flows southward Into tha Gulf
of Mexico.

It was tha Mississippi River system that affected the

economic development of Louisiana so greatly and determined the
course of the trade and commerce of Hew Orleans.

It shaped

attitudes, established a way of life, and subtly influenced almost
•vary economic thought of the population.
The Mississippi River system also Influenced the economic
development of the old West.

Settlers crossed the Applachian Moun

tains, cleared land, and grew erope.

As soon as a marketable

staple existed, the problem of transportation became paramount.
Mature offered a ready solution.
tant avenue of commerce.

The river became the most impor

Until better transportation could be

found, the products of the farms, like the waters of the rivers,
followed the easiest course to the sea.

Canoes, flatboats, keel-

boats, and numerous ether types of craft drifted down the rivers
vtt

to Mew Orleant, the main place of depoeit for the products of the
West.

The development of Mew Orleans into an Important exporting

center was practically assured, and the city anchored her faith
for future economic growth in the waters of the mighty river*
The successful application of the steam engine to water trans
portation only served to confirm this faith*

With the appearance

of the steamboat on the Mississippi River, the economic ties with
the interior seemed even more secure.

The steamboat quickened the

pace of activity on the western rivers, and the Journey up the
Mississippi against the stream now became a matter of course instead
of a nightmare of hardship.

But the steanboat did even more.

It

facilitated the passage of vessels between the port of Mew Orleans
and the sea.

Steam tewboats guided unwieldy ocean sailing vessels

over the shifting bar at the mouth of the river, through the tor*
tuous passes, and past the windless Ingllsh turn, to the wharves
of the city.

Another serious obstacle to the growth of the city

had been partially overcome.
Despite the benefits made possible by steam power, the
Mississippi transportation system bad serious shortcomings.
was the distance involved.

One

The principal markets for the goods of

the Ohio valley were the cities of the last and the countries of
western Burope.

The Mississippi system at best offered a long,

circuitous route for the western staples before reaching their
markets.

The journey also had its dangers.

Rapids, shifting

sand bars, and snags took their toll of the river craft laden with
produce.

There was also considerable spoilage of perishable
viii

eoenodlties during tha long period from the tine of departure until
the goods finally cane to rest in the sea-going vessels at Mew Or lens.
These disadvantages were considered unavoidable then, but the day
would cone when this would not be the oase.

There would be other,

■ore direct outlets from the West than those provided by nature.
The building of canals supplied those outlets.
The beginning of the canal era in the United States followed
rapidly upon the invention of the steanboat.

Whereas the steanboat

improved the cossisrre of the Mississippi system, the canal revolu
tionised the coesMrce of the East.

The completion of the Erie

Canal through New Tork stat~ in 1825 provided a direct route betworn
East and West.

The trickle of goods between the Lakes and the

Hudson River during the first year of its operation was a harbinger
of the approaching changes in the trade patterns of the upper Miss
issippi and Ohio valleys.

It was also an ominous portent for the

more distant future of New Orleans which, up to this time, had
enjoyed an almost complete monopoly of the western trade,
other states moved to emulate New Tork.

Quickly

Pennsylvania and Maryland

each projected elaborate canal systems to tap the western trade,
and Ohio constructed a name of canals which, among other things,
connected the Ohio River with the Great Lakes.

The waterway between

East and West was comple+ s^.
The impact of the East-West canals upon the trade and commerce
of New Orleans was at first not apparent because the West developed
so rapidly.

Western exports over both the northern and the southern
ix

rcvtva i n e m a a d jtarlj.

During aoit of tho fiftoon-yoar poriod

following tho eouplotion of tho Brio Canal, Now Orloono axporioacod
unprocodontod prooporltj and oeoanode growth.

Produeo fro* tho

wootorn hintorland orowdod tho wharroa of tho eity, oaabling low
Orloono to ehollongo low York, hor grootoot riral, for flrot plooo
onong tho exporting eltloo of tho Ualtod Stotoo.

Although town

citiseno Tiowod with a i m tho inroodo of tho Boot on wootorn trado,
low Orloono' folth in tho riror and tho noturol adrantagoa it
offorod gonarally rouoinod unohokon.

Hor approach to tho problow

of inproYod tronoportotion hod booouo water-logged.
It woo in thia oooaoade elinoto thot Louioiona ontorod tho
railroad ora.

Up to thia tina, throo intorrolatod thouoo dowiaatod

100101000'a oeononlc derelopwout —
tho uxpanoion of low Orloano.

tho riror, inland trado, and

Tho rolo played by Louiaiana rail-

roado in thia oeonawie oituation nuot bo told olaowhoro.

9uffleo

it to oaythat, whan tho flrot poriod of railroad oacpoaaion in
Louiaiana ondod, tho riror woo otill ouproao.

1

Chapter I
TfiX ECONOMIC BACKOBOOXD
Tha railroad arm began la Louiaiana in tha nidst of a rising
buainass cycle, increasing prosperity, and general optimism.

Tha

state and its pert city, Haw Orleans, stood in 1830 at the threshold
of a period of incredible growth in population, in agricultural
development, aad in trade and comaeree. In tan years' tine, whether
by natural increase or by lMigration, thousands of additional
inhabitants would crowd the streets of New Orleans, or fill tha
enpty spaces of the interior*

During this decade the nonber of

people living in Haw Orleans wore than doubled, while tha popula
tion of the state increased by 30 per cent.^

At the part, where

aajestic ocean Tassels singled with a notley assortasnt of river
boats, the decade of the 1830's brought hustle, bustle, aad above
all, unprecedented profits.

Haver before had so assy steaatooate

and other types of river eraft aoved down the Mississippi and eap2

tied their cargoes of western produce upon the wharves of the city.

^Between 1830 and 1840, Haw Orleans' papulation increased froa
49*826 te 102,195. The population of tha state increased from
236,209 to 354,148. United States fifth Census. 1830, and United
States Sixth Census. 1840, Louisiana, photegraphed in Micro-film
Laboratory, Bureau of Census.
“The value of produce arriving at Hew Orleans between 1 October
1830, and 30 Septcaher 1831, was 126,044,820. By 1840* the value bad
increased to 849*822,115. "Internal Cswasroe of the United States, •
Ho. 6, 50 Cong.* 1 Sess.* Pt. II,
c Expansion of Hew OrIsaac
Before the Civil Mar," unpublished Fh.B. dissertation, Popartsent of
History, Tulane University, 1953, p. 114.
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As the value of the river trade rose
port trade also quickened.

Readily, the race of the ex

In ten years, the value of Louisiana's ex

ports, which were essentially the exports of New Orleans, increased
about 45 psr cent.

3

Aa far ss the

state of the economy was concerned,

this period should have been advantageous for the coming of railroads
to Louisiana.
Vost of the factors that retarded railroads in other southern
stat eo also influenced Louisiana.
rural nature of the state.
plantation <

Ora* import m t

obstacle was the

Sparsely populated and dominated by the

-y, rural Louisiana as a fertile field for railroad

development left much to be desired.

The plantation trade, centered

nrt nidly around cotton and sugar cane, was V. i^ely sufficient to
su.stain the few short line railroads that

were •'instructed.

Seasonal

in nature, this trade overburdened railroad facilities from October
he dinuary during the marketing season while,

for the remainder of

the year, most of the rolling stock remained idle.^*
desirable and nece33ary as a cheap

although locally

means of transportation, few rural

rai 1 roads were financially sound.
If rail road building was handicapped by Louisiana's rural condi
tions, it received a further setback by the scarcity of population

^Louisiana's exports in 183C were valued at £15,4'fS,692.
H u n t 1s
Merchants * Magazine and Commercial R e v i e w , III (August, 1C40), 171.
In 1^40, their v a l u e was $34>236,93^1
I b i d .. V (December, 1841)# 577*
^Manifesto of cotton shipped from Clinton to Port Hudson, 1841-1843*
W. Feliciana Parish Archives Collection, Clinton and Port Hudson Rail
road Company Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana 3tate University,

1826-1852.

3
etat«ri.

Although Louisiana commanded much of tbs Mississippi River

trad#, shs had for towns along this waterway of any economic significaaes, and Mow Orleans was her only city.

In contrast to the more

populous North, where cities built railroads to other cities and towns,
New Orleans had to be content with short line railroads between her
waterways, and to the suburbs.

While rails were spanning the distance

between Boston and Worcester, and while New York pressed northward
toward Albany and the interior, New Orleans clung to the river.
nearest centers of population were hundreds of niles away.

The

There was

no Albany or Worcester nearby, nor any other town worthy of co-uni cation by railroad.
mature.

An attempt in 1835 to reach Nashville proved pre

The distance involved, the panic of 1837, and New Orleans'

own unwillingness and inability to sustain the project spelled its doom.
The early railroads also suffered as a result of the river psychol
ogy that dominated Louisiana's approach t.o her transportation problems
until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Mississippi River,

plied by modern steamboats, continually held the loyalty of even the
most ardent railroad enthusiasts.

Its preeminence led to confused

thinking and divided allegiances.

For example, the Mew Orleans Bee in

1835 was a noisy supporter of the New Orleans and Nashville railroad.
In promoting the railroad, the paper warned New Orleans' businessmen
of the competition that river traffic faced from eastern canals aad
railroads.'’ A short time later, the same paper confidently boasted

*Mew Orleans Bee, 18 June 1835, P* 2.
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of tho natural advantages of tha Mississippi sjstsai and urged that
steamship ooeipaniss be chartered to ensure Mow Orleans

continued

control of the river trade as far as Cincinnati.^
Although Mow Orleans by 1830 ranked fourth in slse among the cities
of the United States, the scononic pattern renal nsd typically southern*
As the port of the Mississippi River, her energies wore concentrated
on the transehipaent of goods arriving froa the interior.

The success

achieved could hardly bo questioned, for at tines the value of Mew
Orleans' exports exceeded her rival, New Tork.

Unfortunately for Mew

Orleans, other forces were working to offset her apparent advantages.
For one thing, like most southern cities, New Orleans lagged far
behind in manufacturing.

Preoccupied with the entrepot trade, the

business interests in the city showed little enthusiasm for the deve
lopment of industry*

In 1040, over twenty-seven million dollars was

invested in commission houses and foreign trade, while only one and
7
one-half millions was Invested in industry.
Consequently the city
had tc inport large amounts of manufactured goods Just to supply the
home market.

[d., 18 August 1835, P»2.
fin l840, the bulk of tho capital was invested in nomrnl eelon houses
for foreign trade, $16,490,000, aad In retail stores, $11, 018, 225, a
total of $27,508,225. All of the Industry In Mew Orleans was capita
lised at only $1,513,800* United States Sixth Censes. 1840, quoted in
jBgt's Merchants' Masaaine and Commercial Review II CNovember. 1844),

This deficiency in industrial development was a problem to bs
rsekonsd with, but important also was the gradual loss to ths East,
of ths wsstsm market for importsd goods.

Handicapped by geographie

location as well as by poor cioimnmloatioaa up the river, lew Orleans*
wholesalers waged u losing battle to maintain their position as a
distribution center for the West.®

evidence was plentiful that towns

as far west as St. Louis as well as Mississippi river towns south of
ths Ohio were by-passing the Mew Orleans wholesalers to trade with the
eastern merchants.

For example, "...Enoch G. March had goods shipped

from the East, via Chicago, as early as 1831, at one-third less cost
than by way of Mew O r l e a n s , a harbinger of the later shift of St.
Louis from the New Orleans Market.
There was no doubt that ths condition of the export trade, the
wholesale market, and Industry each influenced ths development of
railroads in Louisiana before 1850.

If the glittering success of the

first had not obscured the importance of ths others, the merchants of
Mew Orleans might have seen more clearly that Inland markets, inland

®A comparison of ths foreign imports of New Orleans with those of
New York indicates the importance of this struggle. The value of im
ports into the two cities for three years, 1839 to 1841, were:
1839

1840

1841

Mew Orleans
$12,084*942
$10,873*190
$10,256,350
New York
99,882,438
80,440,750
75*713,426
||gt>s Merchants* Magaiine and C— ■rclal Review. VII, (September, 1842),
9 Barry A. Mitchell, "Mew Orleans as a Wholesale Center," Loulatf— g
Historical Quarterly. ZXVXI (October, 1944), 94b. The town of Matches
tried to promote steam packet service directly with Mew York, by*
passing Mew Orleans. Mew Orleans Bee. 22 November 1836, p. 2.
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railroads, and hone industries were all vital in tha struggle Tor
western trade.

Thay did not foraaaa in 1430, or in 1640, that tha

key to the West would ba tha railread.

By 1850, however, cold,

1— litalila aeonoaic facta had driven thia point hoaa, and soon iron
fingers frcn tha natmpolia of tha South began pointing to tha eaat,
to tha north, aad to tha waat.

But by thia tins railroad develop-

aant in Louiaiana was alruady fiftaan yaara behind tha Bast and tha
Waat.
These problems did not aarioualy trouble tha nan uho guided
Louisiana's aeonoaic destinies during the 1630's.

In addition to

tha export trada and agricultural developaeat, their attention was
turned to internal inprovaaants.

Since 1826, tha problens of

drainage, public health, public utilities, and improved transport
tatIon had occupied an increasingly important position in contem
porary thinking.*0
of progress.

Railroads wara only one aspect of this prograsi

Both public and private institutions ware created to

promote, finance aad construct the desired improvem ents. Tha state
concentrated on a program of public works aimed at the deepening of
natural waterways and the building of roads.

In 1633, * Board of

Public Works was created which expanded annually 620,OCX) on public

*°John C. Andreassoa, "Internal Improvements in Louisiana, 16241637," unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, Louisiana
State University, 1935, p* 146.
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works'^ aad n p t r r i M d the work of |ia|« of negro Iibortri o w M d
ig
by tho atat«.
At the m m t l w , private promoters of Internal
1mfsoTsmsnt i were encouraged fay monopolistic shtrUrs, mad by
f l M a t l a l old frob tho

Companies for tho construction of

eaaala, railroads, drainage projects, Motor works, stroot lighting,
sad even s hotol, wore chortorod

by

tho legislature.

Planning intoraol lmprovemants woo ono thing hot financing
thorn was another nottor.

Alsoat every econoadc instltation In

Louisiana during tho 1830*a waa soaking capital and loans.

Separa

tors, crop financiers, land speculators, and internal Improvement
companies vied with one another for tho seemingly scarce jupply of
capital.^

Tho problem of the scarcity of capital had to be solved,

and it waa obvious to the legislature, at least, that the solution
lay in the creation of more banks.

During the short period between

1831 and 1836, no ffawer than eleven banks were chartered in Mew
Orleans, with individual authorised capital ranging from a modest

^4iOuisiana,, Acts. 11 Legis., 1 Sess., 1833* P* 36.
l^In 1833, the purchase of 150 Megro laborers was authorised for
use in jniblio works projects. When these laborers were not employed
by the state, they were hired to internal improvement companies.
Louisiana, Acts. U Legis., 2 Sens., 1833* P- 106-107.
l^The Beard of Public Works was authorised to subscribe to tbs
capital stock of Improvement companies on bshalf of the State, pro
vided such subscription was authorised by the legislature, and pro
vided also, that
• .no part of the said fund shall be subscribed
towards ,the stock of any company, until an equal amount shall have
been first paid..
by the stockholders, ibid.. 11 Legis., 1 Sess.,
1833.. p. 39
l*&etween 1830 and 1837 the total railroad capitalisation alone
was $24*115*000. See Appendix A.
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$1,000,000 to a staggering $14*000,000.^

Tha lav Orlaana Baa, in

1835# objected vlgorously to the legislature's irresponsibility in
oraating aa many banka and intamal U p r o T a m t companies.

In

addition, it attaekad tha eloaa ralationahip between tha legislators
and tha inproreawnt eoapaoj pronotara.

"Scarcaly an object of tha

no at trifling natum waa undertaken by tha elianta, not tha oonatituanta of oar laglalatora, without baing aanctionad by banking
and lnaoranea privileges,” Tha Baa observed.

In tha racant aaaaion

of 1835, a "legislative panic" axiatad, and "..*so graat was tha
baatard ardor for intarnal inproraaaata, that warily tha laglalatora
might have baan tempted to eraata a bank to drain tha owaapa, or
cloaa tha bayoua in tha 3tata."

Tha laglalatora did "... actually

establish a bank to build an exchange..." for which tha terms wara
so ridiculous that even tha company rejected tha charter.

Mever-

theless, tha sensible advice of the Baa to tha legislature, that it
waa "...high tine to terminate these gambling speculations.want
unheeded.^

f

^Babin, "Economic Expansion of Maw Orlaana," 256-237* Mr* Babin
i his list of chartered baifcs.
£ Orleans gag, 25 July 1835, p. 2

Louisian* banks followed banking proesdnrss characteristic of
othsr banks in ths South during this period.

Capital was created

by using "the conciliation of tee transactions, of getting money
through 'Melting-down1 property (by issuing bonds on the basis
thereof), and of using this nonej for the purpose of banking..
Louisiana banks answered the ■least insatiable demand for aere
capital by issuing bonds based upon two types of securitiest
mortgaged land, slaves, and houses} and state-secured bonde.

leans

were frequently obtained froa European capitalists using these
nortgages and state bonds as security.^®

In their eagerness to

supply banking capital, the banks permitted their credit operations
to reach far beyond the bounds of their resources.

Iamediately

before the crash of 1837, the ratio between the leans and the specie
of the banks was over 19 to l.1^

If all of this specie was retained

Afrits Kcdlieh, The Molding of American Banking— Men and Ideas.
Vol. U , Pt. 1, 1781-1850,
^ n 1835, the Citisane’ Bank of Hew Orleans negotiated a loan from
Hope and Company of Holland for three million dollars, guarantied by
the state. Hew Orleans B y . 16 Hevemher 1835. The Union Bank owed
over 8450,000 to Baring or London, and over $16,000 to Andre and Cottier
of Paris. Ibid.. 4 Moveutoer 1835.
x*In 1830, ths rat|e was 6 to 1. The relationship between loans
and specie in 1830 compared with 1837 waet
Loans
Specie
January, 1830
January, 1837

$6,796,351
59,108,741

$1,492,674
3,108,416

Babin, "Economic Expansion of Hew Orleans," 262. The banking capital
of Louisiana probably was greater than that of New Tork, or of Mass
achusetts. Jamss E. Winston, "Kotos on the Economic Histoiy of Mew
Orleans, 1802-1836," Mississippi Valley q W T f t e f l 8SELS& * * 11
(Septenher, 1924)> 217-218.
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in the vaults of the banks as reserves, Louisiana's banks would bavs
maintained, in 1837, only 3 par ssnt reserve requirements.
As intsraal improvement companies seeking capital and loans, tbs
railroads bad eloss seononie tiss witb tbs banks.

Consequently, mush

Inflated banking capital was used in tbs building of tbs early rail
roads in Louisiana.

The Mew Orleans Canal and Banking Company, itself

engaged in internal improvements, bold shares of stock in an insurance
company, a navigation company, and the Mew Orleans and Carrollton
Railroad Company.

20

Tn its seal for internal improvements, the legis

lature occasionally forced banks to aid improvement companies.

Under

such coercion, the Gas Light and Banking Company agreed to loan $150,000
to the Red River Railroad Company for the construction of its railroad
between Alexandria and Cheneyville.^

This same banking company was

also placed under pressure to aid the Clinton and Port Hudson Rail
road Company, and it agreed to purchase $250,000 in railroad bonds
snd to loan $100,000 for the construction of the railroad.

The legis

lature rewarded the banking company by releasing it from its charter
obligation of establishing a branch bank in Port Hudson.

22

As if banking privileges aad practices were net diffused enough
already, more inflationary pressure was applied by permitting banks to

^This banking company owed $58,131*12 to the London firm of Mllsoa
and Company. Mgw Orleans Bee. 4 November 1835, p. 2.
21Louisiana, Acts. 12 Leals.. 1 Sess., 1835, p. 193* The railroad
company was forbladen to declare any dividends until the principal aad
interest on this loan had been paid. Ibid., 194* The Qas Light and
Bedrff Company was also forced to purchase 500 shares of ths stock of
ths Baratarla aad Lafourche Canal Company. Babin, "Beoaemie Kxpaaslon
of Mew Orleans," 25$*
"Louisiana, Acts. 12 Legis., 2 Sess., 1836, p.3.

pursue end* other than banking, or to pat it differently, by permittiqg
improvement w j o n l w to txtrciM banking privileges.

Canal eoaqmnieo,

goo lighting eooptti«i| railroad comparri os, and a company for tho
oroetion of a hotel, worn aathorlsod to eondaot hanking operations.
Tho Louisiana logialatnro grantod banking privileges to throo rail*
road companies.

Tho Mow Orlaana and Carrollton Railroad Company,

which oporatod eleven oilaa of railroad batvoan Mow Orloono and
Carrollton, received in 1035 "•••oil righto and privileges usually
oxoreiood by a bonk..." to facilitate on extension of tho railroad
northward to Bayou Sora.2^
inerooood ten-fold.2^

Tho eonpany1a original capitalination woo

Tho Atcbafalaya Railroad and Banking Company,

chartarod in 1035 with $2,000,000 capital to build a railroad botwoon
tho Miooiooippi River and Opelousas, woo grantod banking privileges
at tho tino of lto incorporation.25

Tho Pontehartrain Railroad

Company, chartered in 1030, received banking privilogoo six yooro
later to facilitate the oonetruetion of a branch line to Lake Bergne,
to complete its harbor at Lake Pontehartrain, and to lay a aoeond track
next to its completed route between Lake Pontehartrain and Row Orleans.
The attempt to grant banking privileges to the Rad River Railroad
Company waa unsuccessful because the requisite number of subscribers

2% b i d .. 12 Legis., 1 Sess., 1035, p*p. 82-86. Accompanying tho
privilege was ths obligation to open offices of "discount and deposit,"
lc. banks, in the towns of Lafayette, Bayou Sara, Providence, Idropolia
and Baton Rouge*
*$The railroad company hod beam capitalised at $300,000. The now
railroad and banking company was authorised a $3,000,000 capitalisation.
25Lowisiaaa, Acts* 12 Legis., 1 Boss., 1035, P* 51* A curious amend
ment to this act later separated the usnsgsnsnt cf the bank from the
management of the rollread. Of ths slatcan elected directors, nine had
charge of the bank and seven were to mans go the run read. Ibid., 12
Legis*, 2 Sees*, 103$, pp* 12*13*
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TIm attempt to speed railroad construction by granting banking
privileges waa a complete failure.

Tho Pontehartrain Railroad Com

pany did net even got it* hanking operation# under nay before the
ereeh of li37 brought an end to all apeealatiTe operation#.

The

Atohafalaya and tho Carrollton Railroad aad Banking Conpaaiea did
not progress far beyond their banking operations, for neither company
van able to carry out its Intended internal improvement before the
crash.

The economic contribution of these banks mas dubious, if not

detrimental, to the economy, for they created banking capital, invested
heavily in real estate, and loaned money at a tine when speculation
was already running wild.2®

Both banks survived the panic of 1437

and continued their precarious existences until the 1640's when they

27llew Orleans Bee. 12 June 1635. p . 2.
2 « K T ? o I r a s r statistics on the activities of the Carrollton
Railroad and Banking Company, and the Atohafalaya Railroad and Bank
ing Company banks illustrate their speculative natures
Capital
nominal Paid Up

Real Betate
A Investments

Carrollton 3,000,000 1,949,350
Atohafalaya 2,000,000
786,990

993,361
417,107

Mew Orleans Bee. 5 February 1641, p. 2.

Uisoeunts
A Loans

Specie
in Vaults

1,773,004
985,092

57,937
81,513
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were liquidated.2^

Qn« other railroad company, tho West Feliciana,

which operated In Louisiana and Mississippi, waa author!mod by its
NlaaiMippL ehartor to oig«|o la banking oporationa in lHaaiaaippi
for that soetion of ita lino.^°

Tho railroad bank, loeatod at

WoodTillo, Mississippi, dofrayod eoata of oonatruotion with elreulating notoo, or ae-ealled Waat Feliciana Railroad money.

Aftor 1837

thoao notoa, greatly doprooiatod in value, woro being diaooantod
fron 30 to $0 par cental

Liko othor railroad banka, tho West

Feliciana failod to oontribute to tho program of intoraal improvements.
Conatrnation of tho railroad proeoodod at a anail'a paee, and pooplo
along tho projected routo bittorly chargod that tho bank had become
an instrument for tho onrichoont of tho stockholders rathor than for
tho construction of tho railroad.

32

Louiaiana'a Internal inprovoment program aought to achioro
laudable ends, but too anoh waa attsoptod. Soon had plana boon aore

2*The Atohafalaya Railroad and Banking Company bank waa liquidatod
in 1847. Louisiana, House Journal. 3oaaion of 1848. Tho Mow Orlaana
and Carrollton Railroaoi and banking Company atookholdora voted to end
tho oporationa of tho bank in 1849* Mow Orleans and Carrollton Stock
holders Mooting, Mow Orloans, 31 March 1849*
30rypowritton MSS, History of the Mast Folieiana Railroad, by C. R*
Calvert, 16-17, MeOohoo (j. Burrosa) Papers, Department of Archives,
Louisiana State University, hereinafter eited, Calrert typswritton MSS.
3iTestlmouy, 1 m m McCord aad Company vorsas West Folieiana Rail
road Company, Cano 1978, Dutlor (Thomas and Family) Papers, 1845-69,
Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, hereinafter eited.
Testimony, MeCerd Case.
*2"¥eet Folieiana A Century Old,"
Central Masaalno. H I
(March, 1931), 4.
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car*folly formulated, the economic conditions of the 1830'• Might
•till bar* seriously hampered its success.

Unsound stats banking

practices, speculation In land, orer-extended credit, and reckless
prsection of Internal improvements, all pushed the splruling cycle
higher and higher.

The outlays of mammy by internal improvement

coapaaies stluulated the economy at a time when retrenchment should
bare prevailed.

Capital, labor, and natural resources were strained

to nest the demands of the numerous projects of public Inprormssnt,
and the competition for stock subscribers, loans, laborers, and
materials usually resulted in shortages of all of these.
of these shortages were abundant.

Examples

Only twe Its of the twenty-one

railroad companies chartered between 1830 and 1837 were financially
strong enough to begin construction operations.

Long term credit

could usually be obtained only through lnterrention by the state.
Wills skilled workmen had to be imported from the Berth,33 eren the
local labor supply appeared always to be inadequate.34
shortages of lumber,

frequently,

that time almost an ubiquitous material, were

complained of by company officials and contractors .35

The panic of

1837 ended the speculation madness, but it was also the coup d* sraoe
for serious railroad derelopmemt in Louisiana until 1850.

33T**tiaony, McCord Case.
34)few Orleans and Bashrllle Railroad Company, First
Report.
1834. 11. United States, Executive Documents, 48, 24 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Bo. 11, 8.
35pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 89. Testimony,
McCord Case.
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Chapter II
FLANNINQ AND BUILIHJK} TBS RAIUOADS
During the flret three jeers of the 1030's, nest of the enthusiasm
for railroads ease free a wall group of New Orleans businessmen, and
an even saaller body of plantation owners In one of the Florida
parishes.

Out of the efforts of these two groups, Louisiana's first

two railroad companies were organised, one in 1830, the other in 1031.
As ths business cycle gyrated upward, and as the program for internal
improvements changed into a promoters' debauch, the planning and
chartering of railroads was also caught up in the tidal wave.

While

in 1033* only four railroad companies were chartered by the legisla
ture, in the sessions of 1835, 1836* and 1037* sixteen companies
received legislative approval.^

If all of the projected railroads had

been completed* rural Louisiana would have had a curious system of
railroads cutting from cne parish to another* from one navigable

^The chartering of railroado by years, 1830 to 1840* wast
Tear

Number

Tear

Number

1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035

1
1
0
4
0
5

1036

5

1037
1030
1839

6

Louisiana* Acts. 1030 to 1040.

1040

0
0
1
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waterway to the other, and from inland toon to river port.

Although

thoaa projects probably represented the honest desires of leeal Isadora
to inprore transportation and break down the barriers of distance and
isolation, msaally they were nnrealistia.

The majority newer pro

gressed beyond the plans of their charter blueprints.
Vast of the Mississippi Hirer, easy railroads were planned.

The

aost ambitious project would hare connected Louisiana's three great
rlrers by rail.

The Lake Providence and Red Hirer Railroad Company,

chartered in 1936, hoped to build from the port of Lake Providence
in northeast Louisiana, to the Red Hirer at Natchitoches.^

The

Natchitoches and Sabine Railroad Company was created in the following
year to carry this project on to the Sabine Hirer.^

If completed, a

continuous railroad line would have linked the Mississippi, the Red,
and the Sabine Rivers.

Farther to the south, plans ware being made

for another Mississippi to Red River railroad, from Tidalla to
Alexandria.

In addition to linking the waterways by rail, this rail

road's promoters also desired to provide the inland town of Harrison
burg with railroad cossnmications to the rivers.

Thus it was that

the Vidalia, Harrisonburg, and Alexandria Railroad Company, according
to the provisions of its charter, planned a slg-sag railroad between
the rivers, first to the northwest, then to the
modate Harrisonburg.^

southwest, to accom

Bren if the panic of 1937 had not intervened,

the chances of success for these railroads were highly dubious.

*Ibld., 12 Legls., 2 Sess., 1936, p. 106.
flbii., 13 Legls., 1 3ess., 1937* p. 126.

The
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■oit o d n o u portent woo the look of population la tke aroaa through
which the railroad* would pass.

Louisiana oust of the Mississippi

River was in uanjr plaoos still tho frontier, and so sparse was the
population that soon tho parish spates was net pot completely organised. 5
Another organisation, tho Atchafalay* Railroad and Banking Company,
planned a railroad across the loss sparsely settled parishes of St.
Landry and Point Coupee, connecting the town of Opelousas with the

^The population of the area through which railroads were planned
i
Lake Providence and Bed Biver Bailroad
Parish
1830
1840
Carroll
♦Richland
Caldwell
Ouachita
♦Winn

4,237
--

--

5,140
--

4,620
--

2,017

Natchitoches and Sabine Bailroad
Parish
1830
Natchitoches
♦Sabine

7,903
--

1840
14,350
--

Vldalia, Harrisonburg and Alexandria Bailroad
Parish
1830
1840
Concordia
4,662
9,414
Catahoula
2,581
4,953
Rapides
7,575
14,132
United States Fifth Census. 1830. United States Sixth Census. 1840.
♦These parishes, part ef the present day parish system, were net organ
ised in 1840. Their inclusion, however, emphasises the frontier nature
of the area and aid in plotting the proposed route of the railroad.

It
Mississippi River tertM frsm Port Hudson**

Although tbs routs uns

surveyed sad application asds to Congress for « groat of load, little
eonstruetion was accomplished.?

Other roilroods were planned in

Plaquemines Perish end in Iberville Parish, hut the oompaidss ehortered
to build these roilroods apparently accomplished nothing**
Only one railroad was constructed in Louisiana west of the
Mississippi River* and this for only part of the original route
authorised*

The Red liver Railroad Ccapaay was chartered in 1335

to build in Rapides Parish* beginning at Alexandria southward via
Cheneyville* to Bayou Huffpewer.?

Although the population of the

parish alnost doubled between 1330 and 1340, this railroad led a
noet precarious existence.^

The hardships of the Red River Railroad*

in spite of its location in Louisiana's noet populous western parish,
served to illustrate the futility of the other railroads projected
west of the Mississippi River.

^Louisiana* Acts, 12 Legls., 1 Sees.* 1335* p. 39.
of Point Coupee and St. Landry parishes wast
1330
1340
Point Coupee 3*942
7*393
St. Landry
12,536
10*706

The population

United States Fifth Census. 1330. United States Sixth Census* 1340.
'United States Executive Docunents. Mo. 253* 24 Cong.* 1 Sees.,
Tel. FI, 1336.
*The Plaquemines Railroad Company was chartered to run on several
plantations in that parish to facilitate tho carrying of plantation
products. Louisiana* Acts. 12 Legis., 1 Sess., 1335, p. 213. The
Iberville Railroad Company would have connected the town of Plaquenino
with Bayun Plaquaadne, Ibid., 12 Legis., 2 Sees., 1636* pp. 137-133.
9lbid.. 12 Legis.* 1 Sees.* 1335* p. 137.
^I hs population of Rapides parish in 1330 was 7*575) in 1340*
14*132. United States Filth
^°*
Ulkited States Sixth
Census. 1340
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b i t of tho Mississippi River, a&nj railroads were also planned,
la tho rural areas, railroad promotion was oontorod la tho Florida
pari ohos.

Seven looal rallroodo woro ehartorod to serve tho pariohoo

of St. Taamaay, Washington, St. Helena, Livingston, Bast Baton lmi|of
Xaot PeUelaaa, and West Folieiaaa.
constructed, however.
plonnod.

Only two of thooo rallroodo woro

Ia St. T oio ny Parish, two rallroodo woro

Tho Kadisenville aad Covington Railroad Company woo ehartorod

to oonaoet Covington with Lake Pontehartrain, passing through tho
towno of Modloocrrlllo and Jefferson.^*

Northward from Covington,

another railroad, tho Louisiana and Mississippi, would hare reached
tho Pearl River at tho northeast corner of Washington parish.12

Ia

Livingston Parish, tho Livingston Railroad Company was authorised to
build a feeder lino fron tho interior to tho Aalto River,^ while
tho Springfield and Liberty Railroad Company, authorised to build
between Springfield and Liberty, Mississippi, would bavo served the

^Louisiana, Acts. 13 Legls., 1 Sees., 1337, p. 27.
^Ibld., 122-123. The population of St. Tammany and Washington
parlshss were*
Parish
1330
1340

St. Tsmaaay
Washington

2,364
2,286

7,243
2,649

Fifth Census. 1330. Sixth Census. 1340.
^Louisiana, Acts. 12 Lexis.. 2 Sees., 1336, pp. 35-36.
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Louisiana parish** of Livingston and St.

Helena.H

Th* meager resource*

of th*s* two parish** did not Justify th* creation of asy local railrood system.

15

Non* of th*s* railroads progressed beyond th* planning

stag*.
In th* P*li«iaaa parishes bordering th* Mississippi River, three
railroads were planned.

Two of th*s* were completed. Th* Hast

P*lieiana Railroad Company, chart*r*d in 1831, constructed after
much delay, a railroad fron Bayou Sara, on th* Mississippi, inland
to Hbodville, Mississippi.^

Two years later, th* Clinton and Port

Hudson Railroad Company was chartered to build a railroad across
Kast Feliciana Pariah, fron Port Hud*on on th* river, to Clinton.^
In 1837, this sane company projected a branch railroad eastward fro* ,
Clinton to the Tangipahoa River, where a Junction was planned with
the New Orleans and Nashville Railroad, then in the process of
construction.^

Th* failure of the Nashville Railroad, however,

brought an end to the Clinton and Port Hudson branch.

Another rail

road company was authorised to build between Baton Rouge and Clinton,

^ Ibid.. 76-77
l*Thepopulation of Livingston and St. Helena parishes was:
Parish

1830

1840

Livingston
St. Helena

—
A,038

2,315
3,525

United States Fifth Census. 1830. United 3ix££ Census. 1840. The New
Orleans and Nashville Railroad, if completed, would have run eastward
along the Tangipahoa River, almost parallel to the proposed Springfield
and Liberty railroad.
1^Louisiana, Acts, 10 Legis., 1 Sess., 1831, P* 124*
17I b U .. 11 Legis., 1 See*,, 1833, p. 15
1JfbU., 13 Lsgis., 1 Sess., 1837, p. 9
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the Feliciana parishes, In the 1830'% probably offered tho noot
favorable place for tho building of rural, short 11ns railroads.
These parlshos bordorod tho Mississippi Kiror, Louisiana's main
avenue of eoMoree.

Thoir soil was fortH o, sad tholr populations

woro relatively largo in comparison with othor rural parishes.^
Mlth tho oxooption of tho Rod River Railroad, tho Vost Folieiana
Railroad and tho Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad woro tho only rural,
short lins railroads coupletod in tho stato.

In addition to tho

advantage of being looatod in relatively populous parishos, thoso
railroads had othor common oharactsristies.

Both functlonod as

fooder railroads to tho Mississippi Riror.

Thoy woro planned and

ehartorod prior to 1635.

By that year, most of tho projects for

internal improvements had completely lost toueh with reality.

Both

coapauies s o s m M w managed to weather tho finanoial storms of 1837,
and complete the construction of thoir railroads during tho depression
years that followed.

In a way, thoso railroads woro synbols of tho

^ b i d .. 12 Logic.,
Baton Rouge and Clinton
Kast Baton Rougo Parish
of the Clinton and Port
Baton Rouse
17
^depopulation of

2 Boss., 1836, p. 123. This organisation, tho
Railroad Company, was promoted by citisens of
after unsuccessful attempts to divert tho routs
Hudson railroad from Port Hudson, to Baton Rouge.
January 1835, p. 2j 14 February 1835, p. 2.
tho Folieiana parishos was:

Bast Feliciana
West Folieiana
United States Fifth Census. 1830.

1830

1840

8,247
8,829

11,893
11,910

United States Sixth Census. 1840
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rural transportation naada of Louisiana, and perhaps, also, of the
whole South.

As rural railroads, both wars experiments on trial.

Tha

main issue of this trial was tho eeenowie feasibility of the completely
rural railroad, isolated from population eenters and dependant solely
upon an agricultural economy.

In the 1830's, this question was still

to be answered.
If Louisiana's rural railroads were dependant upon tho system of
waterways, so were nest of tha railroads projected around Hew Orleans.
The promoters and builders of New Orleans' first railroad, the Pontchartrsin, hoped to provide better ca-unl cations between the Mississippi
River and Lake Pontchartrain.

They also planned to tap the lake trade,

as well as the eoastal trade as far east as Florida.

The Pontchartrain

Railroad Company, chartered in 1830, completed its four and one-half
■lies of track by 1831, and then pushed forward the construction of pozt
facilities on the lake.21

iu capturing the eastward coastal trade,

the Pontchartrain railroad provided New Orleans with a second port.

The

value of this port to the vessels snail enough to sail on Lake Pontchar
train was important, because the voyage into the Oulf and up the
Mississippi River to New Orleans was not only tine consuming, but also
dangerous.
The construction of the Pontchartrain railroad was not the only
attempt to improve New Orleans' port facilities by using railroads.
Later, in 1835, the Pontchartrain railroad directors planned a branch
railroad eastward "...to some suitable points or places on Lake Borgne,

21Lowisiana> Acts. 9 Legis., 1 Sess., 1830, p. 2

23
th* Rigol«ts, Ch*f Kenteur or Bayou Bi*nv*nu...* and secured a ehartor
from th* legislature for thi* purpose.

22

Apparently th* promoters

anticipated capturing th* trad* of larg*r coastal
sailing on shallow Lako Pontchartrain.

t o o **!*

lnoapabl* of

Another group of railroad

enthusiasts begot' to shorten th* T*jag* b*two*n Mow Orleans and th* soa
by building a railroad between th* city and th* English tura.^

In* St.

Bernard Parish, a railroad was planned to Bayou T*rr* aux Booufs.
Although n*n* of those railroads was ever constructed, th* idea of
giving Now Orleans a better port p«rsist*d.

In 1B37 • group of pro

moters put forth th* nost anbitlous plan of all, an actual seaport for
New Orleans on the Qulf of Mexico.

Their organisation, chartered as

the Mexican Gulf Bailroad Company, chose the deep water off Cat Island
as the most desirable place for this port, and began laying track
eastward fron New Orleans.^

Like so nany other railroads chartered

during the boon period of the 1630's, this company becaa* a casualty
of the panic and depression.

Leas than twenty ailes of railroad were

completed.
Ac the population of New Orleans spilled over into th* suburbs, and
as the lake trad* declined in importance, the Pontchartrain railroad
eventually served as part of the city's street railway system.

^ Ibld.. 12 Legls., 1 Sess., 1635, p. 20b.
33j*w Orleans Bee. 12 April 1637, p. 2.
24 ? H e was th* St. Bernard Railroad Company.
Legis*, 2 Sess., 1633, p. 133.
^Ibid.. 13 Legis., 1 Sess., 1637, p. 54.

Louisiana, Acts. 11
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Sine* its terminus wee en th* lake, th* railroad provided Mew Orl*ane
r**id*nts *aaj aeo**s to r*er*ation facilities that war* aneh d*sir*d
in that often diseas*-atriek*n city.

Similar services war* ale*

provided by th* Maw Orleans and Carrollton railroad.

Thia organisation,

ohart*r*d in 1833 to eonatract an *l*r*n nil* railroad between Maw
Orleana and th* developing suburb town of Carrollton, beeaam th* city'a
firat atr**t railway.

At th* Carrollton terninua the directora

built a hotel and other recreation facilities, attraetiona which
greatly augmented th* railroad*a

receipta fron paaaengertraffic.

The unwlae and ill-fated expanaion of th*

company prior to

27

the panic

further weakened the financial alnewa of a a t i U unprevea economic
inatitution.

The proposed branch northward to Bayou Sara never

materialised, and the existence of the New Orleana and Carrollton
Bailroad Bank waa of short duration.

28

In 1840 the legislature

chartered a railroad company to build from Carrollton through Jefferson
parish to Lake Pontchartrain.2^

The Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain

Railway Company built their railroad, constructed wharves on th* lake,
and competed with th* Pontchartrain railroad company for the lake
trade.

The former was eventually taken over by the New Orleans and

Carrollton Railroad Company and incorporated into its growing street

26Ibid.. 11 Legls., 1 Seas., 1833, PP 9-10.
3?Mq w Orleans Bee. 8 October
1835, p. 2.
"'Supra. I 6-7
^^Louisiana, Acta. 14 Legis., 2 Seas., 1640, p. 83.

25

railway system. 30
Haw Orleans' railroad system aa daaeribod thus far answered only
local needs.

It provided inter-waterway communications, it facilitated

th# develops*nt and aottlemant of tho suburbs, and in a minor way, it
inprorod Now Or loans' port facilities.

But such a system did not

solve tho larger problem of New Orleans' econoede relations with the
interior.

Undoubtedly much of the business community felt satisfied

with the transportation nature had provided, and remained content
to leave their economic fortunes to drift with the great river.

Nevsr-

theless, soma of their more observing members were aware of the possi
bilities of the railroad for the long haul.

They looked on with

alarm as eastern seaboard cities planned and built railroads westward
to channel off the goods that nature herself, so it seemed, had destined
to be New Orleans' own.

It was this apprehension that led a group of

New Orleans' promoters to press for a railroad to Nashville.

The New

Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company, chartered in 1635, would have
been the costliest, but also the most valuable, of all the projected
railroads. ^

Twenty miles of track had been laid when the panic of

1837 blighted the further growth of the company.

The Nashville rail

road was one of the many casualties of the depression, and its demise
would prove to be a major tragedy for New Orleans.

C. Son!at, "The Faubourgs Forming the Upper Section of the City
of New Orleans," Louisian* Historical ^ * * 7 * * 7 (January, 1937), 210.
The Bath Railroad Company was authorised in 1037 to construct a railroad
to Lake Pontchartrain and built a hotel and bath houses. Louisiana, Acts.
13 Legis., 2 Sess., 1337-36* pp. 99-100
’^Louisiana, Acts. 12 Legls., 1 Sess., 1635, p.7-
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Tha railroad promoters received many privileges fro* monopolistic
ohartara enacted by the legislature.

la Louisiana, aa in mast atataa

daring thia period, tka araation of aorporationa raatad exclusively
upoa tka wisdom and diaeratiaa ef tka legislature.

Thia legislative

praragatira aantinaad in Lonialana until 1445* wham a new constitution
proYldad for ganaral inoorporation laws.

32

Sinca tha lagialatnra

grantad ohartara in answer to patitiana received froa various promoters,
it was almost inevitable that tha railroads baeaais involved in tha
higgling and bargaining of tha lagislativa halls, and in tha partisan
ship and factionalian of contemporary Louisiana polities.

Tha legis

lature, lacking experience or precedent, usually accepted railroad
chartera of other states as aodala.

Tha promoters of tha Pontchar

train railroad, for example, asked for charter privileges similar
to those granted by tha state of Maryland to tha Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad.

The Pontchartrain railroad charter, in turn, became a

modal for later railroad charters in Louisiana.

Tha Alexandria and

Cheneyville railroad charter gave tha company tha same righta, privi33
leges, and powers as those enjoyed by the Pontchartrain railroad. ^
Although the various railroad charters differed in detail, certain
general provisions were included in all of them.
of the company was specified.

The capital!eation

If the original capitallsatien should

prove to be insufficient, the Board of Directors was usually given
power to increase the capitalisation up to a maximum amount, sometimes

^Benjamin V. Dart, editor, Constitutions of the State of Louisiana
and Selected Federal Laws. 5IB.
jJlsulaiana. Icis7 11 Legls., 1 Seas., 1033, p. 45*
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double the original capitalisation.

Tha diraotora of tha Clinton

and Port Hodaon Railroad Ceaqpany, oapitalisad originally at $100,000,
donblad ita capitalisation, while othor railroada were permitted
'XL

anbatantial ineraaaaa in thair eapital structures.

So inaeenrata

was tha aatinating of eosta of construction, that oast eonpanies had
to ineraaaa tha original aapitalisation bafora tha railroad waa
completed.

35

Tha ohartara also gars tha railroads many exclusive

privileges and powers.

Ona privilege of utmost lnportaaca waa a long*

tarn nonopoly over tha route described in tha charter.

This nonopoly

usually extended for periods of twenty to fifty years, although ona
conpaay racaired such a nonopoly for seventy-fire years.

If tha rail*

road was not constructed by * specified tine, tha charter becane null
and void unleas tha legislature extended tha tine.

Tha Maw Orleans

and Carrollton railroad charter, granted for fifty years, provided
that construction of the road nust begin within one year, and tha
road conpleted within three years after enactnent of the charter.

3b

Tax exenptions were widely used to encourage railroad construction,
and eagerly sought by railroad promoters.

Moat railrojufc enjoyed tax

exemptions on either their property, or their capital atock, although
some railroads wara exempted from both.

The property of tha Maw Orleana

and Nashville railroad waa free from taxation for twenty years and its
eapital stock waa exempt forever.

3V >id., 15.
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35s*a Appendix A.
^"Louisiana, Acta* 11 Legis., 1 Sess., 1833, p. 12.
37ibld.. 12; ULagia., 1 Sees., 1835, p. 17.
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Another inpertant powtr •njojad by th* railroad* waa eminent
domain.

Thia right waa exercised through tha regular courta.

Although

aaourlng a right of way offarad faw aarlaaa problems ta nest railroads,
■sms trouble aeaaaionally develeped in rural araaa if a plantation
ownar opposed tha railroad.

In tha aaaa of tha West Falielana rail

road, it waa rial nail that tha difficulty in aaourlng a right of way
fron rarloua plantation ownara delayad construction of the road aa
nuoh aa thru* yea rs. ^

After tha route had been aalaetad and tha right

of way agreed upon, danagaa were ascertained by a method that waa a
variation of tha Anglo-Norman sworn inquest.

Usually nine to twelve,

but occasionally more, freeholdera appointed by a lecal judge, examined
tha right of way and decided th* danagaa by a three-fourths vote.
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In a faw cases, damages were determined by commissioners, usually three,
who were appointed by the governor for this purpose.

Th* railroads

were not always prone to use the power of eminent domain.

Th* directors

of the Pontchartrain railroad, rather than prejudice the company by
unpopular litigation to secure its right of way, purchased a whole
plantation at a price much above its normal value.^

The width of the

rights of way were specified in the charters, usually eighty to one
hundred feet.

3®Csivert Typewritten MSS, 16.
39Louislana, Acts. 9 Legis., 2 Sess., 1830, p. 6
^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 60-63.
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A few of tho charters gave privileges that overlapped into other
types of transportation only indirectly related to the business of
building and operating railreeds.

The Louisiana and Mississippi

lailreed Com pany, in addition to oonstrusting its own line, received
permission to deepen the "Bogus Fala" /Talsyj/ and the "Tehefoncta"

£Chefonete/ Riven between the town of Covington and Lake Pontchartrain.
Mlth this accomplished, the company anticipated operating steamboats
and bargee fron Covington te the port of the Pontchartrain railroad
across the lake, but the plan never materialised.^
companies were permitted to construot toll roads.

Other railroad

The Pontchartrain

Railroad Company, by charter authorisation, possessed the privilege
of building a shell road parallel to its tracks, and exacting tolls
for its use from single horsemen and carriages.

The Rapides and the

Atchafalaya railroads possessed similar privileges.^2

There was no

evidence that any of these railroads built the toll roads that were
authorised.
Liberal as the legislature was in granting nonopoly charter
privileges to the railroads, it attempted half-heartedly to bridle
the corporate monsters it created by imposing rates upon a few of
the railroad companies.

The legislature enacted railroad rates into

six charters in an effort to control those monopolistic institutions
endowed with so many privileges and powers.

The charters of the Pont

chartrain, the Mew Orleans and Carrollton, the St. Bernard, the

^Louisiana, Acts. 13 Legis., 1 Sess., 1837, p. 126.
w Xbid., 9 Legis., 2 Ssss., 1830, 10; 11 Legls., 1 Sees., 1833, p* 67.
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Alexandria and Cheneyville, tha fcapldes, aad tha Iberville railroads,
provided far aixiwu ratas.

Tha freight rataa anaatad for tha Pont-

ehartraln railroad imposed a charge of fifty cents par ton far tha
dlatanoa between Maw Orlaaas aad Laka Pontchartrain, aithar way.
Cartain enumerated commodities anah aa bricks, lumber, flra weed,
shells, and samd, raealrad a lower rata of thirty canta par ton*
Tha legislature had, in affact, eraatad two groups of eoaaoditioa
aad plaaad than on two different larala of eoaaodity rataa.

Ona group

conaiatad of balky, laaa valuable goada, apon which lowor rataa woro
preaeribed in order to Maintain volume movement.

The othor group

conaiatad of laaa bulky, bat no re eootly gooda which, becamea of thoir
ralae, probably would more ragardlaaa of higher rataa.

Tha legislature

arbitrarily applied tha Pontchartrain railroad freight rataa to the
eleven and ona-half nila Maw Orleana and Carrollton railroad, in epite
of tiie fact that thia line waa seven nllea longer than the Pentehartrain railroad.
Thera waa no Indication of tha yardatiek, if any, that tha legis
lature used in setting up tha rates for Mew Orleana1 first two rail
roads.

Since the rataa wara enacted before tha railroads wore con

structed, there was obviously no consideration of tha problem of fixed
and variable coats in railroad pricing.

If there was any precedent

for these rates, it probably waa found in tha only other modes of
transportation that existed, water and wagon.

Both tho Mew Orleans

and Carrollton, and tha Pontchartrain railroada woro faced with water
competition for tha entire lengths of their lines.

Tha Mew Orleans

aad Carrollton railroad ran parallel to the Mississippi liver, whiles

the Pontchartrain railroad competed with a canal connecting Mow
Orloaaa with Lako Pontchartrain to/ way of St. John1a Ba/ou.

Tha

legislature alao onaotad rataa for tho Alexandria and Chene/vllle
railroad.

Thoro waa no water tranaportatiaa Mip«tii| with thia

railroad.

Tho oal/ paaaiblo precedent for tho railroad rataa In

thia area waa tho coat of wagon tranaportatlon fron tho interior to
tho Rod River.

Coopotition from wagona night hare kept tho rail

road 1• freight ratoa at a lower level.

Whether the legialatere

need precedenta for railroad freight rate*, or whether the/ logic*
lated freight ratea to/ whin, the result* of their efforta ware
erode, eluna/, inadequate, rigid and unworkable.
Tho legialature alao prescribed passenger ratea for nan/
railroads.

The difference between the passenger ratea applied to

New Orleana' two local railroads left the inplication that conpe
tition fron water carriers existed.

The Pontchartrain railroad,

only four and one-half miles long, charged thirt/-eeven and onehalf cents par person either way over the line.

Water carrier coar*

petition for passengers night have existed on the eanal and Ba/ou
St. John, but this water route waa alow, and not likely to offer
serious passenger competition for the railroad.

The New Orleans and

Carrollton railroad, eleven aad one-half mllea long, charged only
twenty-five cents one wa/, a lower passenger rate than the shorter
Pontchartrain railroad charged.

The proximity of the Mississippi

River to the New Orleana and Carrollton railroad night have accounted
for tho lewur passenger rates of this railroad.
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Attesqpts m r i made to control railroad Monopoly in othor mays
than legislating ratoa.

For tho railroads on which charter rates

woro not imposed, tho legislators applied what appeared to ho a aero
workable expedient.

They limited railroad profits to the amount

that would provide a maximum stockholders *s dividend of 15 per sent.
The eharter of the Vow Orleans aad Nashville Railroad stated that
"...the rates shall be so fixed, as not to allow annual dividends
upon the net profits of more than an average of 15 per cent per annum
upon the amount paid in..." by the stockholders.

The Atchafalaya

railroad eharter limited rates so that the net profits would net
exceed 15 per cent of the amount expended on construction of the
road.^

Fifteen per cent as a fair return to stockholders, or on

the eost of construction, undoubtedly reflected the prevailing comcept of tho relationship between the investment, aad the risk involved.
This arbitrary method of determining fair return was almost meaning
less considering the numerous ways in corporation financing practices
of circumventing the law.
Tho granting of monopoly privileges to the railroads must have
influenced many potential Investors to risk their capital in rail
road stock.

The private stockholder occupied a position of groat

Importance in flnanei^ early Louisiana railroads, and it was his
approval, or disapproval, registered through the purchase of railroad
stock, that often determined the success or failure of proposed railroad
projects.

The first step in raising capital for a railroad was selling

4>3Ihid.. 12 Legis., 1 ?ess., 1*35, pp. 17, 45.
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•took to private citisens.

Kesidozrts alone tho propoood rout# of

tho railroad received first ohaneo at tho stock*

Tho railroad charton,

in ordor to insaro as wide a distrlhation of stock as possible, speci
fied tho subscription commissioners, named towns whore subscription
offices snot bo opened, and H a d ted the number of shares each indivi
dual could purchase In ease of oversubscription.

To prevent control

of the company passing into the bands of large stockholders, most
charters provided for a maximum number of votes for each stockholder
regardless of the number of shares held.

Subscribing to railroad

stock was an easy matter because it could be bought on the install
ment plan.

Subscribers made a down payment of five to ten dollars

per one-hundred dollar share.

The Mexican Gulf railroad stock, which

could be purchased for only two dollars per share as a down payment,
was an exception.^*

Although company directors possessed much dis

cretion in deciding the sise and the frequency of remaining payments,
charter provisions usually made it illegal J.o demand the whole amount
at one time.

The New Orleans and Nashville rwiroad charter provided

that "...not more than one-third of the subr-^ Iptlon...shall be
demanded in any one year from the commencement of the work. ”^5

Usually

thirty days' notice was given by the directors before collecting the
installment.

**Ibld.. 13 Legis., 1 Sess., 1637, p. 54.
^^fbid., 12 Legis., 1 Sees., 1635, p. 9. The directors wore
required to give the stockholders thirty days notice for each installneat.

Sometime s stock subscribers node the required down payment in
cask, and the remainder in mortgages.

Stock of the Atehafalaya

Bailroad and Banking Company, ehartorod in 1835# could bo subscribed
for at firs dollars per share, with installments of fire dollars in
October, 1835# aad fifteen dollars in January, 1836.

The remainder,

seventy-five dollars per share, could be paid in bonds secured by
stockholders' mortgages on real estate assessed at double the Talus
of the bond.

The Clinton and Port Hudson railroad alao utilised this

system of 1melting-down1 property to raise capital for railroad
construction.

Half of the 5,000# $100 shares of stock of this rail

road were purchased with mortgaged property.

For example, Charles

M. Smith of East Feliciana Parish mortgaged 640 acres of land with
1Tiro Tenant e thereon, in return for fifty-one shares of company stock

▼alued at $5,100.

Elsafins Jackson mortgaged 2,082 acres of land and

twenty-two slaves# and received 358 shares of stock valued at $35,800.
The Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company, with the mortgages as
security, was authorised to take out a loan of $250,000, or half of
its capitalisation.

The company directors issued 5 per cent bonds,

secured by the loan subscribers' mortgages upon lands, slaves, and
town lots.^
Almost m i of the Intrastate railread companies sold their stock
to Louisianians except the Hew Orleans aad Carrollton Railroad aad

Feliciana Parish Archives Collection, Clinton and Port Hudson
Bailroad Ccnpany Papers. Louisiana, Acts. 11 Logic., 2 Sess., 1833,
pp. 115-116.
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Banking Company* which waa reputedly financed by eastern capitalists,^
and tha Laka Providence and Sad River Bailroad Company, wboaa ehartar
reserved 5*000 aharas atook for tha altiaana of Phlladalphia.

Louisiana's

two intaratata railroad oompaniss opanad subscription officaa oataida
tha state.

Tha West Palioiana Railroad Company's commisalonsrs sola

stock to MLsslssippians, while tha diraotors of tha projected rail
road to Nashvi11a invited eitiaana of Mississippi, Alabama, and
Tennessee to purchase stock in the enterprise*^*

Most railroad pro

moters orerestimated tha effectiveness of private stock subscriptions
in financing railroads.

Instead of oversubscription to railroad stock,

as anticipated, the opposite situation usually prevailed.

Bailroad

stock generally was undersubscribed, in spite of the liberal terms
for stock purchasing.
The state of Louisiana, in 1833, adopted a policy of direct
financial aid to the railroads, and began buying small amounts of rail
road stock.

In that year, the legislature empowered tha Board of Public

Works to subscribe for the stock of internal improvement companies if
private stockholders had already subscribed three-fifths (later onehalf) of the total capitalisation.

The legislature reserved for it

self the right to pass on the eligibility of each company for aid,

7 j N w Orleans Bee. 20 June 1835* P* 2.
**flibson's Guide and Directory of the State of Louisiana and tha
Cities e T sew Orleans and IaB5ette7^ e w Orleans, 1 0 1 7 pT239.

and in addition, ordorod tho Board of Public Worko to rofrain from
paying installments on tho state-purchased stock in otzeoss of tho
installment payments of tho private otookholdoro.

Between 1B33 and

1834, tho legislaters anthorlsod tho Board to porehaso 1,400 oharos
of stoek in nino railroad companies. If all of thooo railroads had
LG

scoured tho requisite nuober of private stoek subscribers*' required
by law, the state would have invested $160,000 in railroad stock.
Because of the 'three-fifths' aad 'one-half' provisions regarding
private subscriptions, only three companies qualified for state aid,
the West Feliciana, the New Orleans and Carrollton, and the Clinton
and Port Hudson railroads.

Six hundred shares of stock, valued at

$40,000, were purchased from these companies by the Board of Public
Works on behalf of the s t a t e . C o m p a r e d with the total capitalisation

*9See Chapter 1, FN 13.
50The legislature authorised the Board of Public Works to subscribe
for the stoek of the following r&ilroadst
Shares
'"New Orleans and Carrollton
"Clinton and Port Hudson
"Wbst Feliciana
Red River
Baton Rouge and Clinton
Livingston
Lake Providence aad Red River
Alexandria and Chenoyville
Springfield aad Liberty

Amount

100

$ 10,000

200

20,000

100

10,000

200
200
200
200
200

20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000

"This railroad received etate aid. Louisiana, Acts. 11 Legis.,
1 Sess., 1833, pp. 1, 79-80? 12 Legis., 2 Sees., 18367pp. 114, 126.
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of tho rallroodo involved, this suo woo littlo enough.

Probably o

benefit greater than tho actual ototo aid coao from tho confidence
that meet boro resulted fron ototo participation in tho projects*
In addition to tho ototo, tho city of Mow Orloono aanifootod
intoroot in railroad dovolopaont.

Although nanioipal aid waa net

oxtondod to poroly local rallroodo, tho city fathers and tho bnainooa
intorooto bootirrod themselves to action on boholf of tho Vow Orloono
aad Moohrrlllo railroad*

Tho railroad chortor had rooorrod 5,000 aharoo

of otoek for New Orloono, and tho diroctoro, boliorlng that Municipal
backing would awaken greater intoroot anong individual otoakholdoro,
petitioned tho City Council to oubocrlbo for tho s t o c k . I n January,
1036, tho City Council assented, and apparently paid for tho stock in
full by issuing bonds for $500,000, which woro negotiated through an
arrangement with tho Union Bank of Louisiana.
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When it became apparent that public and private stock subscrip
tions had failed to provide sufficient funds for railroad construction,
railroad promoters began to seek othor sources of eapital*

Tho Pont

chartrain railroad directors relied upon short-term loans.

Sometimes

individual directors paid tho company's obligations out of thoir own
pockets, or signed notes for the company when funds in the treasury
were insufficient to meet the company's debts*^

Most railroad

companies found it difficult to obtain either short-term, or long-term
loans through regular New Orleans business channels*

In November, 1036,

Memorial to the City Council, Cablldo Record Book 4004, 20 November
1035. pp. 220-229.
JJMo w Orleans aad Nashville lallreari Company, First Report. 1036. p.R.
'^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 114, 231, 254*
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months before the panic of 1837, the directors of the New Orleane
and Nashville railroad found only one bank in New Orleans willing to
loan money to the company.

The reason for this situation, in the opin

ion of the New Orleana Bee, waa not a lack of confidence in the rail
road's success, bat rather, a shortage of capital.

The shortage

allegedly resulted fron "...the large advances node by our nerohanta
to the planters especially of Mississippi,

By this neans, all our

capital is drawn into the interior..." and the construction of rail
roads delayed for the want of necessary aid.

The Bee urged a boycott

of all banks that financed planters at the expense of internal improve
ments.^
The financial vicissitudes of the New Orleans and Nashrllle rail
road suggested the futility of relying solely upon local eapital for
financing Louisiana's railroad construction.

Railroad promoters,

inaccurate in their estimates of construction costs, and unfaniliar
with the ptrobleas of railroad corporate finance, found the magnitude
of their task too great for the limited resources of contemporary
private enterprise.

While entrepot New Orleans eeuld scarcely find

capital sufficient for its own commercial pursuits, capitalists in the
East and in Europe could not be induced to invest in doubtful railroad
ventures unless some responsible agency other than the chartered rail
road company agreed to underwrite the loans.

5*Weu frliTf Bee. 21 November 1838, p. 2.

Railroaders turned to the
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state for support j and tho state, not unwillingly, east to their raseua
by issuing bond* based on tbs credit of tbs state, in favor of tbs rail
roads.

Tbs legislators, between 1837 and 1839, authorised leans to five

railroad companies.

Only three railroads, tbs Mew Orleans and Nashville,

the Mexican Qwlf, and tbs Clinton and Port Hudson, took advantace of this
legislative generosity.

The Mew Orleans and Nashville Bailroad Company,

in return for a loan of $500,000, agreed to give "... first privilege,
lien, and nortgage to the State of Louisiana, upon machinery, lets,
railways and generally all property which may appertain te said company
within the limits of the State of Louisiana.”

The Mexican Gulf Bail

road Company received a loan of $100,000, and tbs Clinton and Port
Hudson, a loan of $500,000.

Both companies mortgaged their property

under terms similar to the Mew Orleans and Nashville mortgage.^

The

total of Louisiana’s aid to railroads was $1,100,000 in loans, and
$40,000 in stock.

Here was mute testimony to the fact that, during

one phase of American economic growth, platitudes extolling the glory
of laisses fairs and the self-sufficiency of private enterprise did
not resound through legislative halls, or re-ecbo in the conference
rooms of businessmen and financiers.
Financial aid and monopolistic charters were the most important,
but by no means the only form of public encouragement to the railroads.
Privileges such as long-term tax exemptions, rights of way through state
land, and the power of eminent domain over private property, sought to
encourage the fledgling railroad companies in their struggles to improve

^^Louisiana,

13 Imgis., 1 Sees., 1837, p. 110.
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Louisiana'• transportation system.

In addition, the state awarded

soae railroads free surreys of their routes*

Louisiana's ciril engi

neer, already busy with the numerous tasks of surveying bayoas and rivers,
reeeired additional duties when the legislature, either by charter pro
vision or special reeolation, ordered surreys, plans, and estimates for
certain railroads in the state.

Free surreys were a boon to the rail

roads because qualified engineers were scarce, and their services
costly.

The state paid nearly a thousand dollars for the surrey of

the twenty-seven nils route of the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad
in Bast Feliciana Parish,

In reporting to the legislature on this

surrey, the State Engineer discussed elevations along the route, recom
mended nateriale for building the road, and estimated the costs of
construction.^

Not all railroads were favored with the free services

of the State Engineer.

The New Orleans and Carrollton, and the Pont-

ehartrain railroads, hired their own surveyors, while the costs of
surveying the New Orleans and Nashville railroad were defrayed through
contributions from private citisens, the legislature having refused to
appropriate $5,000 for this purpose.^
The federal government also lent a helping hand to Louisiana's
railroads.

At least one railroad, the West Feliciana, was surveyed by

United States Engineers,and other railroads reeeived grants of public

$^Louisiana, House Journal, 11 Legis., 2 Sees., 1833, pp* 24-26.
New Orleans Bee. 43 January 1^33, p. 2, and 16 January 1841, p. 2.
*rfew Orleans and Nashville Bailroad, p. 7*
5Report of James Bradford to the Board of Cosndssionere and Stock
holders, quoted from the Mississippi Beam Brat. 17 December 1631, Calvert
typewritten MSS.
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laaA and rights of mjr.

Petitions for land grants wars aant dlrseUy

to Congrsss, ralaforead by resolutions of ths stats legislature
instructing Louisiana's Congressmen to use their influence in getting
land grants.

The promoters of fire railroads, the lew Orleans and

Nashville, the Atchafalaya, the Baton Rouge and Clinton, ths Red Riser,
and the New Orleans and Carrollton, petitioned for grants of land.

Bach

petition included an additional request for the privilege of taking soil
and timber from public land adjacent to the railroad for construction
purposes.

The Mew Orleans and Nashville directors asked Congress for

ono township, to be selected from public land in the Florida parishes,
while the promoters of the Baton Rouge and Clinton and the Red River
railroads tried to procure six sections of public land for each rail
road.

The directors of the Atchafalaya Railroad and Banking Company

requested either land, or if land was not granted pre-emption rights*
In their petition, they anticipated the lavish land grants of the postClvil War period when they asked for a grant of land "...one mile in
depth on each side of the main line,"

If land was not given, they

requested "...the exclusive privilege of becoming the purchasers thereof
at a reduced price, or upon a credit of some years after the completion
of the road."

In return, the Atchafalaya directors offered the federal

government the use of the road "...free of expense for the transpor
tation of the munitions of war, and the conveyance of the troops of
the General Government during the continuance of the chartered privi
leges."

Here was the essence of the agreements made in a later period

of American history, between the United States government and the land
grant railroads.

The federal government exacted lower rates from these

grant railroads similar to these offered by ths Atchafalaya rail-
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road, until 1946.^
Thu response of Congress to the petition* for land grant* fall
short of ths patitionars' azpaetations.

Rights of way across publie

land wars fortheoning, but only snsll grants of land wars approved.
The Raw Orleans and Nashville, the Atchafalaya, and the Haw Orleans
and Carrollton railroads each received eighty-foot rights of way
across public land, plus the privilege of taking Materials (earth,
stone, and wood) from public land still unsold.

Congress granted

two railroads, the New Orleans and Nashville and the Atchafalaya,
snail aaounts of land along the right of way for depots, watering
places, and workshops.

The New Orleans and Nashville railroad

received, not the township requested, but only one five-acre square
of land on eithor side of the track every fifteen niloo across publie
land.

The Atchafalaya railroad had the privilege of taking one

four-acre square for every ten niles of track across publie land.
The grants beeaae null and void if the railroads did not coanenee
building within a specified tine, usually two years, and couplets the
road within a reasonable period, generally eight years.

60

These rail

roads were unable to take advantage of either the rights of way, or
the land grant privileges.

^^United States, Senate Dofluan t s. No. 245, Vol. XI, 24 Cong., 1
Sees., 1836. United States."kaocutive Doouaasts. 48, 258, 24 Cong.,
1 Soss., 1834, pp. 1-2, 19-20. Louisiana. Acts. 13 Legis., 1 Sess.,
1837. p. 25. D. Philip Loeklin, goononlc* ot transportation. 118.
°°United States, Acts. 24 Cong., 1 Sess., 1834, pp. 142-143} 24
Cong., 2 Soss., 1837, pp. 84-89.
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Railroad construction, liks railroad finance, proved to bo a
hit or alas, trial and orror ordoal for tho businessmen-planter pro
moters of How Qrloana and Louisiana.

Inoxporlonoo in oonotruetlon

techniques, supply shortages, and labor difficulties, all oontrlbutod
to tho fraotratloda of railroad non already booot with financial
problems, and hanstrung by tho uncertainties of tho eeonony.

Railroad

builders tho nation orer facod construction problems with tho sans
inexperience and lack of know-how as Louisiana's railroadors.

Tho

first railroad buildors in Anoriea lookod to Kngland for guidance,
and Louisiana's first railroad buildors, in turn, roliod upon previous
American and English oxporionco.

Tho Baltinoro and Ohio railroad

bscsns tho nodel this aids of tho Atlantis for Louisiana's railroad
non to pattern aftor, but tho geography of Louisiana and Maryland
differed appreciably, and tho. problems of construction wore in naay
instances dissisdlar.

Louisiana's swaaps, bayous, and hardpan offered

their own peculiar challenges to the ingenuity of the railroad engineer.
As tho railroad ora began in Louisiana, railroad non were experi
menting with various types of foundations for the superstructure of the
road.

Most Louisiana railroad builders chose the mors durable excava

tion and embankment type of foundation in preference to piling, although
conditions of terrain sonatinas dictated the use of both.

Excavation

involved cutting off soil when the grade of the line was below the
natural surface of the ground, and embankment, filling in when the grads
of the line was above the natural surface of the ground.

Although a

solid dirt roadbed was superior to piling, there still remained mush
to be desired, because the first engineers did not yet use ballast

between the roadbed and the superstructure.

A task carried cm

simultaneously with excavating and — hsnlrl ng the road wae grubbing,
the clearing of trees, stumps, and bushes from the right of way.

On

the roadbed, a simple, and usually fragile, superstructure, was laid,
ooaslsting of three by-twslvc-inch wooden foundation sills, sixteen
feet long; four-by-eight-lnch cross sills, seven feet long; and sixby-six-inch wooden rails, twenty-one feet long.

To complete the

superstructure, iron straps of varying thicknesses and lengths on
different railroads, but usually two and one-half inches wide, and
two and eight-tenths inches thick, were fastened to the rails with
screws.61

The gauge of Louisiana's early railroads varied with the

preference, or whim, of the builder.

The widest gauge was five feet

six inches; the narrowest, four feet eight inches.
Since Louisiana's early railroads were built before the discovery
of wood preservatives, it was important that good quality lumber be
used In the superstructure.

The most desirable lumber for this purpose

was red cypress because of its superior lasting qualities, and hence,
it also was the hardest to obtain.

In the absence of red cypress,

railroad builders experimented with other types of native lumber,
including yellow heart pine, white oak, and yellow poplar.

While

meet types of lunber went into the foundation sills and the cross sills,
the rails, or stringers, were usually made fraa red cypress, red cedar,
or yellow heart pine.

Shortages of choice lumber were not Infrequently

reported by more than one railroad engineer.

Railroad companies

testimony, McCord Case. Calvert Typewritten MSS, 17-1S. "West
Feliciana a Century Old," 5. San Orleane B f . 5 Sty 1 W » p* 2.

purchased timber by the raft from individuals contracting for tho supply.
Tho rafts were floated on tho lakos or rivers during high water soaaoa
to points aost aeessslblo to ths railroad*

lach raft oontalnod 570

sticks, fourteen and twenty-one foot long, half and half.

Tinbor

pricos varied during tho 1030's, reflecting tbs sofssiiu of tho bustness cycle.

In 1837, the average pries of lumber was twenty-five to

thirty dollars per thousand foot, whereas In the succeeding depression
years, ths price dropped to an average of fifteen and twenty dollars
per thousand feet.

Fluctuating prices for such an essential naterlal

as lumber could mean thousands of dollars to railroad companies.

An

advertisement for timber by the engineer of the West Fslielana rail
road illustrated the high consumption of timber products in railroad
construction.

For seven miles of track, he estimated tho need of

5,280 three-by-twelve-inch pieces, sixteen feet long, for foundation
sills; 12,072 four-by-eight-lnch pieces, seven foot long, for cross
sills; and 4,024 six-by-six-inch pieces, twenty-one feet long, for
rails.

In constructing tho Pontehartrain railroad, at least 100,000

foot of timber was required for the sills and stringers on five miles
of track.^
Procuring timber supplies was only a minor problem in comparison
with tho task of accumulating most of tho other materials used in
constructing and operating a railroad line.

Next to timber, iron rails

^Testimony, NoCord Case. Calvert Typewritten MSS, 17-18.
chartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 54*

Pont-

u
wers

o m

of tho cootH o o t items In railroad construction.

It tho

beginning of tho reilrood ora in America, railroad buildora, bj
necessity, purehaood meet of thoir iron in England.

Because of die-

tanoo and supply problems, contracts for fiaglish iron worn and# a year
in advance to insaro delivery when noodod.

Tho supply situation was

so uaond.ofaetory that railroad eonpanioo frequently triad eithor to
borrow, or to purchase, surplus rails froa one another, but usually
to no avail.
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Tho eoat of iron Incroaaod booause of tho tariff

policy of tho federal government, which sought to protect tho American
infant iron industry froa outside competition.

Eventually, protect

ing ths iron industry seamed loss impelling than encouraging railroad
building, for in 1032, Congress altered tho iron tariff by granting a
drawback on imported iron used in railroad cometruction.

In order to

receive the drawback, however, it was incumbent upon tho railroad
companies to actually lay tho rails.

All of Louisiana's early rail

road builders preferred English rails to American, chiefly because
tho American iron industry had not yet boon able to scale down its
costs of production to a level whore price competition with English
firms was possible.

In 1830, English rails sold for fifty dollars per

ton delivered to New Orleans, while Pittsburgh rails cost $197 dollars
per ton.

Part of this difference in pries was the result of higher

freight rates between Pittsburgh and New Orleans, amounting to twice
the rates between

and New Orleans.^

The price of English

rails remained steady throughout the 1830's.

*Ventehartraln Kailroad Company, Miastee, 173.
^ H o f A m a to Haile, 6 Sapt— her 1830, quoted in Calvert Typewritten
MSS, 11.
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Acquiring rolling stock m e another large item of expense for
the railroaders.

In purchasing this equipment, a two Tears' advance

order m s usually required. ^

The sources of supply for railroad

rolling stock increased nore rapidly than for railroad iron.

By the

nid 1330's, railroad eonpanies could purchase locomotives in Cincinnati
and Philadelphia, as m i l as in England.

While the Pontchartrain

railroad directors preferred the English sake, they once considered
ordering a loeonotive constructed by Thoms Shields of Cincinnati
after their order could not innediately be filled in England.
Because of the difficulty in locating suitable loeoaotives, nore than
one railroad had to turn temporarily to horse power for activation.
American loeonotive makers gradually put a larger supply of locomo
tives on the market.

Toward the end of the 1830's, three loecau>tives

by the famous Mathias Baldwin of Philadelphia were hauling ears of
cotton over the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad.^

Ths passenger

cars on the early railroads were little more than horse-drawn type
vehicles adapted to rails.

A shortage in ftigland forced the Pont

chartrain directors to purchase coaches wherever they could be found,
Including new and used stock from the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

At

the same time, they ordered wheels from Mew York for carriage bodies
to be built by local craftsmen, a practice later followed by meet raileompanies in Louisiana.^®

^United States, Executive Documents, No. 48, Vol. II, 24 Cong.,
1 Sees., 8.
"Pontchartrain Bailroad, Minutes, 133*184*
°?Baton Rouge Merging Advocate. Magaslne Section, 3 May 1953, P* 6.
^o«tefaartral7i3Ccui, flOutes, 85, 9*.
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If the railroad builders found it difficult to obtain eonstruetion materials and rolling stock, they faeod even further aotbaeka
froa ahortagoa of labor.

Even in 1630, akillad workmen wore ao aearoo

that many carpontora had to bo iaportal froa tho North to work on the
Fontchartrain railroad.

Aa tho m a k e r of internal improvements pro

jects inereaaed between 1830 and 1837, old and new companies had to
oeapete for the already inadequate anpply of akillad and unakilled
labor, aa well aa hired-out slaves.

The legislature, in its seal

for progress, had unwittingly beooao the instrument that retarded
progress.

It created nore improvement companies than the avail

able resources of the atate could sustain.

Shortages of labor slowed

down the construction of all improvement projects.

In October, 1635,

it was estimated that 6,000 laborers were needed 1Mediately on the
various improvements in the state, 4,500 of these on the railroads
69
alone.
During fall and winter months, when plantation operations
slowed down, the labor force was swelled by hired-out slaves.
in the fall

Tet

winter of 1035-1636, there was no Indication that,

even with this extra seasonal supply of construction laborers, the
estimated need of 6,000 workers was filled.

The New Orleans and Nash

ville railroad, whose works alone could have accommodated a force of
2,000 laborers during the fall of 1635, had only sixty-three at work
on the prairie section of the line.

Somewhat reluctantly, the direc

tors, looking ahead to the summer months of 1636, decided to purchase

^United States,
Sees., 1636, p. 6.

Documents. 40, fol. U , 24 Cong., 1
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a m a b « r of slaves in order to foretell further disappointments
resulting froa labor scarcities.
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Both akillad and anakll.lad whit* laborara who workod on tha
railroads wars surprisingly mobile,

Workmen aorad froa one rail

road project to tha other, especially fre* North to ths South, wharo
tha skills of experienced earpantars wars especially in daaaad.
Louisiana's railroad boildara triad to attract as augr laborers froa
tha North as possible in ordar to have workmen already faaillar with
tha basic problaas of railroad aonstruation.
New Orl**M

Lata in 1836, tha

Baa announced tha arrival in New Orleans of fifty-two

"mechanics" fresh froa tha Just eoaplatad Utica railroad, to work on
tha New Orleans and Nashville railroad.*^"

Tha West fall clana rail

road directors contracted tha building of tha entire line to a
northern firm which agreed to bring a large labor force from tha
North,

Occasionally railroad builders triad to persuade laborers

to leave other railroad Jobs by offering higher wages.

Tha unskilled

worker's average wage was between twenty-six and thirty dollars per
month, and in addition, room and board were provided.

Almost every

railroad company found it necessary to build sleeping quarters near
tha line for its workers.

It cost between twenty-five and forty cents

par day to board each worker.

The take-home wages of white unskilled

labor were higher in Louisiana than in the North, where common laborers

Orleans and Nashville Bailroad Company, First Report. 1836.
pp. 11-12,
71gew Orleans Bee. 30 November 1836, p. 2,
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could bo hired for seventy-five cents por day.*^

S kiUad lobororo In

Loolslsna oornod almost twice tho sa|«a of unskilled lobororo*

Tho

average carpenter roeoirod fifty dollars por sanih, while on oxoeptionolly okillod oorpontor ooowtlnoo received oo mooli oo sixty dollars
por month.

Superintendonto of laborers commanded salaries of $100

dollars por month, and higher.
Another important source of labor wore tho slares, who wore hired
out by tho month to improvement companies after ths sotton and sugar
cane were harrested.
unskilled white labor*

Slare labor ccmnnrled almost as high a price as
The Clinton and Fort Hudson Railroad Company

paid twenty-fire dollars per month for the services of slares, while
the Hew Orleans and Nashville railroad offered to pay twenty to twentysix dollars per month for slares and board them*
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Laborers on

Louisiana's internal Inprorsnsnt projects faced constant harras meant
from diseases such as yellow ferer and cholera.

These maladies brought

so much sickness and death among workers that railroad construction
often earns to a near standstill*^
It was little wonder that Louisiana's railroad builders, faced
with so many unforseen prob learn, erred in estimating their coots of
construction*

Their greatest mistake was placing their probable coots

too low, even though the experience of earlier railroad companies in

^^Testimony, McCord Case.
73Rseeipt, Harriss to Langfitt, 1 November 1S39, W, Feliciana Paridi
Archives Collection, Clinton and Pert Hudson Railroad Company Papers,
Hem Orleans Bee. 6 July 1836, p. 1
74New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Co., First Report. 1836, p. 12*
United States, House Resorts. Ho. 43$, Fol. II, 5$ Cong., I Sess., 1*4$.
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America gave Louisiana's rallroadars no ground to do so.

Moat

Louisiana railroad promoters believed that an outlay of #10,000 por
nils would build ths railroad and by tbs rolling atook for ths lino.
Tbs West Folisiana railroad diroetora found, as did aaay othors, that
#10,000 par nils did net srsn eonatruot tho lino, but instoad, #25,000
por mile was nseoaaary to pay for eonstruotion and rolling stock.
Even this figurs, however, was nuch lower than ths national average,
as wars ths costs of construction of all southern railroads.^

Many

reasons hare boon offered for ths lower costs of railroad construction
in tho South than in ths nation as a whole.

Certainly ths southern

states possessed a less rugged terrain than other sections of country,
the railroad lines were shorter and did not require as nuch rolling
stock, and their construction was usually fllnsier and less costly,
*

Another reason frequently offered as an explanation for tbs lower costs
of construction of southern railroads was the use of slave labor in
76
building the roads.r

This claim was not completely borne out by

conditions in Louisiana during the 1830's.

Able-bodied slaves, when

rented to the railroads by their owners, cosmended monthly wages
almost as high as those of free white labor.

Nevertheless, most rail

road men in Louisiana believed it was cheaper to purchase slaves than
to hire a labor force, white or slave, regardless of the high initial
capital outlay for slaves.*^

Louisiana's railroad builders believed

75"West Feliciana a Century Old," 3.
Miles' Weekly Register,
(March. 1839) 160. Mew Orleans Bee. 5 November
pTTT”
JJjohn F. Stover, The ifAiwmada of the South. 1865-1900, p. 6.
f?Iew Orleans and Mashville Railroad Company. First Report. 1836.
p. 12. Pentehartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 392.
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this even though ths faets In ths ease nsithsr conclusively condoned
nor disprorsd ths idea.
Ths early railroads of Louisian* wars experiments in constructing
and operating a nsw and unfmadliar nods sf transportation.

Ths results

ef Louisiana's first tan /oars of railroad bonding brought disappointnonts and disillusionnsnt even to tho nost snthaslastln railroad promoters.
By 1840, only about 120 nilss of track had boon laid in ths stats.
Bstwssn 1840 and 1845, one-third of this track lay unused, or had boon
torn op after ths failure of ths sonpaniss to nost financial obliga
tions to ths stats.

Only five of ths twenty-three railroad companies

chartered bstwssn 1830 and 1837 survived after 1845, operating a total
of about eighty nilss of railroad.
near financial collapse.
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Even ths survivors often hovered

Although ths early railroad promoters left a

record of numerous failures, they did, nevertheless, gain priceless
experience.

In many ways, these railroad builders, as much as any In the

United States, pioneered in developing a new invention that would eventu
ally revolutionise the transportation system of the nation.

It was almost

inevitable that, in the evolution of the railroad from a crude replica

?*The following railroads were operating in Louisiana in 1840:
Miles of track
New Orleans and Nashville
West Feliciana
Clinton and Port Hudson
Bed U v e r
Pontchartrain
Meadsen Qulf
New Orleans and Carrollton

20
27
27

12
4*
19
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of a itui stag«coaeh running on wood rails and iron strap*, to tho
aodorn atoaa ongin* and oar* running on stool rails, muaj railroad
pwojoets would fall by tho way-sids.

Th* aeeount of tho individual

railroads built in Louisiana during tho 1430'• was a story of
failuros and a fow succossos.

m i

y
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Chapter III
THE RURAL RAILROADS
The railroad* of rural Louisiana were planned and built by the
townspeople and plantation owners of the parishes in answer to
pressing transportation needs.

Although many of these rural rail

roads were proposed, only a few were constructed.

After nuch delay

and many disappointments, railroad enthusiasts in three rural
parishes finally witnessed the completion of the West Feliciana
railroad in West Felieiana parish, the Clinton and Port Hudson rail
road in East Feliciana pariah, and the partial completion cf the Red
Hirer railroad in Rapides parish.

The rural railroads of the 1830fs

and 1840's differed from any railroads built in Louisiana after that
time because of necessity, they made no junction with larger railroad
systems.

Instead, they became appendages to the water transportation

system, connecting interior towns and plantations with the rivers.

In

this situation, each railroad depended completely upon a local area
and its monoculture economy for traffic and sustinenee.
Because of this economic environment, the rural railroad builders
faced many problems in operating their lines.

Th* most important

problem concerned the ability of the railroad to maintain sufficient
earning power to pay for th* costs of construction, as well as keeping
the line in repair and the rolling stock in proper running order.

Since

these railroads ware constructed chiefly to transport cotton from the

interior to the rivers, the destiny of the railroads became inextri
cably interwoven with the cotton economy of the local area they served.
The first drawback froa this situation was the seasonal nature of the
moveawiit of traffic over the line.

Cotton producers overtaxed rail

road facilities during the marketing season, but for the remainder of
the year most of the rolling stock lay unused.

Outside of the ootton

traffic, the railroad's services were demanded by only a small number
of coosftodities.

Another problem inherent in this situation was the

scarcity, and even non-existence, of goods for the back-haul.

During

the rush season, freight cars moved to the river loaded with cotton,
but returned empty, a factor that greatly increased the railroad's
inability to meet variable costs.

Although the railroads would have

been Justified in levying tariffs on cotton sufficiently high to cover
the charges of the movement of cars both ways, railroad pricing policies
must have been limited by the ability of the plantation owners to haul
their own products to the river, using plantation wagons and hands that
were idle during the winter season.
The story of Louisiana's rural railroads was at first centered
around the probleam of raising capital and constructing the roads.
After their

completion, it remained to be seen whether or not these

rural railroads faced with so many disadvantages, could successfully
survive the struggle for existence.
THE BED BITER RAILROAD
In Louisiana west of the Mississippi River, settlers searching for
fertile cotton and sugar land gradually pushed back the frontier.

As

agriculture moved Inland from the rivers and bayous, the problesi of
conquering the frontier gave way to a new problesi of finding suitable
transportation froa the interior to the navigable waterways*

The

advent of the railroad appeared to the frontiersmen to be a most
timely panacea in aiding the movement of civilisation into the interior,
and in connecting isolated plantations with their markets.

Thus it

was that Louisianans west of the great river outdid themselves in
planning railroads.^

Numerous railroad projects were plotted by

local promoters and chartered by the legislature until the financial
panic of 1837.

The optimism engendered by the apparent prosperity

of the rising business cycle before 1837 made almost anything seem
possible to the railroad promoters.

Progress, prosperity and expan

sion deluded them like drugs, changing the diffioult

problem of

railroad finance and construction into an apparently easy task.

In

their enthusiasm, the railroad planners were unrealistic and visionary,
but the panic of 1837 ended their dreams like a nightmare.

Only one

railroad was constructed west of the Mississippi Kiver.
The setting for this railroad was Rapides parish, one of the
fastest developing areas in western Louisiana.

During the decade of

the 1830's, the population of the parish nearly doubled.

2

As the

westward migration transforms! virgin hardwood forests along the Red
River and the Bayous Rapides, Huffpower and Boeuf, into large plantations,

JSee Chapter 2, pp. 13-20.
23ee Chapter 2, FN 10.
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many »ogar and cotton plantora listened a«|arljr to proposals for
3

providing tha parish with railroad transportation.

By early 1833,

tha local railroad promoters aocoaplishad tha first stap In thalr
project.

In that year, tha lagislatara ehartarad two railroad

coapanias for tha parish.

One of thasa, tha Rapidas Ballroad Company,

received a chartar to build a short lins batwaan tha Bad River and
tha south of Bayou Rapidas.

It was capitallssd at $10,000.

Tha

other, tha Alexandria and Chanayrilla Railroad Company, was a nore
aabitious project.

This company, capitalised at $250,000, was

authorised to construct a line batwaan Alexandria, on tha Hirer, and
tha town of Chanayrilla, on Bayou Boauf.

Its chartar granted tha same

privileges and powers as tha Pontchartrain Railroad chartar, and also,
soma of tha sane restrictions, including charter rates.

Although tha

Civil Engineer of Louisiana was instructed by charter provision to
surrey tha route, there was no indication that this service was begun.^
Neither the Rapides railroad, nor the Alexandria and Chanayrilla rail
road was constructed, but two years later, renewed attempts to provide
the parish with a railroad were more successful.
In 1835, railroad promoters in Rapides parish secured a charter
from

the legislature for another railroad company to build over

approximately tha same route as the proposed Alexandria and Cheneyrille
company*

The new organisation, the Red River Railroad Com pany, was

3q . P. Whittington, "Rapidas Parish, Louisiana, A History,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XVII (July, 1934), 540.
^Louisiana. Acts. 11 Leals.. 1 Sess., 1833, pp. 61-67*
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author!sad to eonstruet a line froa Alaxandria to Chenayvilla, and
than froa ChanajrilXa on to Bayou Huffpower.
roata aztandad for fifty years.

Capital!sad at $300,000, tha aoapany

could incraaaa ita capitalisation to a
to eoaiplata tha road.

Tha monopoly over tha

of $300,000 if naoaaaary

In ordar to facilitate construction, tha chartar

authorised tha railroad directors to borrow $150,000 froa another
improvement company, tha New Orleans Gas Light and Banking Company,
which the legislature compelled to make loans in return for certain
privileges it had received.

If the loan was taken, tha railroad

directors ware forbidden to give dividends to stockholders without
tha permission of tha Gas Light and Banking Company, until principal
and interest on tha loan had bean paid.

A capital surplus for tha

final liquidation of tha loan would be acquired by placing tha
undistributed stock dividends into a sinking fund.

Until tha loan

was paid off, the railroad directors were empowered to make loans
from tha accumulating sinking fund at a maximum of 8 par cant interest
This curious method of providing tha railroad with a long term loan
did not go into operation.
Instead of loans, tha most important source of capital in tha
initial financing of all aarly railroads in Louisiana was tha private
stockholder, but in tha case of tha Rad River railroad, ha was tha
missing link.

Chartering tha railroad had bean easy, but persuading

a sufficient number of private citisane to risk capital in tha venture

h b i d .. 12 Lagis., 1 Sees., 1835, pp. 187-194.
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proved unsuccessful.

The first attempt to ralao capital for tba rail

road found tha pablic unresponsive, and tha capital atoek undersub
scribed.

To remedy tha situation, tha promoters called upon the state

to aabaeriba for Rad River railroad stock, and thus increase tha
attractiveness of tha investment for private stockholders.

In 1636,

tha legislature responded, partly through tha efforts of State Senator
Richard Winn, member of the Board of Directors of the railroad, and
authorised the purchase of 200 shares of Red River railroad stock,
provided private individuals had previously subscribed for one-half
of the authorised capitalisation.

6

The railroad directors once again

opened the subscription books, but they were unsuccessful in selling
enough stock to qualify the company for state aid.

By late 1637*

after the panic, the state began bolstering the shattered internal
improvements program by granting loans to needy cosqmnies, and the
railroads received special consideration.

The legislature authorised

a loan of $75,000 for the Red River Railroad Company and directed the
Treasurer of the state to pay $10,000 to the railroad for each mile of
track completed after authorisation of the loan.

Because of serious

construction difficulties facing the Red River railroad at this time,
the company probably did not build enough track to qualify for any of
this $75,000 loan.

The company did not attempt to secure any other

state financial aid until 1841, when the stockholders petitioned the

^Rew Orleans Bee. 5 Nay 1636, p. 2. Louisiana, Acts. 12 Legis., 2

Sess.TT^flSSTpT*
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legislature to purchase $20,000 (two-hundred shares) of unsubscribed
stook, bat the request was turned down.

Presumably these shares were
7

the same 200 authorised in the act of 1036.
The Red Hirer railroad directors failed also to get a grant of six
g
sections of public land from the federal government, but in procuring
the free services of the State Engineer, they were completely successful.
This official made a detailed survey, although he did not finish the
task until over a year after the company was chartered, a factor that
undoubtedly contributed to the tardiness in getting the project started.
In his report to the Board of Public Works, he submitted a plan includ
ing the distances of the route, recommendations for construction, and
estimates of costs.

Between Alexandria and Cheneyville, the route was

twenty-four and one-half miles.

The seven miles between Cheneyville

and Bayou Huffpower made a total of thirty-one and one-half miles of
track.

Over this route were four bayous to be crossed.

Numerous

plantations also had to be traversed, but in securing the right of way
for the road, the Engineer reeonsMnded the expropriation only of the
land actually needed for the width of track, ten to twelve feet, in
stead of the thirty foot right of way authorised.

His plan of con

struction involved the barest minimum standards of construction

and

if adopted, must have been one of the most flimsy and poorly constructed
railroads in the state.

Instead of embankments, the State Engineer

?New Orleans Bee, 27 February 1841, p- 2j 10 March 1841, p. 2.
Louisiana, Acts. IT"Legis., 2 Sess., 1837-38, pp. 85-86.
*See Chapter 2, PM 59*

advocated the use of piling across the law ground, with timber ten feet
square or twelve feet In disaster, driven Into the ground four to eight
feet deep.

Piling would be used over at least one-fifth of the route,

six miles.

Por the remainder of the line, he proposed placing wooden

rails on a foundation of cross ground sills.
of leveling, or of ballasting the road.

No mention was made either

Finally, with iron rails two

and one-half inches wide and two and eight-tenths inches thick, the
Engineer believed the road would support engines and ears weighing as
a
much as five tons.
In estimating construction costs, the State Engineer included costs
of all materials, labor and rolling stock.

For timber, he believed that

the necessary piles, caps, cross sills and rail timber could be pur
chased for somewhat over $56,000, while the five hundred tons of iron
needed would probably cost $27>000.

He estimated costs of labor at

$23,000, cost of rolling stock at $15*000, and all other expenses in
the engineering department, $20,000.

He placed the probable cost of

construction at the staggeringly low figure of $4,606.40 per mile.^
In order to avoid possible labor shortages which might hold up the
construction, the 3tate Engineer recommended that a number of slaves,
preferably fifty to seventy, be purchased.

Some of these slaves, he

believed, could be trained as "mechanics" and perform the more intri
cate tasks in constructing the railroad.

9
1

ans Bee. 5 May 1836, p. 2.

The railroad management did
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not take seriously this last proposal, hofferer, for soon afterward they
advertised for individual bids from contractors, for construction of
ths 11ns in four sections.
Vfork on ths railroad began soon aftsr ths receipt of ths Engineer's
report, in spite of the serious difficulties in securing financial back
ing for ths project.

By early 1837, two shipaents of railroad iron had

arrived in New Orleans for ths Red River Railroad Company, which were
transshipped via river steamer to Alexandria.

Although the iron had

been received, it was impossible for the company to lay iron during
that year, or in subsequent years.

The panic of 1837, and the result

ing depression, slowed down all improvement projects, while labor
sh<rtages caused by epidemics in 1837 and in 1839, delayed work on the
railroad until 1840.^*

The railroad directors did not even attempt to

collect stock installments during the period of depression.
however, efforts were renewed to construct the railroad.

By 1840,

Since the

four years granted in the charter for completion of tha raod had
elapsed, the directors first petitioned the legislature for an exten
sion of time to complete the railroad.

Once again, Senator Richard

Winn used his influence to get the time extended to ten years,

12

and

soon the directors of the Red River railroad began calling for install
ments from the stockholders.^

^United States, House Report. 436, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. II, 1836.
W g e w Orleans Bee. 22 January 1840, p. 2.
^3lbid.. 14 November 1840, p. 2.

By May, 1641, twelve idles of the Red River railroad had been
completed, froa Alexandria to Bayou Laaourie.

14

Although the speedy

completion of the entire thirty-one allee of track to Bayou ttuffpower
wae predicted, only four allee nore were actually conetrueted.

Soaetine

during the 1840'% the eixteen allee of the Red River railroad eaae into
the poseesslon of lta chief engineer, Ralph Salth, who previously had
worked in constructing the Cheeapeake and Ohio railroad.

Smith operated

the line for nearly twenty years, often aaidst complaints of irrespons
ible aanageaent at the expense of the public Interest.^
Civil War, the railroad finally caae to its demise.

During the

In 1864, the Red

River railroad was completely destroyed, the rails and rolling stock
16
being dumped into the Red River near Alexandria.
Thus Louisiana's
only railroad west of the Mississippi River prior to the decade of the
1850's net an inglorious end after an unprofitable twenty-three year's
of operation.
THE CLINTON AND PORT HUDSON RAILROAD
In the rural parishes east of the Mississippi River, enthusiasm
for railroads kept pace with the efforts being made in western parishes.
Railroad promoters in the Florida parishes successfully secured charters
froa the legislature for eight railroads, but the sparseness of popula
tion and the lack of resources in most of these parishes precluded the

^Alexandria Red River Whix. 8 May 1841* P* 2.
!5walter Prichard, editor, "A Tourist's Description of Louisiana in
I860*" Louisiana Historical Quarterly. X U (October, 1938), 1157*
16Whittington, "Rapides Parish," 540.
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successful construction of almost all of thess.

In tbs Feliciana

parishes, however, economic conditions were more favorable for rail
road promotion.

As cotton culture gradually moved into the lower

Mississippi region, the fertile soil of the Feliciana parishes attracted
many settlers, and plantations sprang up rapidly.

In East Feliciana

parish, for example, the population, even in 1830, was relatively large
when compared with most rural Louisiana parishes, and it increased 44
per cent during the decade.

17

Already cotton was moving triumphantly

forward to first place among the agricultural pursuits of the South,
and eventually would be 'king1 of the southern staple crops.

In the

Feliciana parishes, railroads came into being in answer to the trans
portation demands of this reigning monarch.
In East Feliciana parish, plantation owners and inland townspeople
sought an easy means of transportation from the interior to the Mississ
ippi River.

Travel for passengers and freight was both arduous and

expensive.

The cost per person of carriage passage one way between

Clinton and Bayou Sara, was eighteen dollars, while the wagon route
between Clinton
convenience.

Port Hudson left much to be desired in the way of

Transporting bulky cotton to the river was particularly

difficult and time consuming.

Slow, cumbersome wagons, lumbering over

difficult roads, required the motive power of at least five oxen or
horses to haul five to six bales of cotton; advocates of a railroad
claimed that one horse could pull a car laden with 100 bales of cotton.

^ S e e Chapter 2, FM 20.
^Receipt for transporting a box, Bayou Sara to Clinton, Marston
(Henry V. and Family) Papers, 1820-37. Calvert Typewritten MSS, 14-15.

Like ths people of Rapides pariah, Eaat Feliciana cltlsens found the
railroad tha most axpadlant aathod of Improving tranaportation.

Early

In 1933* local railroad promoters securad a charter from tha legislatura to build a railroad between tha Mississippi River at Port Hudson,
and the Interior town of Clinton, aaat of tha pariah government.

Tha

charter contained the usual privileges and concessions granted to early
railroads in Louisiana, including a a*)nopoly of the route for twentyfive years, a generous one-hundred foot right of way, and a tax exemption for the capital stock of the company for twenty-five years.
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One feature of the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad charter was however,
unique.

It protected the sauall stockholder by limiting each stockholder

to 100 votes regardless of the number of shares held.
The capital structure of the railroad was confused, partly because
the company, between 1933 and 1837, went through two capital expansions
as it enlarged the scope of its operations.

In early 1833* the company

was originally capitalised at $100,000, with power to increase to
$200,000.

The state extended financial aid to the new railroad company

by authorising the Board of Public Works to subscribe for two—hundred
shares of stock.
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This aid was only the first of a series of actions

by the state to build up the railroad's financial structure.

The next

step came later in 1833* when the legislature increased the railroad's
capitalisation to $500,000.

The method used in financing the Clinton

^Louisiana, lets. 11 Legis., 1 Sees., 1833, pp. 15-20.
aOlbld.. 79.

and Port Hudson railroad after its capital expansion to $500,OCX) was
different from any other railroad financing in the state*

The charter

provided two ways of procuring funds for the railroad by dividing the
$500,000 capital into two equal parte.

One-half of the capitalisation,

$250,000, was subscribed for in cash.

Stock purchasers paid ten dollars

at the tine of subscription, with subsequent installnents to be deter
mined by the directors.
stockholders.

The purchasers of this stock were called cash

The remaining one-half of the capitalisation was raised

by a loan based on company executed bonds at 5 per cent interest.

The

terms of the bonds were eight years ($75*000), fifteen years ($75,000),
and twenty years ($100,000).

The bonds, in turn, were secured by

mortgages on "...lands and slaves, and uncultivated lands and town lots...
mortgaged by the owners thereof in return for railroad stock.

Those

who gave mortgages instead of cash for railroad stock were called
mortgage stockholders.

There were certain restrictions on each of the

types of mortgagable property in its application toward railroad stock.
Unimproved lands and town lota were mortgaged for no more than onefifth of the stock purchased by each mortgager.

If land and slaves

were mortgaged, "...the value of the land shall be equal to two-thirds
at least of the stock...".

Brick buildings located on town lots had

to be protected by fire insurance.
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For eventual redemption of the

railroad bonds, the charter provided for a sinking fund to be created
out of surplus dividends.

21Ibld. 11 Legis., 2 Seas., 1«33, PP- 115-117.

In addition to then* liberal, even loose, provisions for raising
railroad capital, the legislature further aided the Clinton and Port
Hudson railroad’s financial structure by coercing another improvement
company, the New Orleans Gas Light and Banking Company, first, to pur*
chase the bonds of the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company, valued
at $250,000, and second to loan the railroad company $100,000 at 6 per
cent interest, for construction purposes.
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The New Orleans Gas Light

and Banking Company, which had been similarly imposed upon by the legis
lature to make a loan to the Red River Railroad, had no recourse but
submission to the legislature's dictates.

In February, 1836, the Gas

Light company took $175,000 in C. & P. H. bonds, on terms of fifteen
23
and twenty years. At the

ssbm

time the legislature was helping the

Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad raise capital, it also goaded the
directors into swifter action toward completion of the project, by
imposing a penalty of $10,000 per year, to be paid by the railroad
company to the State Treasurer, if the railroad was not completed within
three years.

The money would be refunded if the railroad was completed

within five years.
In 1837, the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company went through
another expansion of its operations, and an accompanying capital increase.
In the spring of that year, the railroad directors received permission
to extend their line from Clinton eastward to make a junction with the

^ Ibid.. 12 Legis., 2 Sees., 1836, pp. 3-4*
^Liquidator of the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company versus
James S. Ramsey and others, Kilbourne (j. G. and Family) Papers.
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projected New Orleans and Nashville railroad sosMwhere between the Amite
and the Tangipahoa Rivers.

This was not the first time that an east

ward extension of the Clinton and Port Hedson railroad has been suggested*
As early as December, 1833, the State Engineer envisioned the Clinton
and Port Hudson railroad as the first seetion of a great trunk line to
Washington and the East.

In his opinion, if Louisiana promoters took

the initiative in such a project, and built a railroad from the Mississ
ippi River to the Mississippi state line, undoubtedly promoters in the
state of Mississippi would then extend the railroad eastward from place
to place until it reached the Alabama line, where Alabamians would do
likewise.

2A

This naive and wishful thinking approach to railroad

construction was typical of railroad men in Louisiana during the 1830's.
The State Engineer was realistic about one factor, however, when he
expressed the belief that the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad would
be of little consequence as a purely local
extension to the

venture.The authorised

New Orleans and Nashville railroad was to be financed

by increasing the capitalisation of the Clinton and Port Hudson Rail
road Company to $1,000,000*

All of the $500,000 increase was to be

procured from mortgage stockholders, using the method of mortgaging
property for railroad stock, and issuing company bonds thereon*

25

Neither the Clinton and Port Hudson extension, nor the New Orleans and
Nashville railroad were completed*

^Louisiana,
'Louisiana,

House Journal. 11 Legls*, 2 Sess., 1833, pp* 23-24*
Acts. 13 Legis*, 1 Sess., 1837, pp. 9-10
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Besides extending liberal capitalization pririlegee to the
Clinton and Port Hudeon Railroad, the state also picked up the check
for the railroad surrey.

The State Engineer's report to the legisla

ture on his surrey indicated >aee of the construction difficulties
facing the railroad builders.

The distance between Port Hudson and

Clinton on a straight line was twenty miles, but the unerenness of the
terrain, cut by numerous marshy bayous, necessitated certain deflec
tions southward from the direct route.

There were two major obstacles

along the route, the crossingsorer Redwood Creek and the Conite River.
With the crossing of Redwood Creek accomplished about ten miles from
Clinton, the line would trarerse the fairly level champagne country,
called the Plains, which separated the Lake Pontchartraln and the
Mississippi River watersheds.

From the Plains, the route would cross

the Comite River two and one-quarter miles from Clinton.

The line of

elevation would rise from sixty-one feet at Port Hudson Bluff, to fourhundred-twenty-six feet near Redwood, the highest point along the route.
The State Engineer objected to making deep cuts in constructing the
roadbed, and also complained of a lack of material for embankments,
hence, he recommended the construction of a superstructure supported
upon piles.

By taking the easier, cheaper, and also less durable way

of construction, the Engineer estimated that the railroad could be built
at a cost of $8,000 per mile, or a total of $176,000.

^Louisiana, House Journal. 11 Legls., 2 Sess., 1833, pp. 24-26.
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The speedy completion of the survey, the extension of state aid,
and the easy way provided for stock subscription, did not induce a
sufficient number of private investors to subscribe for stock in the
Clinton and Port Hudson railroad.

This stockholder disinterest, and

the tardiness of the railroad directors in getting construction started,
gave the citisens of Baton Eouge an opportunity to attempt the seisure
of the Mississippi River terminus of the railroad away from Port Hudson.
In this maneuver, the Baton Rouge promoters were aided by a group of
dissatisfied stockholders of the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad
Company.

At a public meeting at Baton Rouge in January# 1835# many

citisens of the town as well as the parish of East Baton Rouge, resolved
to cooperate with a portion of the Clinton and Port Hudson stockholders
in petitioning the legislature to change the railroad charter so that
Baton Rouge, instead of Port Hudson, could be the terminus.

Within a

month, citisens of East Baton Rouge parish pledged $50,000 for the sub27
scription of railroad stock if the new route was sanctioned. ' The
legislature refused to authorise the change, but in the following year,
it did yield to pressure from railroad promoters in East Baton Rouge
parish and chartered another railroad.

In a characteristic manner of

Irresponsibility, and lack of improvement company planning, the legis
lators created the Baton Rouge and Clinton Railroad Company, capitalised
it at $800,000, and authorised it to build a railroad between Baton Rouge
and Clinton.

26

Now two railroads competed for stockholders, for capital,

for materials, and for the allegiance of a small rural area that could

^ B a t o n Roujre Qasette. 14 February 1 8 3 5 *
2 *Louisiana, Aeis. 12 Legis., 2 Bess., 1 8 3 6 , pp* 123 - 1 2 6 .
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not rapport even a single line.

The Baton Rouge and Clinton Railroad

Company sold stock, received state aid, and graded a portion of the
route, only to end its operations forever after the panic of 1637*
remains of the roadbed becaae a public highway in 1841.^

Tbs

The Clinton

and Port Hudson Railroad Coapany, having begun earlier, was financially
stronger, and soaehow survived the financial panic of 1837*
While the railroad promoters of Baton Rouge connived to change the
route of the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad, East Feliciana citisens
began supporting the railroad no re actively.

By late 1835, there was

evidence that nany residents of the parish mortgaged their property in
favor of the r a i l r o a d . I n spite of this apparent increase in public
support, the railroad directors continued to procrastinate, and aade no
immediate move to provide for construction of the road.

Finally, by

September, 1836, they advertised for railroad contractors to work the
first section of the line, beginning at Port Hudson.

Contractors were

asked to submit sealed bids before December 1, 1836, for clearing, grading or constructing seven miles of railroad.

31

Because of the late

beginning, construction operations probably did not commence before the
panic of 1837 disrupted all internal improvements projects.

During the

depression that followed, the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company
floundered without funds, and without a railroad.

By 1838, however,

promoters of the railroad once again began pushing the project, and sales

% b l d .. 15 Legis., 2 Sess., 1841, p. 403*
30clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company Papers, 1828-52
^nTew Orleans Commercial Bulletin. 1 November 1636, p. 2.
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of Mortgage stock increased rapidly.

From April to October, 1836* at

least 3,775 shares of Mortgage stock passed into the hands of citisens
in East Feliciana parish in exchange for mortgages on land, town lots,
buildings and slaves.
value of $377,500.

These shares of stock, at par, represented a

The mortgages covered land in two parishes, East

Feliciana and East Baton Rouge, totaling over 11,600 acres, one—hundredeighteen slaves, three plantation houses, numerous small tracts of land,
32
and town lots.
At last both directors and stockholders were apparently
in earnest.
Following the renewed efforts on behalf of the railroad, the
directors, by January, 1639, were enabled to construct about fourfifths of the line when the company once again hovered close to insol
vency.^

In spite of the earlier financial support from citisens of

the parish, the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company was apparently
not strong enough financially to finish building the railroad.

The only

hope for saving the partially completed railroad, it was claimed, rested
with the legislature and possible state aid.

In answer to the petitions

of the railroad company, the legislature, on March 28, 1839, passed
legislation over the veto of the governor, authorising a loan of $500,000
to the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company.

As security for the

loan, the company pledged all its assets, estimated at about $300,000,
which included the capital stock, the property, and the stockholders *s
mortgages.

The state issued bonds, payable by the railroad company in

-^Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company Papers, 1828-52.
33lfew Orleans Cnisssrc^al Bulletin. 23 January 1839, p. 2.
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three installments of ten, twenty end thirty years.

About one-heIf of

these bonds were negotiated through the Union Bank of Louisiana, which
had business connections with European capitalists.^*

If the railroad

coapany failed to pay the principal and interest on the bonds, the
railroad would become the property of the state.

The legislature

allowed the coapany until January, 1840, to complete construction of
the railroad.

In finishing the building of the railroad, the directors

used all of the state loan except $2,000, thus obligating the railroad
coapany to the state for the sum of $498,000, with interest of nearly
$25,000 per year.-*'*
The state loan to the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company
was exorbitantly generous considering the large amount of construction
already accomplished on the line, and the work remaining to be done*
The total contemplated milea|p included a track from Port Hudson, via
Redwood, to Clinton, and a spur from Redwood to Jackson.

About 80 per

cent (twenty-miles) of the twenty-seven mile railroad had been completed
before receipt of the loan.

In view of this situation, it appeared

that the legislators gave away a rather enormous sum of money to a small
group of railroad promoters in one parish, to spend almost as they pleased.
Apparently the taxpayers of Louisiana were hoodwinked out of $500,000
under the guise of constructing seven miles of railroad and purchasing

^Louisiana, Acts. 2 Legis., 1 Sess., 1848, p. 125*
•**Ibld.. 14 Legis., 1 Sess., 1839, pp. 212-218. State Treasurer's
Report, New Orleans Bee. 27 January 1842*

rolling stock for a twenty-seven alio line.

It was not even certain

that the railroad directors, when their funds ran out in 1039, had
exhausted every naans possible for financing the road with private
capital.

At the time of the state loan, the directors still had not

called in all of the installments of the cash stockholders, and did
not do so until two years later.
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If the railroad management employed

all of the state loan to the beat uses of the railroad, it was not
apparent when the state liquidation eoandssion took possession of the
line in 1042.

At that tiae, many debts of the coapany remained unpaid,

while contractors for the railroad superstructure, unable to secure
payment for their work from the company directors, had instituted a
suit for the sale of the railroad to settle their claims.

The rail

road itself "...was so much out of repair that the passage of a loco
motive over it was both difficult and hasardous..." and a considerable
cash outlay necessary to put the road in running order.^
It was inevitable that the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad, a
project of little merit in its own right, would fall in fulfilling
its financial obligations to the state.

The coapany, already greatly

overcapitalized after 1037, struggled under a bonded indebtedness far
out of proportion to the value, or the utility, of the railroad.

The

first two years of the railroad's operations showed conclusively that
the company was incapable of paying the interest on the bonds of the

■^Jackson Feliciana Republican. 30 January 1041*
^Louisiana, Senate Journal. I Legis.. 1 Sess., 1046, pp. 41-42.
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state eren from gross earnings.

An indication of this fact was the

amount of cotton shipped over one section of the line, from Clinton
to Port Hudson, in 1841, and in 1842.

Cotton growers gave the railroad

most of its business, but with a tariff of one dollar per bale, the
9,229 bales shipped in 1841, and the 8,087 bales in 1842, brought a
trifling gross revenue compared with the staggering financial obli
gations of the railroad.*^®

Because of the limited economic oppor

tunities for any rural short line railroad to expand operations, the
traffic moving over the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad represented
only a fraction of the railroad's capacity to serve the comsumity.
Even substantial increases in the tariff would have been insufficient
to save the company.

The stage was set for state seisure of the

railroad.
State intervention in the affairs of the railroad came in Harch,
1841, when the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company defaulted in
paying interest on the state bonds.

In order to protect the credit

of the state, the legislature directed the State Treasurer to pay the
interest.

At the same time, other steps were taken to deal with the

insolvent railroad company.

In accordance with the 183V act authorising

the state loan to the railroad, the legislature ordered the seisure of
the company's property, valued by appraisers at $13,470, and proceed
ings of liquidation were instituted.

To this end, the Governor appointed

three liquidation commissioners who took over the railroad and operated it.

■^Manifesto of Cotton, Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Coapany Papers,

1828-52.
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Oth«r steps wars taken to foreclose the stockholders •s mortgages*
Although several suits were instituted, involving about 761 shares
of stock, it was found that in most instances few mortgage stock
holders were in arrears.^

The railroad and its property1 remained

in the hands of the state until January, 1846, when it was sold for
$45,000, to a New Orleans firm, C* C. Lathrop and Company*

The

purchasers intended to make necessary repairs and put the railroad
into effective operation.

Unforseen circumstances, however, led to

the disavowal of the purchase agreement by the buyers, and the return
of the railroad to the state.

It seemed that the railroad company

had been a debtor to many besides the state, and these other creditors
looked to the railroad property as a means of reimbursement*

When

the State

Treasurer attempted to sell the railroad, the other claimants

placed an

injunction upon the proceedings. Under these conditions, the

state could not give a clear title to the railroad, and C. C. Lathrop
and Company declined to honor
Once

the purchaseagreement.

40

again the state had on its handsa railroad already in an

advanced state of dilapidation, a condition which daily grew worse.
Although the legislature offered generous terms to any prospective
purchaser, including payments for the railroad in installments, the
railroad and its property remained unsold until 1853.

41

During this

^Louisiana, Acts. 15 Legis*, 2 Sees., 1841-52, pp. 258-262* Louisiana,
Senate Journal. 1 Legis., 1 Sess., 1846, p* 42. Liquidator of the Clinton
and Pori Hudson Railroad Company versus James 3. Ramsey and others, Kilbourne
(J. 0. sad Family) Papers.
The movable property of tbs company was listed and appraised as follows:
four locomotives, $4500} twelve burden ears, $2120$ ten slaves, $6850; Total,
$13,470, Clinton and Fort Hudson Railroad Company Papers, 1828-52.
4°Louioiana, Acts, 1 Legis., 1 Sess., 1846, pp. 111-112. Louisiana,
Senate Journal. 1 Legis., 1 Sess., 1846, p. 53.
^Louisiana, Acts. 1 Legis., 1 Sees., 1846, pp. 111-112.
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period of state ownership, the liquidators again took eharge of the
affairs of the railroad and its operations*

finally, in Mareh, 1653,

the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad was again sold.

It was purchased

at a sheriff's sale by an Kast Feliciana resident acting on behalf of
a group of planters and businessaea in the parish, who had previously
forned a corporation to purchase the railroad from the state.

The now

corporation, chartered in March, 1652, as the Clinton and Port Hudson
Railroad Conpany, was capitalised at $50,300.

Ten local promoters of

the coapany took all of the

capital stock of

503 shares.

price paid for the railroad

equaled the full

capitalisation of the new

coapany.

Presumablythe

The owners inasdlately took steps to provide the ooanunity

with better service, and to

operate the road

By the tine of the sale of the

on a profitable basis.

Clinton and Port Hudson railroad

in 1853, the road had been chartered for twenty years and operating for
about thirteen years.

The econosdc effect of the Clinton and Port

Hudson railroad on East Feliciana Parish must remain partly a natter
of conjecture, although one fact was fairly certain.

The investment

of several hundreds of thousands of dollars in the parish must have
temporarily influenced land values on the plantations and in the towns.
The coming of the railroad also encouraged land speculation.

In Port

Hudson, for example, two businessmen-speculatora, James Hudson and
Hugh B. Maxwell, in anticipation of an expanding population, began
surveying land for town lots long before completion of the railroad was
in sight.

, 206-208.
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Speculators had good reason to be optimistic at this time.

As early

as October, 1835* citisens in East Feliciana Parish discussed the
possibility of making Port Hudson an official port of entry by act
of Congress.

There was even talk of erecting a cotton factory at

that place.^

The panic of 1837 left James Hudson, at least, heavily in debt,
and by 1649, the creditors of both Hudson and the deceased Maxwell
forced the sale of all their property around Port Hudson.

The rail

road had failed to transform Port Hudson into a populous Mississippi
River port, or to alter greatly the course of the economy of the region.
Nevertheless, if reports of the late 1840's were true, Port Hudson did
experience some economic growth.

Trade was brisk, a receiving and for

warding business was established, and many new buildings were erected
between 1845 and 1850.

Much of this growth can be attributed to the

expanding cotton economy, although undoubtedly the existence of the
railroad aided somewhat, even though trains ran at most irregular
intervals.

Indeed, train service in 1850 was so erratic that a livery

stable was established in Port Hudson bee tuse of the absence of dependable passenger service to the interior.
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Land speculators were active in Clinton as well as Port Hudson
during the period that the railroad was being constructed.

Part of

the Kilbourne estate, located along the railroad, was surveyed for

^ New Orleans Bee. 20 October 1835, p* 2.
A4lbid., 14 November 1849, P- 2; 16 January 1850, p. 2.
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town lots about 1841 in anticipation of tha expansion of tha town*
By 1646, aftar tha completion of tha new Killian Hotel, Clinton eould
boast tha possession of two hotels and a three story office building.^
As the inland terminus of the railroad, Clinton must hare been the
center of much business activity from the surrounding cotton plantations.
Nevertheless, in spite of the slight growth in Clinton and Port Hudson,
the role of the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad up to 1653 was a some
what dismal recital of the futility of the all rural railroad.

Its

cost represented an enormous sum to invest in one rural parish during
the early Nineteenth century, and its utility to the planters in the
area, although highly beneficial, could not justify the cost.
THE WEST FELICIANA RAILROAD

The history of one other railroad must be Included in the somewhat
woeful saga of railroad promotion and construction in Louisiana's rural
parishes prior to 1850.

The parish in which the details of this story

unfolded was West Feliciana.

The railroad built there was the first

railroad chartered for Louisiana's rural parishes, and the second rail
road chartered in the state.

Economic conditions in Vest Feliciana

Parish were more favorable for railroad development than any Louisiana
parish, If the word 'favorable* could be aptly applied to these condi
tions, and the population growth during the 1830's generally paralleled
that of East Feliciana parish.
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Because of the absence of important

{►Jciinton Feliciana Whig. 20 June 1649, p. 2,
*®See Chapter 2, M 15/

do
inland towns in any direction except north, tha railroad crossed tha
Mississippi atata lina, thus receiving tha dubious distinction of
becoming anothsr on# of tha famous firsts, in this easa, tha first
interstata railroad in tha United States.

Tha railroad in West Felici

ana Parish, among tha three rural railroads of Louisiana, night be
classified as tha nodal railroad, but again, only if tha word 'modal'
could be applied to the least of three evils.

Comparisons of tha

planning, the financing, tha construction, the management, and tha
operations of the three railroads, bora out this conclusion.
Tha West Feliciana Railroad Company was chartered by tha legis
lature in March, 1631, after two and one-half years of promotional
activity by its sponsors and other interested parties.

Although tha

railroad, whan completed, was primarily a Louisiana railroad in its
mileage, tha original promotion of tha project began in the town of
Woodvilie, Mississippi, among a small group of citisens anxious to
improve comsunications between Woodville and tha Mississippi River.
The first suggestion for sueh a railroad appeared in September, 1826,
in a communication to tha Woodville Republican. This latter discussed
tha advantages of a railroad between Woodville and St. Francisvilla,
Louisiana, the first steamboat port of importance south of the town
of Natches.

With much exuberance and enthusiasm, but without supporting

statistical evidence, the correspondent claimed that a railroad would
save each plantation owner between $200 and $500 yearly in transporta
tion coats, while additional advantages would result from savings in
time.

Transporting cotton by railroad Instead of wagon would probably

out the time by one and one-half, while the existence of speedier
transportation would enable cotton producers to take advantage of the

ex
fluctuating demand for cotton, when "...the difference of a day would
oftentimes deprive ua of the benefit of a market."^

The suggeetlon

to build a railroad had been made, but it was not until a year and a
half later that tangible action resulted.

This action came when In

March, 1530, citisens of Woodville, in a public nesting, discussed the
subject of a railroad and appointed a cooedttee to explore its possi
bilities.

The eoanittec received instructions, first, to conduct an

econoeic survey of the resources In the area, and after this, to
correspond with President Jackson, asking for the services of the
United States Engineers in asking a survey of the r o u t e . T h e econooic
survey would include such vital data as land values and cotton exports
froa the region, and was a unique and far-sighted action soldo* prac
ticed by the railroad promoters of the 1830's.
While the various coosdttees collected data and carried on corres
pondence, the proponents of the railroad attracted attention to the
project through the press.

One of these railroad apostles was Willia*

Haile, Woodville lawyer, and later, West Feliciana railroad director.
Haile attempted to answer the charge that the railroad would be extremely
expensive to construct.

He argued that the cost of construction for

this particular railroad did not necessarily have to be as high as
other types of railroads because only light, bulky products, such as
sugar, cotton and timber, would be hauled.

In the absence of heavy

^Woodville Republican, 30 September 1525, quoted in Calvert
Typewritten iBa, 2.
^Calvert Typewritten MSS, 4*
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freight like etone end coal, the use of lighter end thinner reile
would be feeeible end much lees costly.

The fairly level end firm

terrain of the eree would ela# add to the economy of construction
beeeuse no excavations were necessary.

Haile wee unrestrained in his

optimism about the beneficial effeets of the railroad.

Real estate

values would certainly rise, while Woodville would eventually become
a manufacturing town.

Also, there were native natural resources to

be developed, including a stone quarry (an obvious contradiction to
hia argument for cheap construction), deposits of fire clay, and a
copper mine on Buffalo Creek.
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Haile's promotion of the project

was timely and necessary, because opposition appeared to the railroad, and also to the route to St. Francisville.

Many loyal Miseiss-

ippians preferred developing a port town in their own state, rather
than benefiting a town in Louisiana.
If Haile greatly minimised the problems facing the railroad
builders, the opposition somewhat overestimated the difficulties
involved.

Nevertheless, one writer, submitted a factual and thought

ful article to the Woodville Republican against building a railroad
that could not be ignored.

First, the writer recognised that railroads

improved economic conditions in an area only under certain circum
stances.

Definite prerequisites were necessary, such as a fairly dense

population, an "active commerce", and manufacturing.

Whether or not

conditions in West Feliciana Parish and Wilkinson County, Mississippi,

^Woodville

MSS,

8-4.

Republican. 25 August 1830, quoted in Calvert Typewrittmi
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fulfill'd these requircamnts, the writer udLd, m i the real issue in
the eonstru tion ef a railroad.

Second, the writer meted that esti

mated costs for a railroad at Manchester, England,

.where both

labor and material are far cheaper than in any portion of this country... "
were about $90,000 per mile.

Thus, to build a nineteen mile railroad

from Vood-rille, west to Fort Adams on the Mississippi Hirer, if the
latter town were substituted for St. Fraudarilie, it would cost
$1,700,000, with an annual interest of $140,000.

Allowing for a

maximum of 30,000 bales of cotton per year using tha railroad facilities,
it would be necessary to lory a tariff of four dollars and sixty cents
per bale to pay Just the interest charges, and eren this amount would
be out of gross earnings.

Although these estimates were too high, the

correspondent was closer to the economic facts of the situation than
was Haile.50
While debates orer the railroad continued in the press, the
promoters and the local eoomdttees searched for all possible infor
mation on railroads.

Haile of Wood-rills, besides his letters to the

papers, kept in comaunication with railroad promoters in other parts
of the state.

Among his correspondents was M. W. Hoffman of New Orleans,

the railroad enthusiast who guided the destinies of the recently
chartered Pontchartrain railroad.

Hoffhan, In addition to his exper

iences with the Pontchartrain railroad, possessed other knowledge of
railroads through contacts with the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and

50o n . . no date given, quoted in Calvert Typewritten MSS, 7.
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he furnished valuable advice to Hallo on the many ramifications of
organising a railroad company.

His letters indodod information about

••curing a railroad chartor, construction techniques, matorials needed,
and soots of construction.
nil*.

Tho latter, ho «stlmatod at $6,370 por

Thoso eoomunications from a not completely inexperienced rail

road builder were published in the newspapers and undoubtedly aided
the West Feliciana railroad promoters in swaying public opinion.
Meanwhile, the local committees continued collecting economic data.
Ry December, 1830, the St. Francisville committee completed its work
and reported to an open meeting of all West Feliciana citisens friendly
to the railroad.

It was this December meeting, held at the St.

Francisville courthouse, that sanctioned the application for the charter
granted by the Louisiana legislature in March, 1831.

The West Feliciana

Railroad Coapany was at least an accomplished fact, if only on paper.^
The company received power to construct a railroad from the
Mississippi River, at or near St. Francisville, to the Mississippi
state line, and during the forty year period of its monopoly, the
railroad was exempt fro* taxation.

Although capitalised at only

$150,OCX), the company could add 1,000 shares of stock ($100,000) if
necessary to complete the railroad.

The West Feliciana charter con

tained a provision Included in other railroad charters granted later
by the legislature that safeguarded the interests of the small stock
holders.

No individual stockholder was permitted to cast over 100 votes

^Hoffman to Haile, 6 September 1830, quoted in Calvert Typewritten
MSS, 11. Louisiana, House Journal. 10 Legis., 1 Sess., 1831, p. 149*

65
while five or more stockholders with at least 100 shares of stock eoul4
demand a stockholders*s meeting.

One provision of the Vest Feliciana

charter was unlike its model, the Pontchartrain rai?

1 charter*

Whereas the Pontchartrain charter prescribed railroad rates, the West
Feliciana charter left this matter to the discretion of the directors.
Indeed, the directors possessed rate making power over two types of
railroad functions, the use of the railroad, and the use of wharves and
warehouses that the company might build at the Mississippi River port.
Charter provisions instructed the directors, within ten days after their
first meeting, to publish a railroad tariff, the rates of which must
not be increased during the one year term of the directors.

In the

case of the wharves and the warehouses, the directors could fix rates,
but the legislature reserved for itself the power either to regulate,
or to change these rates.^
With the charter in their possession, the promoters wasted little
time in offering railroad stock to the public.

Only three months passed

before the railroad commissioners charged with the sale of stock, opened
their offices.

In June, 1831* residents of West Feliciana Parish were

given the opportunity to register their approval of the proposed inter
nal improvement by subscribing for West Feliciana railroad stock.
Citisens of Woodville, Mississippi, might purchase stoek also, although
the charter for the Mississippi section of the line had not yet been
granted by the Mississippi legislature.

In this activity of raising

^Louisiana, House Journal. 10 Legis., 1 Sess., 1631,pp. 120-129
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railroad capital. Judge Edward McGehee, prominent Vast Feliciana
plantation owner, served as a stook nnmmlssioner at 3t. Francisville,
53
and staunchly supported the railroad project*
Rapid subscription
for railroad stock was Important, because it was necessary to sell
1,000 shares, and receive payent of $10,000 (ten dollars per share),
before the stockholders could Legally eeet and elect coapany officers.
The Vest Feliciana Railroad Company finally became a complete
entity In December, 1831, when the legislature of Mississippi incor
porated the Mississippi sector of the line, from the Louisiana border
northward to Woodville.

The possession of charters from two states,

however, did not increase the attractiveness of railroad stock to
private investors.

By 1833, the railroad company still floundered

without sufficient stockholders, and without company officers.

5JL

Under these circumstances, an offer of financial aid from the state
of Louisiana was most welcome.

The legislature, in 1833, authorised

the purchase of 100 shares of railroad stock, but hedged the offer with
certain qualifications.

State subscription for stock could not go

into effect until private individuals purchased 500 shares, and then,
only one-half of the state subscription could be paid in cash.

The

legislature further protected the interests of the state by empowering
the governor to appoint an additional railroad director to represent
the state.^

^Calvert Typewritten MSS, 5-6.
^Louisiana, Acts. U Legis., 1 Sess., 1833, p. 1*
55Ibid.
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Although the state of Louisiana offered to become a partner In
the West Feliciana railroad, there was apparently no additional private
support forthcoming.

Planter opposition became especially strong when

the railroad promoters suggested purchasing slaves to build the rail
road,

Many felt

..it would be dangerous to have so many slaves in

the vicinity of our plantations.” Most of the stockholders regretted
having risked their money during the initial wave of enthusiasm for
the railroad, while the promoters themselves lost interest and failed
to carry on even rudimentary public relations policies.

Thus, the

Woodville Republican, in the summer of 1833, complained that "...no
reports, no publications, no proceedings, no nothing in tangible shape
has reached the public...the people feel reluctant to pay out money for
a purpose they are not informed of...it's all talk and no cider.
Although the Louisiana legislature obligingly extended the time for
completion of the road to five years so ths charter would not be for
feited, it seemed as if the West Feliciana railroad was dooswd,^
Since state aid from Louisiana failed to revive ths project, the
Mississippi legislature offered its own solution for the problems of
the financially unsupported, and unconatructed railroad.

In December,

1833, the Mississippi company received power to open and operate a
bank in Woodville, with branch banks in Vicksburg, Natches and Brandon.

'Woodville Republican. 15 June 1833, quoted in "West Feliciana A
Century Old." Illinois Central Magasine. H I (March, 1931), 4.
5fLouisiana, Acts. 11 Legis., 1 Sess., 1833, p* 79.
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The bank was empowered to circulate two kinds of bills and notes, one
kind based upon railroad stock, and the other, upon deposits.

The

amount of this circulating bank paper was restricted to "...twice the
amount of the capital stock actually paid in and moneys deposited...11
in the bank.'** Assuming that all the capital stock, $250,000, had been
subscribed for and paid in, the West Feliciana railroad bank, in effect,
could hare doubled the amount of capital at the disposal of the rail
road, while additional bank money could be created from private deposits.
This granting of loosely controlled banking privileges to the West
Feliciana Railroad Company only aggravated the railroad's financial
problems.

The unwise practices pursued by the bank, and the depre

ciation of its bills and notes, eventually brought intense criticism,
and discredited the whole railroad project.
As the railroad project reached its nadir in 1833 and 1834, many
citisens in West Feliciana Parish would not suffer the effort to fail,
and by early 1835, after a revival of Interest, plans were made to
begin construction of the railroad.

By March of that year, the directors

advertised for contractors's bids to grade and bridge seven to fifteen
nilee of railroad, beginning at Bayou Sara.

Other contractors were

asked to bid to supply timber for the project.
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At the same time,

the directors placed orders in Bngl&nd for railroad iron.

Actual work

on the road began in July, 1835, amidst glowing predictions that the
railroad would be completed within two years.

Apparently the contracts

^®Mew Orleans Bee. 15 May 1835, p. 1 Calvert Typewritten MSS, 17-18.
S^Iew friTfme Bee. 23 July 1835, p. 2.
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negotiated In 1835 by the railroad company were not satisfactory, for
a short time later, the directors secured the services of a new group
of railroad builders.

In January, 1836, the firm of Isaac McCord and

Company of Pennsylvania, agreed to perform all the grading, road for
mation, grubbing, bridging and trestle work for the sum of $$00,000.
Further, the contractor promised to supply labor, tools and lumber
for construction, while the railroad company would supply the iron.
It appeared to the railroad directors that their construction problems
had been solved, but one small matter haunted them throughout the
operations of the McCord Company, and that was the lack of money to
pay the contractors.^
The McCord construction company began work soon after signing
the contract, and worked on the railroad until August, 1837*

During

this eighteen month period, they grubbed and cleared the line for
twenty miles, made over 220,000 cubic yards of excavations and 200,000
cubic yards of embankments, and laid five miles of superstructure, in
addition to building abutments, culverts, and intricate trestle work.
But relations between the McCord company and the West Feliciana Rail
road Company were by no means harmonious, and after charges of bad
faith by both sides, the association finally ended when the Chief
Engineer of the railroad, Samuel H. Kneass, suspended the operations
of the contractors in August, 1837.

This action had been provided for

in the contract, but many years of litigation followed before affairs

60
Petition, Isaac McCord and Company versus the West Feliciana
Railroad Company, Case 1978, Butler (Thosms; Papers, hereinafter cited
McCord Petition*
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between railroad company and contractor war* sottlod.

After McCord

left, the Heat Feliciana Railroad Company itself constructed some of
the road, and contracted parte of it to others, but the work was net
completely finished between Bayou Sara and Wbodville until the fall
61
of 1842.
West Feliciana Parish finally had its railroad, but the
capital outlay had been far beyond the wildest dreams of the promoters.
This internal improvement had cost over $464,000, exclusive of railroad
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iron and spikep .

Building the West Feliciana railroad offered constructional as
well as financial problems.

The simple movement of earth for excava

tions and embankments had to be done by hand labor, and was a slow,
weary task.

The railroad required twenty-eight miles of grubbing,

over 400,000 cubic yards of common excavation, $00,000 cubic yards of
embankment sixteen feet wide, and sixty culverts and bridges before the
roadbed was prepared for laying the superstructure.

The first task,

grubbing, cost $450 per mile, and included cutting down trees at least
twenty-five feet on each side of the center line of the road.
excavation varied with the obstacles encountered.

Common

At sixteen cents

per cubic yard, the cost of common excavation was high enough, but the
removal of compacted, clayey hardpan, caused the price to more than
double.

When bed rock was encountered, the price of excavating climbed

to eighty-five cents per cubic yard.

/Testimony, McCord Case.
^Testimony (Whiles), McCord Case.

A laborer could remove about twelve
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yards of

o o m o i i

excavation in * day, but only six yards of hard pan*

Also costly was ths construction of trsstla work and the horisontal
part of bridges.

This work cost six dollars par linear foot, but when

the bridge specifications called for the wore involved town lattice
plan of construction, the price was twenty-four dollars per linear foot*
Building the superstructure of the road was estimated, in 1836, at
$3,650 per sile, but this figure was conservative.
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Procuring sufficient timber supplies was also a problem.

It was

estimate^ in 1836, that for seven miles of the line, at least 140,000
feet of timber was required for the superstructure, 1,400 feet for the
horisontal superstructure of the bridges, and 20,000 feet for trestle
work.

The railroad engineer used great care in prescribing only the

most durable types of timber for the road.

The original plan called

for the use of only red cypress, yellow poplar, yellow heart pine, red
cedar, or white oak for foundation sills, cross sills, and rails,
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but

apparently supply problems led to experimentation with other types of
timber.

The much inferior white cypress lumber went under the sills of

the superstructure in spite of the fact that the contract with the
McCord company specified the use of best quality timber.

Either for

reasons of econosy, or because of the scarcity of sawed lumber, the
railroad directors, by 1836, gave up the plan to purchase custom made
lumber, and began sawing their own pieces for the superstructure.

For

^Contract between Isaac McCord and Company and the West Feliciana
Railroad Company, Butler (Thomas) Papers, hereinafter cited McCord Con
tract* Testimony (Savoy), McCord Case*
^Calvert Typewritten MSS, 17-18.
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this task, the McCord company constructed a m

mill at Bayou Sara at

a location where rafts of timber could bo floated to ths nlll froai tbs
river about six nonths of the yoar.^
Ths Hast Feliciana railroad directors went through many frustrat
ing experiences securing railroad iron, and United supplies of the
netal were obtained only after nueh hard luck as well as inefficient
planning*

Ths first ahipuent of 11*00 arrived in Mew Orleans fron

Knglaad in July, 1836, but during ths transhipment to Bayou Sara,
part of it was lost when the river boat sank.

Another shipment of

iron arrived in New York on July 25, 1836, and thus, had to be re
loaded on a ship bound for New Orleans, where again, it was sent by
river boat to Bayou Sara.

Why the West Feliciana railroad directors

pemdtted part of their iron to be sent this roundabout route via Mew
York, thus incurring additional handling charges, remained a mystery.
About 300 tons of railroad iron arrived at Bayou Sara in August, 1836,
In addition to the 9,000 bars making up ths bulk of the shipment, there
were sixty casks of spikes weighing about 450 pounds each, and six casks
of plates that weighed between 1,000 and 1,100 pounds each*^

The

directors, in compliance with the provisions of the tariff of 1832,
posted bonds for their railroad iron as a guarantee that the iron would
be used only for the railroad, and would be laid on the superstructure
within the specified time*
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67 Because of many uncontrollable conditions,

/McCord Contract, McCord Petition. Testimony, McCord Case.
^Testimony (Woodruff), McCord Case.
^united States, Senate Reports. 155, 31 Cong., 1 Sees., Tol. 1, 1850.
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the railroad company did not lay the iron within the tine linit pre
scribed by Congress, and forfeited the duty*

It was not until 1654*

that Congress passed a law to renit the duty to the railroad eompaay.^*
The problea of supplying the labor fores and also the equipnent for
construeting the railroad rested with the contractor.

The McCord company

agreed to furnish laborers as well as other equipnent* including horses
and wagons* wheelbarrows* axes* picks and shovels.

Soon after the

contractors arrived and began work* they hired about eighty laborers
in Louisville* Kentucky.

These workers cane to Bayou Sara via river

steaner* and the McCord company paid their passage* and provided room
and board after their arrival.

Most of the labor force imported by

the McCord company possessed previous railroad building experience*
and were a part of a labor force in the nation that moved from one
railroad construction job to another.

Despite the addition of numerous

workers from the North* the labor force mustered to build the West
Feliciana railroad was always insufficient in numbers.

In addition to

bringing in laborers* the McCord company purchased numerous horses and
about 100 carts in the midwest at considerable expense and freighted
them on the rivers to Bayou Sara.

It cost about $15 per horse* and $10

per cart for freight passage from Louisville.

Also* considerable

quantities of oats* bran and hay to feed the beasts* came southward by
the same means.

These facts* unimportant in themselves* did illustrate

the inability of both New Orleans manufacturing and Louisiana agriculture

^United States* House Report. 368* 33 Cong.* 1 Sess.* Vol. Ill* 1654.
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to provide even the rudimentary necessities for tbo railroad builders
In Louisiana.
The McCord company, boaldoa its own diroct offorta in building tbo
railroad, ofton sub-contracted work when possible.

Sub-lotting Jobs

could bo dono only with tbo eonoont of tbo railroad company, and usually
Involved tbo more opooialisod task of building tbo ouporotructuro. A
fow abater carpenters, with thoir helpers, received contraeto froa tbo
McCord company for ouch work.

Moot of thooo sub-contractors bad boon

building railroad superstructures for several years and wore highly
experienced in their craft.

Usually an experienced carpenter, with

four or fire hands, laid down a nile of superstructure in a aonth if
the grading was done and the timber delivered.

Although the amount

of work available for those specialists was sporadic, the rewards were
high.

Apparently these superstructure exports enjoyed a sellers' market,

for the pries per mile, varying with the railroad, usually ran from
$600 to $2,400.

One contractor "...got 4 bitts a foot...", or $2,640

per mile, for laying the superstructure on the Clinton and Port Hudson
railroad, but admittedly "...it would have been worth $1,500 per aile."
Another contractor, in 1832, laid superstructure on the Baltimore and
Ohio railroad for $686.40 per aile, making a profit of $400 per aile.
The McCord company paid around $800 per mile for laying the super
structure on the West Feliciana railroad.

Obviously, the cost of skilled

labor represented a considerable chunk of the cost of a construction
project even in the days before the so-called monopolistic labor union.

^Testimony (Savoy, Holly, and Mathews), McCerd Case
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The contract between the McCord company cod the West Feliciana
Railroad Company was at no tins completely advantageous to the contractor,
while relations between the contracting parties became progressively
worse following the financial panic of 1037*

The McCord company, in a

tine of inflation, assumed the obligation to build the railroad for a
fixed sum of money, and felt the squeese of rising prices during the
short period of operations.

Unavoidable miscalculations in estimating

costs added to the hardships of the contractor, and the McCord company
would probably have lost money had not the panic of 1837 intervened*
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The whole situation was further complicated by the unwise banking
practices of the Vest Feliciana Railroad Bank.

Loose charter provisions

permitted the bank to expand circulation of bank bills and notes with
precariously meager supplies of specie as reserve.
bitter day of reckoning arrived.

In May, 1837, the

West Feliciana Railroad Bank notes

declined alarmingly in value, while backing in specie was practically
non-existent.

The railroad company could not discharge its financial

obligations except with Inflated bank notes, called at that time,
"West Feliciana Railroad money."

The value of these bank notes depre—

elated so greatly that discount rates ranged between 25 and 50 per cent.
The railroad workers, paid either in worthless bank notes, or not paid
at all, justly complained that they were being cheated and many left the
job.

The McCord company thus found Itself in an unenviable situation.

^^Testlmony (Hoard), McCord Case.
'^Testimony (Orayson and Montgomery), McCord Case.
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Its labor force gradually dwindled away, while the prospectj diminished
for reimbursement for the work already done,

Nevertheless, in spite

of these adverse conditions, the McCord company continued work on the
railroad with a akeletin crew until the Chief Biglneer of the railread terminated the contract in August, 1637*
After its dissdasal, the McCord company left West Felieiana
Pariah Immediately, but relatione between the estranged construction
company and the West Feliciana railroad did not end until 1843*

The

disgruntled contractor sued the railroad in the Thiid District Court,
West Felieiana Parish, in 1639, for breach of contract.

It was

charged that the railroad company cheated the McCord company in a
number of ways:

by underestimating the value of work done on the

railroad and paying the contractors accordingly; by failing to furnish
iron plates, rails, cast iron, chains, splicing plates and spikes when
needed; by paying its obligations with inflated West Feliciana Rail
road Bank notes; by failing to provide the services of an engineer for
three months during 1636; and finally, by refusing to pay the MeCord
company the value of materials and lumber that it had furnished.

The

contractor demanded $500,000 damages for these breaches of contract.
In addition, the MeCord cos^any asked $30,000 for a railroad bridge
they had constructed over Bayou Sara.
If the McCord company somewhat overstated their case, the West
Feliciana Railroad Company, in answering the petition, lost contact
with the facts.

The railroad company boldly charged that McCord had

caused the railroad expense because of failure to carry out the terns
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of the contract, mud demanded nearly $195*000 damages.72

The cmse

finally had a hearing in 1642 in the West Feliciana Dietrlet Court*
but tram dl endseed by the presiding judge, Isaac Johnson* who was
apparently a railroad partisan,

A reversal of Judge Johnson's deci

sion by the Louisiana Supremo Court resulted in the trial of the
ease in 1645.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,

but then proceeded to enact a travesty on justice.

MeCord and ecmpany

received damages, but instead of the $530,000 they requested, the jury
awarded six and one-quarter cents.

McCord also had to pay the costs

of the suit.73
After the Chief Engineer of the West Feliciana railroad ended
the contract with the McCord company in the summer of 1837* the
railroad eompany continued constructing the line, building some on
its own, and contracting Jobs to others.
muoh of the superstructure itself.

The railroad company laid

Sometimes plantation owners con

tracted to build part of the railroad.
Joseph Johnson and Judge Edward McGehee.

Two such men were Major
Both served as railroad

directors, and together they built the last section of the railroad
to Woodville.

Judge McGehee, for his part, utilised hie plantation

slaves, consisting of thirty-five to forty hands, whenever they could
be spared from the crops.

In good weather these laborers worked the

^^McCord Petition.
73Sidney j, Aucoln, "The Political Career of Isaac Johnson, Governor
of Louisiana, 1846-1650,■ Louisiana Historical Qaarterljr. XXVIII
(July, 1945i 955.
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railroad, while in vat weather they were employed in getting timber.
McGehee1e slaves came felly equipped with all the implements neeeaaary
for carrying on the construction work.

Presumably other plantation

owners favorable to the railroad used their labor forces in a like
manner.

In spite of this sustained local effort, however, the rail

road company could never muster as many workers as the McCord company.
Thus the West Feliciana railroad was finished by local plantation
owners in cooperation with the railroad company.

In a way the rail

road was a community project, although the contributing citizens reaped
their rewards in return for efforts on behalf of the railroad.

The

West Feliciana Railroad Company paid the plantation contractors well
for the 'mechanical labour' supplied.

McGehee, Johnson and others

received between #1,200 and #1,500 per mile, exclusive of materials,
for the labor furnished in grading the road.

The profits accruing

from the labor of idle plantation hands were well worthwhile.

Judge

McGehee's superintendent reported that expenses of carrying out a
#1,500 contract for the railroad were less than #500, thus leaving a
profit for this improvement minded citizen of over #1,000.
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Regardless of the mftorta of the railroad company and local
residents to construct the line, progress toward completion was pain
fully slow.

Although a locomotive had been purchased before the arrival

of McCord and Company in February, 1636, two years later trains ran only

(Butler), McCord Case.
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fire miles, as far as the Barrow plantation at Rosadale.

In November,

1336, fifteen months after the MeCord company departed, the Maadv^Hf
Republican complained that "...patience seems to be nearly exhausted
In relation to the tardy progress of this work...Some plainly insinuate
that the railroad bank is conducted more with a view to swell the
wealth of Individual stockholders than to effect the laudable objective

/Jor7 which its charter was granted."7^

gj 1840, much work still

remained to be done, and the time limit set by the charter for con
structing the railroad had expired.

By this time the West Feliciana

railroad had become such a controversial issue in West Feliciana Parish
that many local residents put up determined opposition to the extension
of the charter.

Nevertheless, the Louisiana legislature extended the

time limit for five years, although it was noted that "...there are
many more petitioners against the extension of the charter than in its
favor...".76
The reasons for opposition to the railroad were not difficult to
find, for the railroad directors, in an evasive, public-be-damned
attitude, had avoided both public and private obligations of the railroad

7^Wbodville Republican. 27 November 163S, quoted in "West Feliciana
A Century Old," Illinois Central Maxaslnc. XIX (March, 1931), 4* John
B. Heronan, Jr., "A Study of the Economic Development of the Tasoo and
Mississippi Valley Railroad," unpublished Master's thesis, Department
of History, Louisiana State University, 1934* p. 3*
7°New Orleans Bee. 24 January 1840, p. 2. Louisiana Acts. 14 Legis.,
2 Sess., 1&40, P* HO.
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eMptqjr,

It appeared that the dlraetors maintained no fixed domicile

for thair arrant corporation In Vast Feliciana Pariah, and that company
off!car* prorad to be moat Inaeoaaalbla whan sought by bill collectors,
or by bailiffs with notices of litigation against the railroad company.
To correct this Irresponsibility, the Louisiana legislature, while
extending the charter for fire years, ordered the railroad company to
maintain a permanent railroad office at or near St, Francisrllle, where
all company business could be conducted.

The legislature also attempted

to force the railroad company to beoone legally responsible.

It pro-

rlded that "...all citations, writs, orders or notices...shall be held
and deemed to be good and ralid in law..." if giren to the officer or
agent at the company office personally, or if "...made by leaving the
same at the said office, or by attaching them to the door thereof in
case of the absence of such officer or agent..,".

Such legislative

phrases apoke for themselves as to the integrity of the West Feliciana
Railroad Company in 1840.
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The completed line to Woodville was finished in the fall of 1842,
and the first steam locoawtive, with its grotesque coaches and its
burden cars puffed obtrusively into that sleepy Mississippi village.
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If the transportation revolution, begun in this area nearly twelve
years earlier when the Louisiana legislature chartered the West Feliciana
railroad, was finally completed, its effects upon the cosnunlty and the
people were not as revolutionary as the erstwhile promoters had predicted.

'^Louisiana, Acts, 14 Legis., 2 Sees., 1840, p. H O ,
?*Testim0ny (flETTes), MeCord Case. Calvert Typewritten MSS, 24*
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The railroad company during most of ite existence after 1642, could
barely make ends meet.

Frequently railroad service was suspended for

long periods to make repairs, much to the annoyance of the local
clientele.

In 1851, the horrible condition of the West Feliciana rail

road caused the Woodville Republican to comment that "We have what might
be called a railroad; at present it is a burlesque on the anem, and
almost a nuisance; we will be glad when the road is repaired."
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The

West Feliciana drifted along close to bankruptcy until 1686, when it
defaulted on its bonds.

The following year, the railroad was merged

with the Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railroad Company.®®
The economic effects of the West Feliciana railroad upon the area
it served remained almost as negative as the feelings of the disgruntled
citizens who criticised the railroad.
into the venture by 1642.

Nearly $550,000 had been sunk

This investment created a mechanical creature

that operated almost solely for the benefit of the dominant plantation
class of the area.

As cotton was the master of the planter class who

grew the staple, so it determined the destiny of the railroad.

The West

Feliciana railroad, controlled and operated by its planter directors, of
necessity, patterned its existence to the plantation system.

Its planter

customers frequently ran up freight bills of several thousands of dollars,
but the railroad company patiently waited for its freight payments, as

^^Woodvilie Republican. 11 February 1851, quoted in "West Feliciana
A Century old." Illinois Central Magazine. XIX (Harch, 1931), 5.
°®*West Fexiciana A Century Old," 5.
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the planters In turn waited upon their factors elsewhere.

SosMtlawa

freight charges were paid in kind, indeed, if at all.
Like the Clinton and Port Hudson railroad In its effeots upon the
Inland town of Clinton, the Vest Feliciana railroad undoubtedly in
fluenced the position of Woodville and its economic relations with the
interior.

Further, this railroad might hare had sose bearing upon the

erection of a cotton factory in Woodvilie sometime before 1050.
idea of a cotton factory was not new.

The

It had been discussed as early

as 1035 by residents of St. Francisvllle, and part of the capital for
the $100,000 project was subscribed, but no more than this was accom62
plished.
Later, cltisens of WoodTills finally raised capital for a
cotton mill.

Although the existence of the West Feliciana railroad

must have influenced the location of the new factory at Woodrille,
other factors, such as nearness to the bulky raw material, and the
promotional actirlty of WoodYllle citlsens, shared in determining the
location of the mill.

The incorporators, among whom was Judge Sdward

McGehee, lacked both sufficient capital and experience, and the pro
ject soon failed.

When the mill was offered for sale and no buyers

appeared, Judge McGehee purchased the property for $50,000^made improve
ments, and reportedly operated the factory on a paying basis.

The

success of Judge McGehee was supposedly assured when he discontinued the
services of white laborers from the North and substituted slave labor.

81KL11s owed to the West Feliciana Railroad Company, Randolph (John
ipers (2), 1622-1690.
f i l e s ' Weekly Register. H J X

(October, 1635), 64
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He Imported experienced hands from the Bogg Hirer mills in Alabama,
and eren risited textile mills in Lovell, Massachusetts, to study
factory management*

As to the aetual operations of the Woodrille

cotton factory, the statistical details of the business remained un
known.

The else of the factory, whether both y a m and cloth were

manufactured, and the location of markets, were undetermined.

The

renture did not survive the Civil War, when it was destroyed by Union
soldiers.
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The existence of this inland factory at Woodrille must be
\.

partly accounted for as an economic effect of the West Feliciana rail
road, although the factory probably never alleviated the financial
distress of the railroad bound to the southern monoculture.

The three rural railroads of Louisiana, the Red River, the Clinton
and Port Hudson, and the West Feliciana, were experiments in the economic
feasibility of the all rural, shortline railroad.

In view of the dis

advantages of rural railroads, isolated as they were and operating as
auxiliary feeders to the river system, the lack of success of these
railroads was almost preordained.
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In fact, the three rural railroads

of Louisiana generally represented the consummation of futility.

All

of them failed to provide most of the benefits that their prasoters
envisioned.

Each railroad experienced precarious financial traumas

during construction, and after completion, its earning power scarcely
sufficed to pay maintenance costs, while the complete costs of construction

^McGehee (James Stuart) Papers, Vol. 1, 46.
®^*See above, 54-55.
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were never paid.

Outside of the connection of the West Feliciana, rail

road with the Woodvilla cotton factory, the only tangible benefit of
these rural railroads proved to be the improvement of transportation
facilities for the dominant rural economic interest, the planters, but
only after the outlay, and even waste, of siseable sums of money.

The

impracticality of the rural railroads and their near failures, partly
explained why the railroad mileage of Louisiana and the rest of the
rural South remained far below the nation until the beginning of the
great trunk line railroads*
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Chapter XV
NEW ORLEANS AND HER LOCAL RAILROADS (Part I)
Railroad construction in and around Now Orloans bogan alnost as
early as any city in tho nation, but unlike most cities, the railroads
built there, with the exception of the New Orleans and Nashville rail
road, wore purely local ventures.

Geographic conditions greatly influenced

the pattern of railroad development In the New Orleans area.

Built on

the lowlands of the Mississippi B*lta in the midst of marshes and swamps,
the Crescent City was literally wedged between the Mississippi River
and Lake Pontchartrain.

The easiest means of reaching the city from

almost anywhere was by river, canal or lake, and roads were practically
non-existent.

If geography determined that New Orleans residents would

be waterway minded, the steady commerce and profits of the river trans
formed this geographic fact into an obsession.

Most New Orleans

businessmen possessed of all their senses could never believe that
the railroad would become a rival of the river.

Instead, the railroad

should fit into the existing transportation pattern as an auxiliary to
the water system.

This philosophy determined the course taken by most

railroad development around New Orleans during the 1630's.

Local rail

roads were built merely to improve upon what was already nearly good
enough.
There were a few weaknesses in New Orleans1 water transportation
system, that the railroad could remedy.
c ommunications

One was the interwaterway

between the Mississippi River and Lake Ponte bartrain.
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Before the railroad era, the two were linked by a bayou and a canal.
Over this water route small coastal vessels reached New Orleans from
the lake, sailing five miles up St. John’s Bayou, and thence through
the Carondelet Canal to the city.

This route, at best, left much to

be desired, for travel on the crooked, shallow bayou was tortuously slow,
while canal tolls were exorbitantly high.^

Larger vessels in the east

ern coastal trade had to use the long route via the Gulf of Mexico and
up the Mississippi River.

Another transportation need of New Orleans

in the 1830's was better communications with her growing suburbs.

While

New Orleans had grown rapidly in sise between 1820 and 1830, the popula
tion doubled in the following decade, and suburban settlements mush
roomed around the periphery of the commercial heart of the city.

Finally,

one of the greatest weaknesses in New Orleans' transportation system was
her poor port facilities for ocean ships.

Ironically, the shifty river

that provided New Orleans access to the sea had almost whimsically
placed obstacles in the path of commerce with its moving sand bars,
treacherous crosscurrents, and winding course.

In the face of these

disadvantages, New Orleans needed a more accessible port.
Thus, the story of local railroad development in New Orleans between
1830 and 1850 centered around these three themes, interwaterway communi
cations, expansion to the suburbs, and improvement of port facilities.

Hfew Orleans Louisiana Advertiser. 27 April 1831, p. 2. Golda M.
MeArdle, "The Pontchartrain Railroad, Pioneer in the South," unpublished
Master’s thesis, Department of History* Tulane University, 1931, p.
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Railroad promoters saw In this new Invention a chance to improve New
Orleans' local transportation system.

While one group of railroad men

sought to attract more eastern coastal trade into Lake Pontchartrain by
building a short railroad from the city to the lake, another group built
a railroad along the Mississippi River into the Carrollton suburbs.

Still

a third group wanted to improve New Orleans seaport facilities and they
attempted to free ocean vessels from the disadvantages of the Mississippi
River route to the city by beginning a railroad to the Gulf of Mexico.
All of these efforts met with many disappointments, and only two of the
three succeeded.

THE PONTCHARTRAIN RAILROAD

New Orleans* first railroad was built to improve transportation
between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain.

While it served

to connect these two waterways, it also performed the even more important
function of providing better port facilities for vessels in the eastern
coastal trade.

This railroad, the Pontchartrain, was chartered in

January, 1830, and was opened to passenger traffic by the end of April,
1831.

It was Louisiana's first railroad, and one of the earliest rail

roads chartered and built in the nation.

Thus, the Pontchartrain rail

road was the pioneer railroad of the state.

The Pontchartrain railroad

charter, with its privileges and prohibitions, became a guide for later
railroad charters enacted by the Louisiana legislature.

The construction

problems faced by its builders, and the techniques, either borrowed or
developed, to cope with these problems, helped acquaint local engineers
with railroad building.

The four and one-half mile Pontchartrain railroad.
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although abort and unlmpraasira In Its also, nevertheless, In ita plan
ning, conatruction and operation, deaerred the title of patriarch of
Louiaiana railroada.
The idea for a railroad between the lake and tha river appeared
as early aa July, 1825.

At that tine, New Orleana papera arouaed local

interest in this new node of transportation by carrying accounts of
railroad developments in England and Scotland.

Almost immediately

there was much bussing in business offices and coffee ahopa around the
city about a railroad for New Orleans.

But the year 1825 was also a

landmark of the canal era, for the completion of the Erie Canal gave
impetus to canal construction all over the nation.

In Louisiana, canal

enthusiasts had their own ideas for improving New Orleans' comnunica
tions with Lake Pontchartrain, and their proposals naturally did not
include the building of a railroad.

Hence, rivalry resulted between

canal and railroad promoters in New Orleans.
This controversy over a railroad versus a canal was one manifes
tation of many factional quarrels going on in New Orleans during this
period.

Hostile feelings among various groups in the city had grad

ually been building up since the American occupation of Louisiana in
1803.

The basic points of friction were economic and cultural ir origin.

For years, New Orleans proper, or the 'Old City', with its French and
Creole population and traditions, dominated the rapidly developing
faubourgs, populated with American and foreign elements.

Above the

'Old City1 was Faubourg St. Marie, the American sector, while below was
Faubourg Marigny.

Both faubourgs successfully competed with the 'Old

City* for the expanding Mississippi commerce as well as the lake and
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and coastal trade, and both resented the domination of the French and
Creole blue bloods in the 'Old City*.

This intersectional rivalry

became so intense by 1836, that the legislature divided New Orleans
into three separate municipalities.

Between 1825 and 1830, business

men in all three sections of New Orleans talked about improving
communications between Lake Pontchartrain and New Orleans.

The exist

ing route, via St. John's Bayou and the canal, channeled the lake trade
into the 'Old City'.

Leaders in the upper faubourg wanted a new,

deeper canal to the lake, while residents of the lower faubourg desired
a railroad to replace the inadequate canal, and of course, the terminal
point for either canal or railroad would be in the faubourg promoting
that particular improvement.

2

Both groups believed that the eight

foot channel of Lake Pontchartrain would be deep enough to accommodate
vessels of 200 tons and even larger.
The topic of internal improvements did not receive another public
airing until January, 1827, when Governor Henry Johnson proposed to
incorporate a Louisiana company to build a canal to Lake Pontchartrain.
It was believed that such a canal would merit financial support from
the improvement misvJed federal government.

The railroad enthusiasts,

however, inspired by the recent chartering of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company, continued to agitate for a railroad, but they did not
initiate any definite action until July, 1828.

By that time, steps

were taken to transform informal discussions about a railroad into

^McArdle, "The Pontchartrain Railroad," 6-7.
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tangible, positive action.

Newspaper notices Invited all the "friends

of internal improvements" to meet in Hewlett's Coffee Shop to discuss
the possibility of building a railroad between ths river and the lake.
The group met, and like most organisational meetings of this type, they
appointed a committee to study the matter.

The committee received

instructions to make a survey of the most suitable route, to ascertain
the distance, to procure estimates of the cost of construction, to ob
tain all necessary information for the building of a railroad, and to
report its findings to another public meeting called for the following
November.

Possibly because the committee received no funds to carry

out its mandate, the November meeting was never held.

Possibly, also

enthusiasm for the railroad somewhat subsided, but at least some action
had been taken.

Some of the members of the committee, including

Maurice W. Hoffman, along with a few of the original railroad promoters,
revived the project early in 1629.

After several meetings, this group

of New Orleans businessmen organised a society in August, 1829, called
the 'New Orleans Railroad Company,' to build a railroad from Lake
Pontchartrain to New Orleans.

This unofficial organisation formed the

3
nucleus of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company, soon to be incorporated.
One of the guiding lights in the new railroad society was Hofffcan.
This man more than any other, was responsible for the planning and
completion of the Pontchartrain railroad.

^Thid.. 13-15.
1828, p. 3.

A former resident of Baltimore,

New Orleans Courier. 17 July 1828, p. lj 31 July
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Hoffman had been in close contact with the promoters of the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad.

After moving to New Orleans, he joined the rail

road agitators in that city and threw himself into the task of rail
road promotion with tireless energy*

He published a pamphlet outlining

his ideas on a railroad for New Orleans, presenting all the information
on railroads he could find.

After obtaining topographical maps of the

area around the lake, and after visiting the swamps and lake shore
for his own first hand knowledge, Hoffman, in the fall of 1829*
journeyed to Baltimore, and then to Boston, to obtain further infor
mation on railroads from the builders of the Baltimore and Ohio rail
road in Maryland, and the Quincey railroad in Massachusetts.

Hoffman

not only invested heavily in the New Orleans railroad project with his
time, but also with his money, and along with a few New Orleans promo
ters, he became one of the large stockholders in the railroad.

Later,

in 1835, Hofftaan supported another railroad venture, the New Orleans
and Nashville railroad, with the same indefatigable energy.

This

inspired, but occasionally misguided, man undoubtedly influenced early
railroad promotion in Louisiana more than any other single individual.^
Hoffman and the railroad society had much work to do before the
unofficial 'New Orleans Railroad Company' could become a legally recog
nized corporation in the state of Louisiana.
obtain all information on railroads available.

First, they tried to
In this pursuit, the

society sanctioned Hoffman's fact-finding trip to the East, and each
member contributed between five and twenty-five dollars to pay the

^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 60-63.

expenses of the journey.

Hoffman became so enthusiastic about the

railroad that he requested and received permission from the society to
order enough railroad plates from Pittsburg to build a short track of
100 yards, and to purchase a passenger car similar to the type used
by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, for demonstration purposes.

By

December, 1829, the railroad society had exhausted its funds, and the
members were asked for another contribution, this time, $100 each.
Apparently the businessmen promoters contributed willingly, while at
the same time, eight new members joined the organization.

This readi

ness of the Pontchartrain railroad promoters to give the project their
financial support both before and after its incorporation, made the
financing of this railroad different from any other railroad in Louisiana
during the period.

Its tight little group o f .supporters had faith

enough in the railroad to risk their own capital in almost all of the
railroad stock.

In fact, many of them risked their fortunes in the

venture.^
Especially important was the preparation of a sample charter to
present to the Louisiana legislature at its meeting in January, 1830.
In this task, Hoffman again took the lead, modeling his requests after
the charter of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

The legislature wasted

little time in acting upon the request for a charter made by the 'New
Orleans Railroad Company.'

Working with Hoffman, who was on hand at
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Donaldsonvi11® during the discussions of the charter, the legislature
approved the document by ths end of the month.

The newly created

Pontchartrain Railroad Company, capitalised at $150,000, with power
to increase to $250,000, received exclusive privileges over its route
for twenty-five years.

The railroad also obtained a generous ninety

foot right of way, along with the power of eminent domain.

In addi

tion, the company could erect warehouses and other buildings, and
construct a harbor, piers, and breakwaters in Lake Pontchartrain.
While the charter granted monopoly privileges to the railroad company,
it also attempted to prevent the company from combining with other
corporations in the state.

In a most Interesting provision of the

charter, the legislature warned that the interests of the Pontehartrain Railroad Company shall "...be distinct and separated from the
interests of all other corporations."

The Pontchartrain railroad

charter would be forfeited if the company made "...any transaction
tending to combine..." its Interests "...with those of any other
corporate body,"

The charter listed seven directors for one year

terms, including the names cf M. W. Hoffman and 3amuel F. Peters.^
About the former, much has already been said.

The association of

Peters with the Pontchartrain railroad was a fortunate circumstance.
This banker and businessman was a prominent figure in the New Orleans
business community for over a quarter of a century, and played an
important role in the promotion of the Pontchartrain railroad.

7

^Louisiana, Acts. 9 Legis., 1 Sees., 1830, pp. 2-10.

7&ita K. Carey, "Samuel Jarvis Peters," Louisiana Historical Quar
terly. XXI (April, 1947), 439-481.
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The leaders of the newly chartered railroad company wasted no
time in getting the project under way.

Early in February, 1830,

directors and stockholders met and laid plans for the vigorous and
speedy prosecution of the work.

Toward this end, they created an

Executive Committee of five members, consisting of three directors
and two stockholders.

The committee received broad powers to make

contracts for material and labor, and to purchase land for the right
of way.

On this committee rested the task of laying the ground

work for the new company, and it did its work well.

Although the

Executive Committee worked without previous experience or with little
precedent for its decisions, it had, within two months, set the pro
ject off in a flurry of activity.

An engineer and assistant engineer

were hired, land for the right of way was purchased, construction
contracts were made, and lumber supplies were ordered locally, as
well as railroad iron from England.
Gy the middle of February, 1830, the Executive Committee engaged
the services of a Chief Engineer.

The man chosen was General Joseph

Gardner Swift, who agreed to superintend the building of the railroad,
and the construction of the harbor on Lake Pontchartrain.

General

Swift's experience with railroads was limited, but he had gained much
first hand knowledge of harbor construction as an assistant in building
New York's harbor defences during the War of 1812, as Surveyor of the
Port of New York from 1818 to 1827, and as superintendent of harbor
improvements on the Great Lakes after 1829*

For his services, the

®McArdle, “The Pontchartrain Railroad," 15*
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Pontchartrain Railroad Company agreed to pay $6,500.

Unfortunately

for the railroad project, General Swift could not begin his duties
as Chief Engineer* until November, 1830, and an assistant engineer had
to be found to direct the work until that time.

The job was given to

Lieutenant G. W. Long of the United States Army, who resigned his
commission and came directly to Ne w Orleans.

Long agreed to work one

year for $1,500, this sum to be deducted from the $6,500 promised to
General Swift.

Long's services to the Pontchartrain Railroad Company

proved to be unsatisfactory and of short duration, however,

The

Executive Committee accused him of lacking "energy, efficiency and
zeal and devotion", and of failing to attend to his duties, and dismissed him in June, 1830.

9

Between June and November, the Pontchar—

train Railroad Company remained without the services of an engineer,
and the Executive Committee found it necessary to Improvise plans as
it went along.

This procedure proved to be fairly successful.

In

fact, these businessmen-railroad builders directed the construction of
the railroad and harbor with little assistance from trained engineers,
except for the period between November, 1830, and June, 1831, when
General Swift personally supervised the works.
The Executive Committee also planned the route of the railroad
and obtained the right of way.

The purchase of land for the right of

w a y generally did not prove to be troublesome, partly because of the
willingness of moat plantation owners to sell land, and also because

^Pontchartrain Railroad Company* Minutes, 11-12, 37*
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of the desire of the railroad company to avoid litigation even if it
involved paying more than the land was worth.

Although the railroad

charter provided for eminent domain by means of a Jury of twelve free
holders and the courts, this power was never used.10

The most

expensive acquisition of land made by the company was Marigny's Canal,
which cost |25,000.

This substantial outlay was deemed necessary

because the best possible route for the railroad was a continuation
beyond this three and one-half mile waterway, to the lake.

This route

represented the shortest distance and contained the highest ground
with the least swamp.11
The choice of the route from Marigny's Canal took the railroad
across five plantations in its four and one-half mile route to Lake
Pontchartrain, including the property of Messrs. Destrechan, Howe,
Darcantel, Hopkins and Milne.

The Executive Committee found all but

one of these plantation owners cooperative and eager to have the
railroad cross their land.

Destrechan, believing that the railroad

would increase the value of his property, sold six squares of land to
the Pontchartrain Railroad Company for $5,000, a small lot for $200,
and permitted the company to take timber from his land.

Howe traded

a right of way for land on the adjoining Darcantel plantation, which
the railroad company had been forced to buy outright.

The owners of

the Darcantel plantation gave the railroad company some trouble.

10Louisiana, Acts. 9 Legis., 1 Sess., 1830, p. 6.
^■Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 60-63.

Having
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refuted to grant a right of way, they offered the entire plantation
to the railroad company for $18,000.

Although the price was too high,

the company bought the plantation to avoid unpopular lawsuits.

This

apparently costly acquisition of property proved to be quite beneficial
to the railroad company.

In addition to the trade with Howe, the

railroad company took much dirt fill and timber from the plantation for
construction purposes, used the plantation buildings to house their
hands, and later broke up the more choice land into a real estate
development.

The last two plantation proprietors, James Hopkins and

Alexander Milne, readily sold the desired 150 foot right of way to
the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.

In addition to paying Hopkins $150

per arpent (1.26 acres) for the "clear cultivable high land" found on
the right of way, the railroad company agreed to build and maintain
fences.

12

Alexander Milne owned the plantation and land along the

lake at the terminus of the railroad.

This shrewd businessman almost

immediately began surveying his land for lots, and in a few years, made
a small fortune in real estate transactions.

This area became the

13
lakeside suburb of Milneburg.
Another task performed by the Executive Committee was the pur
chasing of railroad iron from England.

By March 25, the committee had

more estimates of the amount of iron needed and reported their findings
to the directors.

After minor changes in the committee recommendations,

^Ibld.. 15 , 60-63.
13John S. Kendall, History of New Orleans. II, 640.
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the directors decided to order 60,000 running feet of rail plate,
five-eights inches thick, and two and one-fourth inches wide,"...per
forated with holes from twelve to eighteen inches asunder, counter
sunk to receive the head of a spike;" 3,000 to 4*000 splicing plates
(one for each rail plate) "...to be placed under the Rails where the/
joint or unite;" eight freight cars and four passenger cars, "...the
carriage bodies to be plain and free of useless ornament."^
The Executive Committee and the directors vasclllated over the
type of locomotion to be used on the new railroad.

At first, they

decided to adopt steam power, and ordered a locomotive engine from
England to be modeled after Stevenson's Rocket in "...quantity of
power, and in such other respects as late improvements have not
changed for the better."
locomotive, asked for

The company, in placing the order for the
.duplicates...of all such parts of the

engine as are liable to break or give way..." and, if possible, the
wooden patterns also.

15

Later, the directors, on observing the

operations of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad without steam power,
changed their plans and decided to use horses from which "...a
velocity of twelve miles per hour can be attained."

A letter was

sent to England countermanding the order for the steam engine, but
it arrived there too late.

Thus, partly because of uncertainty in

planning, the Pontchartrain railroad became a steam railroad in
September, 1832, when its first locomotive, the Pontchartrain. arrived
in New Orleans.

The width of the wheels was four feet eight inches,

^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 21
l5Ibid.

119
although the directors had originally planned for a track guage of
five feet.16
The difficult taek of ordering expensive construction material
sight unseen from a source of supply thousands of miles from New
Orleans was made easier through the assistance of the American Consul
in Liverpool, Francis B. Ogden.

This official advised the inexper

ienced Pontchartrain railroad planners on the latest and best types
of railroad iron, and finally received from the directors authority
to select plate rail used by the Manchester and Liverpool Railroad
Company "...if in his opinion it be much preferable to the plate rail
described in the order adopted..." originally by the company.
Obviously, the services of this public official were invaluable to an
organisation like the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.

Ogden contracted

for the rails with the English firm of Gordon, Forstall and Company,
and inspected the supplies before their shipment to New Orleans.

The

Pontchartrain directors found that it was cheaper to pay cash for the
iron even with borrowed money, and remitted their check for fc2,5O0, or
$11 ,777*77.

The railroad company, being

unable to finance the pur

chase from its own treasury, borrowed the entire sum on a short term
loan of sixty days, with interest of about $127.00.

17

The 300 tons

of iron arrived in New Orleans in three 100 ton shipments between
September and November, 1830.

l6Ibid.. 21, 31-32, UB.

iTfbld., A8.
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Although the Pontchartrain Railroad Company found it necessary
to borrow money in order to pay cash for the railroad iron, the initial
financing of the organisation proved to oe a huge success, and only
tardiness in calling in stook installments made it necessary to float
the loan.

The original capitalisation was $150,000, or 1,500 shares

of stock.

Of these shares, 1,000 were subscribed by the original

promoters, leaving only 500 shares for public subscription.

The

original members of the railroad society were so eager to purchase
more stock, however, that many reserved additional shares from the
limited amount set aside for public sale.

In view of this situation,

the directors finally ruled that "...none of the original corporators
of this company are entitled to subscribe at the subscription to be
opened to the public...unless on default of full subscription of the
shares offered.”

In line with this ruling, the Pontchartrain rail

road directors refunded over $3,300 in advances made by the original
members of the company.

18

Public sale of the 500 shares of stock was conducted from Monday
to Saturday, March 29 to April 3, 1830, and the results were most
gratifying.

One hundred eighty-one persons subscribed for 675 shares

of stock, representing an oversubscription of 175 shares.

The company's

treasury began expanding from the ten-dollar subscription payments,
while installments of ten, twenty and twenty-five dollars were called
for by the directors quite regularly beginning May 20.

lgIbid., 22.

By December,
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1830, one-half of the capitalization of $75,000 had been called in,
but nearly all of this amount had already been expended for construction
purposes*

Up to that time, the directors spent almost $72,000, leaving

a balance in the treasury of $3,711*42*

These figures represented only

construction expenses, however, and concealed the costs of purchasing
land for the right of way.

Only half of the capitalisation had been

paid in and used, but the financial report, even at this early period
of the company's operations, was indicative of financial embarrassments
19
to come later. 7
Construction on the railroad proceeded fairly rapidly.

The work

was vigorously prosecuted under the leadership of the Executive
Committee, of Martin Duralde, the first President of the railroad
company, and of Vice-President Maurice W. Hoffman, who was elected
President in July after the resignation of Duralde.

Construction began

March 10, 1830, when railroad laborers struck the first axe into the
first tree.

The railroad company had its own labor force, but whenever

possible the Executive Committee negotiated contracts "...for digging
ditches, cutting down the woods and cleaning out the road.*

20

The first

contract was made in the middle of March with John Corry and Cormick
Hart "...for cutting a canal through the High Land of the Gentilly
Road."

The Gentilly area, an elevated strip of land running roughly

parallel with the lake, separated the marshes lying between New Orleans
and Lake Pontchartrain into two parts, Corry and Hart agreed.f ...to cut

19Ibid.. 17, 19, 22, 26, 28, 45, 54, 68.
20rb£d.. 64.

and dig a ditch or canal at the place where the route of the railroad
emerge* out of the swamp near /and perpendicular to7 the Gentilly Road
.••to run across the high ground of Gentilly to the swamp adjoining
the lake shore..."

The ditch was to be an average of three feet deep*

eight feet wide at the top, and six feet wide at the bottom.

The

contractors agreed to finish the ditch within thirty days or pay
twenty dollars per day damages for time in excess of thirty days.

21

The railroad management also made contracts for a supply of timber,
but they were not completely successful in obtaining the necessary
supplies by the contract method.

Although A. P. Rist agreed in April,

1830, to furnish 12,000 feet of red cypress logs by the middle of July,
only a small part of the timber was delivered in spite of a five dollar
per day penalty for failing to fulfill the contract.

Consequently,

the railroad company with its own labor force took as much timber as
possible from the swamps adjoining the railroad line.

During the

summer of 1830, about 100,000 running feet of timber was procured by
the company.

In addition to lumber supplies, the company obtained

horses, oxen, carts, pile drivers, surveying instruments, a scow,
and a lake boat.

22

Mustering a sufficient labor foree was continually a problem to
the Pontchartrain railroad planners, and especially scarce was the
supply of skilled workmen.

Although General Swift somewhat alleviated
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the shortage by bringing two master workmen and fourteen carpenters
with him from New Tork in November, the directors had to find a labor
force by other means before that time.

In July they decided to entrust

the task of recruiting labor to others and made a contract for this
purpose.

The labor contractor agreed to find workmen and laborers, and

board them between July and November.
was allowed for board.

A maximum of forty cents per day

The railroad company took the responsibility

of housing all the laborers, and in March, began putting up huts along
the lake for this purpose.

No slaves were purchased during the early

phase of the railroad's operations, although 3laves were hired from
time to time.

23

The progress of construction was fairly rapid.

By June 7, after

three months of work, the Executive Committee proudly reported that all
of the route had been opened across the swamps to the lake.

In addi

tion, "...the whole of the upper swamps from the Elbow of Marigny's
Canal to the high ground of Gentilly has been filled as is believed
sufficiently high, and the Road appears solid and firm."

In the lower

swamp between Gentilly and the lake, about one-third of the filling was
finished.

This optimism was premature, and the committee soon realised

that only a small beginning had been made in filling an embankment
across the swamps.

The work on the embankment continued from June to

October before the height and firmness of the roadbed was sufficient.

23Ibid.. 22, 54

In using the embankment, or causeway type of construction for the
foundation, instead of piling or log pillars, the Pontchartrain rail
road planners made a very basic, important and wise decision.

When

finished, the superstructure rested on a "permanent, level and solid”
foundation which most of the early railroads of Louisiana lacked.

The

task of building the embankment in this level area of swamps and low
lands was difficult, and supplies of dirt were hard to obtain.

The

company took most of the dirt fill from the lake shore, from Gentilly
ridge, and from the banks of the canal.

The operation of moving this

soil was long and tedious, and for months, between twenty and thirty
carts moved back and forth between the sources of supply and the
roadbed.

Occasionally, as layers of dirt were added to the rising

embankment, the directors opened the road to the public, allowing
carriages to pass freely back and forth along the right of way from
New Orleans to the lake, packing down the roadbed.

Finally, when

the embankment reached a height above the high water mark of the
swamps and level with the shell bank of the lake, and sufficient time
had been allowed for settling the earth, the roadbed was pronounced
solid, and workmen began laying the superstructure.

The railroad

company had no time to lose because the contract with the skilled
laborers from the North expired in April, 1831.

With the roadbed

completed, and the superstructure begun in December, 1830, there was
room for some optimism on the part of the railroad management.

Con

fidently they announced to the stockholders in the first annual report
that the railroad would be completed by the following March or April,
and the harbor and breakwater, by May or June, 1831.

Their prediction
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proved to be half right.

The railroad opened on schedule> but the

problem of financing and building the harbor cast an ominous shadow
over the future of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.

24

In fulfillment of the directors’ predictions, cars rolled over the
tracks of the Pontchartrain railroad for the first time on April 23,
1631, slightly more than a year after construction began.

Although

much work remained to be done "...in filling up, shelling, and carry
ing down materials to the harbor...", the early opening of the pro
ject for public inspection gave the railroad much needed publicity.
It also became the object of a gala celebration in New Orleans, and
the railroad directors made the most of the occasion by inviting
federal, state, and city officials to take the first ride on the Pont—
chartraln railroad.

At the appointed hour for the opening, stock

holders and invited guests proceeded to the railroad where six cars
waited to make the Journey to the lake.

Only the lack of cars kept

the number of invited guests from being even larger.

The company,

having been unable to obtain passenger coaches in England, possessed
only one plush carriage, the Louisiana, while the remaining vehicles
in the impressive procession were ordinary freight cars dressed up for
the occasion.

The cars, drawn by horses, "...moved in the most

imposing manner to the sound of anisic, amidst a large concourse of
admiring spectators, who lined each side of the road...".

The pro

cession "...reached the lake by happy coincidence at the moment the

j^ I b i d ., 64-66, 155.
2-'New Orleans Mercantile Advertiser. 26 April 1831
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Mobile steamboat arrived for the first time at Port Pontchartrain with
the mail."

The party inspected the pier, which at that time m s

far

from completion, and then returned as far as the Darcantel plantation
house at Gentilly road, where they were served a "sumptuous collation"
at the expense of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.

26

to the city about five o'clock, without accident." v

They "...returned
A week after this

festive and ceremonial opening of the railroad, this announcement in
the New Orleans newspapers signaled the beginning of passenger service
over the railroad:
The road will be open for passengers on Saturday next...at
4 o'clock in the afternoon. Until further notice, the cars will
leave the city on week days at 3 o'clock, half past 4 and 6 in
the afternoon; on Sundays, every two hours, commencing at 5 o'clock
in the morning...A car will be provided for free people of color. '
Perhaps this notice of separation of the races on the Pontchartrain
railroad was the first instance of 'Jim Crow' practices on the railroads
of the South.
The press outdid itself with praise and platitudes for the novel
improvement, and the men responsible for it.

"Everyone felt gratified

at witnessing the great simplicity and efficiency of the work.

No

undertaking has ever bean conducted in a more business like manner,"
commented the Louisiana Advertiser.

Many people who were uninformed

as to the progress of the construction, and skeptical about the feasibility of crossing the swamps, were surprised at the results achieved.

^^Jew Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 25 April 1831, p. 2.
27lbld.. 28 April 1831, p T T
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"A distance of nearly fire miles, one-half of which was impenetrable
morass, has...witnessed the pageantry of a procession borne along
with rapidity and safety over its hitherto yielding surface."

It

was now possible to stand on the Mississippi River bank, look across
the 150 foot wide avenue of the Pontchartrain railroad, and see lake
vessels sailing past the opening in the forest.

In the prosecution

of the work, "...too much credit cannot be given to the directors and
General 3wift, whose merits as an engineer are already well known to
the public."

Maurice W. Hoffman also received deserved praise for

his role in the undertaking.

"The President of the company has...

established a reputation which places him on a level with the best
practical engineer in the country."

28

While lauding the new railroad as a glamorous and exciting
innovation, the Louisiana Advertiser. at the same time, thoughtfully
anticipated the effect the railroad would have on New Orleans' economic
life.

It was almost taken for granted that commerce would greatly

increase as a result of the railroad, and the port soon to be completed.
One area of commerce that would surely use the new facilities was the
eastern coastwise trade, including the Florida Parishes and the adjacent
states to the east.

It even seemed possible that vessels in the West

Indian and Mexican trade would prefer Port Pontchartrain to New Orleans.
In addition to increasing commerce, or at least diverting it from the
Mississippi River, the railroad and Port Pontchartrain would offer other

28Ibid.. 25 April 1031, P. 2; 27 April 1831, p. 2
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advantages*

Some predicted that the improved transportation and

communications offered by the railroad in conjunction with steam
vessels operating on Lake Pontchartrain, would help the New Orleans
consumer.

It was believed there would be lower prices for lumber

products such as building materials and fuel, while produce could be
shipped to the city market the year around from rural parishes north
of Lake Pontchartrain.

29

Obviously, promoters and well-wishers alike

were highly optimistic about the possibilities of the Pontchartrain
railroad.

The role that the railroad would play in developing New

Orleans' trade and commerce was, of course, undetermined in April,
1831, but as the directors shifted their energies from the railroad
to the construction of the harbor and pier, there were painful indi
cations that certainty of success was by no means assured.
The principal concern of the Pontchartrain Railroad directors
during the remainder of 1831 and throughout 1832 was construction of
the harbor and pier in Lake Pontchartrain at the terminus of the rail
road.

This formidable task taxed the resources of the company to the

breaking point.

Work on the harbor had begun back in 1830, and was

carried on simultaneously with the construction of the railroad.

The

object was to provide a harbor deep enough to accommodate lake vessels,
but this goal was not easy to attain.
shallow body of water.

Lake Pontchartrain was a relatively

Since the descent of the lake bottom from the

shore into the lake was consistently gradual instead of abrupt, it was

29Ibld., 25 April 1831, p. 2.
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necessary to build into the lake several hundred yards in order to reach
deep water.

By the end of 1830, a good start on the pier had been made.

"A mound of earth, sand and shells..." had been extended into the lake
for 150 yards "...and timber and side pieces were carried out and
driven in past for about 400 yards."

Then, in December, 1830, the

company experienced a minor setback, the first of many sieges of hard
luck that beset the harbor project from beginning to end.

"rfhen this

part of the undertaking had progressed thus far, the person who had
charge of it died and the whole work received a

c h e c k .

"^0

In the meantime, while construction of Port Pontchartrain pro
gressed slowly, the railroad directors began taking steps to obtain
federal recognition of their port.

In November, 1830, letters from

the Pontchartrain Railroad Company to each member of the Louisiana
delegation to Congress asked for the passage of "...an act making Port
Pontchartrain a port of entry and delivery."
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Congress granted the

request in April of the next year, making Port Pontchartrain a port
of delivery and departure, with its own surveyor.

All vessels could

legally unload their cargoes at the port by "...making report and
entry at the port of New Orleans within the time limited by law...",
and they could legally depart from Port Pontchartrain after clearing
their cargoes "...at the customs house in the city of New Orleans
under the same rules, regulations and restrictions...as vessels clearing

^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 65.
^Ibld.. 56.
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out and departing for foreign ports and places from the said city of
New Orleans, by way of the Mississippi River."

Drawbacks on duties

paid for goods imported and then re-exported to foreign places, would
apply to Port Pontchartrain the same as the Port of New Orleans.
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Thus Port Pontchartrain was recognised by law, even though it did not
exist yet in fact.
During the winter of 1830-31, construction of the harbor works
was virtually at a standstill because of unfavorable weather conditions.
The company did attempt, however, to finish a temporary harbor for its
own boats.

33

With resumption of work in the spring, the railroad

management pressed construction as fast as possible, concentrating
on the extension of the pier into the lake.

Throughout the spring

and early summer, however, operations were continually hampered
because there was a shortage of "competent workmen," and "...con
tractors failed to deliver t i m b e r , T h e n ,

in August, 1831, nature

herself dealt the railroad company a severe blow that climaxed the con
tinuous trend of hard luck experienced in constructing the harbor.

At

that time, "...a severe hurricane and long continued storm..." all but
destroyed the railroad’s buildings and other works on Lake Pontchartrain.
"The waters rose to great heights in the lake, their force carried
away the bath house, washed out a large quantity of timber, drove ashore
boats and floats...", and flooded over the railroad line to a depth of
eighteen feet above the tracks.

Railroad officials estimated the

^ N e w Orleans Mercantile Advertiser, 16 April 1831.
33pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 86-87> 89.
34ibid.. 155.
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damage between $6,000 and $3,00Q and to this amount was added the
exaggerated loss in revenue from the road, estimated at 415,000 to

$20,000.35
Although the August hurricane had done considerable harm both
to material and to morale, the damage was soon repaired and by
December, 1831, railroad officials reported to the stockholders that
an extension 1,500 feet long had been made into the lake.

Of this

amount, 830 feet was solid pier, while beyond, a little over 670 feet
rested on piles.

In addition, a single track extended the whole

length of the pier.

The harbor itself was 300 feet wide, "...giving

sixty feet for the trackway and landing place, and 120 feet on each
side as births for vessels."

To make 3ure of ample protection from

northerly winds, the railroad directors decided that a breakwater was
necessary.

Obviously, the August hurricane had taught its lesson, but

the extra work necessary to protect the harbor must have been costly.
The breakwater would be thirteen feet wide, and "...of sufficient height
above the water, ballasted with stone, and supported by piles at every
36
ten feet distance on each side,"*3
The work continued to progress throughout the summer of 1832 in
spite of the usual problems of labor and lumber shortages, but it was
not until the following December that the railroad management could
finally announce that "...the difficulties to the undertaking have been
overcome."

The breakwater was finished, and under trial, proved to be

sound and sufficient for the purpose it was Intended.

3 3Ibld.. 155-156.
36fbld.. 157-158.

The pier exterded
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into the lake "...to six feet of water at the lowest tide..." and its
completion wps anticipated by January, 1833.

On the pier, three sets

of rails provided the best facilities for handling incoming and outgoing cargoes.

37

The harbor was completed during 1833, hut the breakwater remained
unfinished when the railroad directors made their annual report in
December, 1833.

Besides the railroad and harbor facilities, the direc

tors proudly presented the stockholders with an impressive list of
equipment and machinery belonging to the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.
The company possessed a large car house and an engine house, with two
locomotives and ten new passenger cars to store in then.

The latest

locomotive, the Creole. had been purchased only recently, while a third
locomotive was on order.
end of the road.

There were double and treble tracks on each

The railroad company previously had built, and still

owned the Washington Hotel at the lake terminus of the railroad, as
well as "...a cash house for the people of color".
had recently been purchased.

A dredging machine

This handy piece of equipment served the

"...double advantage of preserving a proper depth of water in the harbor
and of supplying the company with material to fill up their lots."
Dredging equipment was costly, and required an outlay of at least $3,500
besides a specially built scow capable of carrying the machine.

jjlbid.. 234.
J8TbId.. 86-87, 89, 300-301.
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After the completion

of

Port Pontchartrain seemed

to

the harbor and allied works, businessat
be brisk.

In 1835, beginning January1

and ending June 30, there were 552 arrivals reported at the port.

These

figures broken down included 169 steamboat arrivals, 226 packets and
schooners, forty-six sloops, two brigs, and twelve barges.

There were

by that time twelve steamboats plying the waters between Port Pontchar
train and the Gulf states

to

the east, while vessels of all types came

from such scattered towns

and

places as

St. Marks, Apalachacola,

Pensacola, Mobile, Pascagonia ^Pascagoula^, Pearlington, Covington,
Madisonville, and River Amite,

During the first six months of 1835*

Port Pontchartrain handled imports of 13,122 bales of cotton, besides
"...mai^ thousand cord of wood, lumber, shingles, shells, merchandise,
etc. etc., and an immense number of passengers varying from 2 to 3,000...
The outgoing trade included "...western and domestic productions and
foreign articles generally in demand...together with numerous passengers."
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Although the number of entries into Port Pontchartrain was large,
it apparently did not meet the expectations of the railroad management,
who apprenhensively watched as receipts from the company's operations
failed to keep up with expenditures.

The New Orleans Bee, a constant

champion of the railroad, believed that "...it is not generally known
that this is a port of entry and delivery...possessing the same advan
tages in this respect as the port of New Orleans...", and published

^ New Orleans Bee. J+ April 1835, p. 2; 23 July 1835, P» 2.
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again the Act of Congress establishing the port, in the hope of
attracting more shipping into Port Pontchartrain.

40

But this diag

nosis did not explain the dilemma facing the Pontchartrain Railroad
Company*

What really was happening to the organization came as the

result of undertaking more responsibilities than the financial struc
ture of the company could sustain.

This situation was apparent as

soon as the company officials fixed their attention on the construction
of the harbor and began pouring money into the under talcing.

The finan

cial history of the organization after 1830 bore out this observation.
Soon after opening the railroad in April, 1831, the directors
faced the problem of obtaining sufficient funds to complete the rail
road and harbor.

The last of the stockholders' installment payments

had been collected and with this source of revenue exhausted, the
directors found themselves and their company In a critical situation.
The money in the company treasury was practically used up, while
thousands of dollars were still needed to finish the project.
problem was temporarily solved by short term loans.

The

Early in May, the

Pontchartrain Railroad Company obtained a loan of $40,000 for one year
at eight per cent interest, from the Merchants' Insurance Company, and
later, $25,000 was borrowed from various banks in New Orleans.

This

money, along with the passenger receipts from the operations of the
railroad, enabled the company to continue the harbor construction until

k°Ibjd.. 23 July 1835, p. 2.
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the following October, when once again a lack of funds threatened
the company.

Realizing that the policy of borrowing money could not

continue indefinitely, the railroad directors tried to find other
escapee from their financial vicissitudes.

First, they sent an urgent

memorial to Congress n ..•soliciting a grant of money to enable the
company to complete the harbor and breakwater at Port Pontchartrain..
and second, they decided to enlarge the capitalization of the company.
Congress finally responded in July, 1832, with an appropriation of
$20,000 for a lighthouse on the breakwater, but this aid came too
late, and would not have been sufficient to succor the railroad company
in its immediate needs.

41

Increasing the capital of the railroad was the most sensible solu
tion to the financial problem of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.
In November, 1831# the directors, according to the provisions of
the railroad charter, increased the capitalization by 1,000 shares of
stock, making a total capitalization of $250,000.

It was decided not

to put the newly created shares of stock on the open market for public
subscription, but instead, only the stockholders were initially
"...permitted to subscribe for...the capital stock of the company pro
rata to the amount of shares now held by them respectively."

If the

"allotted portion" of shares was not subscribed, it would revert to
the company and be disposed of at the discretion of the directors.

^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 113, 143, 150-151,

159-160.
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This decision indicated that both directors and stockholders
apparently retained their faith In the ultimate success of the ven
ture, and still wanted to limit participation to the small number of
businessmen who pioneered the railroad.

With the increased capital

isation, the railroad management assured the stockholders that the
funds soon to be available, plus the profits made from the sale of
property owned by the railroad company, would provide financial
resources more than sufficient to complete the project.

1*2

In spite of these reassurances, the financial report of December,
1831, should have caused some apprehension.

It showed that after

spending all of the original capitalisation of $150,000, and the
r

$65,000 in loans, the Pontchartrain Railroad Company was still

incapable of performing the functions for which it was created,
namely, transferring cargoes from lake vessels to the city of New
Orleans.

Cargoes of cotton, firewood, and timber were turned away

because the harbor was not completed.

In the operations up to Decem

ber, 1831, nearly $236,431.2? had been spent for construction purposes,
and acquisition of property and equipment.

The long term and short

term obligations of the railroad company were $122,190.67 compared with
$35,856.67 owed to the company for property it sold on long term pay
ments.

There was a balance in the treasury of only $3,008*31*

The

brightest part of the financial report was the income reported from

^ Thid.. 150-151, 160.
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passenger traffic over the railroad.

Railroad receipts from the

54,437 passengers traveling between New Orleans and Lake Pontchar
train, April 23 to December 1, 1631, totaled $20,414*57.^
Despite the uneasy financial condition of the company, much work
remained to be done during the first part of the coming year.

There

was a double track one-half mile long at Gentilly under construction.
At each end of the railroad, an enclosure and shed were necessary,
while bath houses were planned on the lake.

These improvements,

besides the harbor and breakwater, were to be completed by June, 1832.
The directors had also ordered large amounts of machinery from England,
including equipment for the harbor, and rolling stock necessary for
successful operation of the railroad.

"Three cranes, and blocks of

stone to stand them in..." would soon arrive and be installed "...at
the ends of the road."

A steam engine had been contracted for and

would be delivered in Liverpool by November, 1832, while more passenger
cars and freight cars were also being ordered.

44

All of these improvements including construction and machinery,
were made during 1832, but not within the time allotted by the directors
in their annual report of 1831*

So extensive had been the work necessaiy

to complete the harbor that the Pontchartrain railroad was not ready
to carry freight until early November, 1832, a little over nineteen
months after the railroad had been opened.

^ I b l d .. 157, 159, 163-164
^ Ibid.. 158.

As far as the financial
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status of the company was concerned, the near completion of the harbor
and the opening of the railroad to freight traffic had not happened
in time to avert another crisis.

As usual, the expense of carrying on

the construction, and purchasing equipment forced the company again to
borrow money.

In November, 1832, "...a loan was negotiated with the

City Bank of New Orleans for $50,000 in fifty— $100 bonds."

But the

Pontchartrain Railroad Company was in more serious difficulty this
time than simply insolvency.

The public began to lose confidence in

the venture, and Pontchartrain railroad stock declined in value.

Never

theless, receipts from passenger traffic were still encouraging.

The

company grossed $31,000 from passenger faxes between April and October,
1832, the most serious construction problems had been dealt with, and
perhaps now the tide of the company's fortunes would turn for the better.
The directors still hoped the situation would improve In spite of the
, 45
depreciation in the value of the company's stock.
The financial outlook of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company through
out 1833 was far from encouraging.

In March of that year, individual

directors had to put up money from their own pockets to pay the com
pany's obligations because the company treasury was nearly empty.
Apparently the corporation experienced difficulty at this time in pro
curing loans, and the directors had to be personally responsible for
short term loans made to the company.

45Ibid.. 231, 234-235.

At one directors' meeting, it
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was resolved that the President "...issue a note for four thousand
dollars at four months...and that all members present be responsible
for the same."^

By December, 1833, the cost of the railroad and

harbor had climbed to a staggering figure.

The directors reported

that "...the rail, track, harbour, machinery, real estate, negroes,
etc..." had, up to that time, cost $443,433.75, "...to which may be
added the additional amount required for machinery and completion of
the road— -$18,600."

This sum placed the total probable cost of the

railroad at approximately $462,033.76, and the company owed long term
obligations in excess of $100,000.

In forecasting the company's oper

ations for the coming year, the directors could, at best, present only
a pessimistic report.

The debts of the company due in 1834 were over

$98,000, while income was estimated at only $94*000, leaving an
expected deficit of $4,000.
true picture.

But these figures did not present the

They took no cognisance of the costs of operating the

road, a factor that would Increase the railroad's estimated deficit
i fj

considerably. r
The financial history of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company in
the years immediately to come was a continual story of success being
just around the corner.

In the report of December, 1834, the directors

gave assurances that the railroad and harbor works would "...soon yield
some returns for the large expenditures bestowed on them...", while the
traffic between Port Pontchartrain and Mobile, "...now being carried on

j*^Ibld.. 251,.
fr'Ibld.■ 299-301
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exclusively by steamboats...will greatly increase our passage receipts."
By the end of 1635* the directors predicted, the Pontchartrain Railroad Company should be able to pay dividends of eight to ten per cent
on the capital s t o c k . B u t these happy days of high dividends never
arrived.

Although the revenue from the railroad was over #100,000,

"...it has been absorbed in the construction and repairs of the harbor.
The dual functions of operating a railroad and maintaining a harbor were
too much.
Although the Pontchartrain Railroad Company had experienced finan
cial difficulties throughout its operations before 1635* the manage
ment of the company up to that time was relatively conservative during
a period when business conservatism yielded to the frenzy of the specu
lation mania that preceeded the panic of 1637.

But in 1635* the Pont

chartrain Railroad Company was finally caught up in the improvement
company whirl that swept Louisiana.

The leaders of the Pontchartrain

railroad thought they saw a way out of their difficulties through
expansion.

Almost starry-eyed, it would seem, they planned an exten

sion of the Pontchartrain railroad eastward along Lake Pontchartrain
to Lake Borgne, the Rigolets, Chef Kenteur, or Bayou Bienvenu.

If

previously they had overestimated the volume of the eastern coastal
trade on Lake Pontchartrain, this error could be rectified.

48Ibld.. 351.
^•9New Orleans Bee. 10 November 1835* p. 2.

Why not

141
take the Pontchartrain railroad to the Gulf, where vessels of the
seven seas could be accommodated?

In short, these promoters proposed

to build the Pontchartrain railroad to a rainbow, but they failed to
50
see that there was no pot of gold at the end*
Impractical as the Pontchartrain railroad extension was, the idea
of providing New Orleans with an access to the sea other than the
Mississippi River appealed to many Internal improvement promoters during
the 1330's.

For example, in 1832, the Louisiana legislature chartered

a canal company for this specific purpose.

This organization, the Lake

Borgne Navigation Company, received power to "...construct between
Bayou Mazant ^which flowed into Lake Borgne/ and some part of the city
of New Orleans or its faubourgs, a canal for all vessels drawing six
feet of water.

When the Lake Borgne Navigation Company failed to

make any definite progress with its project, the legislature in the
following year created another improvement company and bank, the
Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, which would either aid, or replace, the
Navigation Company.

The Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, capitalized at

$12 ,000,000, received authorization to subscribe for the stock of the
Lake Borgne Navigation Company, but if the latter failed to dig a canal,
the Citizens' Bank could itself construct a canal from Lake Borgne or
any bayous flowing into it, to the Mississippi River.

The Citizens*

Bank could also build a railroad "...to cosmunicate from beyond the line
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of the Pontchartrain railroad, and any point or points between the
river Mississippi, the Gentilly, and Chef Menteur road, and extending

52

to and in the Parish of St. B e r n a r d . A f t e r creating the Citizens'
Bank of Louisiana, the legislature was itill not satisfied that the
possibilities for tapping the eastern trade were more than exhausted.
Thus, in the spring of 1834, another improvement company was created,
the St. Bernard Railroad Company, with authority to construct a rail
road from the Mississippi River to Bayou Terre aux Boeufs, which
flowed into Lake Borgne.

53

The climax to this improvement company

folly came in 1835 when the legislature authorized the Pontchartrain
Railroad Company to extend a branch to the east.
Obviously, the first three improvement companies, if they pur
sued their objectives, would offer serious competition to the struggling
Pontchartrain Railroad Company, but in 1835, this competition was still
far in the future.

There was another improvement company, however,

that would, within a short time, threaten the Pontchartrain Railroad
Company's monopoly of the Lake Pontchartrain trade.

This was a canal

project undertaken by the New Orleans Canal and Banking Company,
chartered in ]"31 with $4,000,000 capital, to construct a ”... canal
from some part of the city or suburbs of New Orleans, above Poydrae
street, to Lake Pontchartrain."^

Although the New Orleans Canal and

11 Legis., 1 Sess., 1833, pp. 172, 183-184.
Ibid.. 11 Legis., 2 Sess., 1834, p. 133*
10 Legis., 1 Sess., 1831, pp. 38, 44.
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Banking Company had six years to complete the canal, work progressed
so rapidly that the New Orleans Bee could assure its readers in the
fall of 1835 that the New Orleans Canal would be opened for naviga
tion sometime in the following January.^

This six and a quarter mile

waterway connected the upper faubourg, St. Marie, with the lake.

In

the sectional rivalry of New Orleans for the lake trade, the canal
represented the answer of the business interests in Faubourg 3t. Marie,
to the chartering of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company by the business
men in the lower Faubourg Karigny.

The potential danger of the New

Orleans Canal to the Pontchartrain railroad was, no doubt, apparent
to the railroad directors long before the New Orleans Bee claimed, in
the fall of 1835, that the canal "...can monopolize the whole of the
trade on the lakes to this city from the interior of the eastern part
of the state; from Mobile; and the interior of Alabama.. . " With
an economic struggle soon to begin between the New Orleans Canal and
the Pontchartrain railroad, and with the potential threat from the
Lake Borgne Navigation Company, the Citizens1 Bank of Louisiana, and
the St. Bernard Railroad Company, it was little wonder that the direc
tors of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company embarked upon their wild
scheme of expansion toward the Gulf.
In addition to the authorized extension of the Pontchartrain rail
road to Lake Borgne, the Rigolets, Chef Menteur, or Bayou Bienvenu, the
company received other powers and privileges not granted In the original

cxHSU O r l ^ n * Bee. 23 October 1835, p. 2
56IbidT
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Pontchartrain railroad charter.

The capitalization, then at $250,000,

could be enlarged by the directors up to $500,000, and the charter
monopoly, formerly fixed at twenty five years, was extended to thirty
five years beyond the date of the amending act.

57

Throughout 1835*

after the passage of the amending act, the company management began
to make plans and estimates for the extension of the railroad.

After

consulting an engineer, the directors recommended a route "...along
the Gentilly Ridge to Fort Wood at Chef Menteur..

and reported to

the stockholders that "...the cost of the road would not exceed
$100,000..•

while construction of the buildings at the end of the

road would require about $30,000.
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These low estimates must have come

as a startling surprise to some of the more thoughtful Pontchartrain
railroad stockholders who, during the past five years, had witnessed
the expenditure of nearly $475,000 just for four and one-half miles
of railroad and the harbor.
It would appear from their recommendations that neither the
engineer nor the directors understood the Immensity of the task of
building the Pontchartrain extension, because there was a most impor
tant omission from their report to the stockholders.

No mention was

made of the port facilities that would be necessary for the vessels
arriving at the proposed Chef Menteur terminus of the railroad.

^Louisiana, Acts. 12 Legis., 1 Sess., 1835, PP* 133, 207.
58pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 393-
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It have been possible that the railroad directors, who had spent
thousands of dollars on Port Pontchartrain during the previous years,
believed they could build a railroad to the sea without providing port
facilities there also?

The seeming naivete with which the Pontchar

train railroad management approached the Lake Borgne extension must
have been either the result of appalling ignorance and inability to
learn from past experience, or of outright dishonesty, aimed at
deceiving the stockholders as to the financial ramifications of the
contemplated project.
Whichever was the case, by the beginning of 1836, there was more
awareness of the expenditure necessary for the Lake Borgne extension,
and the legislature was asked to give the railroad company more privi
leges and powers in order to pursue the task.

The promotion of the

railroad extension received encouragement also from the New Orleans Bee.
The state government had "shamefully neglected" the Pontchartrain
railroad, said the Bee.

"The state should subscribe for shares of its

stock...The company are entitled to banking or insurance privileges...
They should have their charter amended to this effect..." at the next
meeting of the legislature.
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In response to the pleas of the rail

road company, and the stings of the Bee, the Louisiana legislature
lavished additional privileges on the Pontchartrain Railroad Company
early in 1836.

The company's capitalization could be increased, if

necessary, by adding 10,000 shares of stock, making a total possible

^^New Orleans Bee. 10 November 1835* p. 2.
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capitalization of $1,500,000.

In addition to enlarging the capital

structure, the legislature gave the directors power to negotiate a
long term loan by issuing railroad company bonds up to $500,000 for
twenty years at five per cent Interest.
granted the company banking privileges.

And further, the legislature
60

The Pontchartrain Railroad

Company thus became in inflated, speculative shell, like most of the
improvement companies in Louisiana immediately before the crash in 1837*
The Pontchartrain railroad bubble quickly deflated with the panic
of 1837-

What remained afterward was an insolvent railroad company,

In possession of its track, Its port, its equipment, and also a generous
supply of the same problems that had hampered the company throughout
its existence, but now were magnified as a result of the panic and
depression.

By the end of 1837 > the railroad directors, still wrest

ling with the depressing financial condition of the company, needed
money, as uaual, "...in order to complete a new track, and improve
the harbor."

Again the legislature was called upon, this time to

authorize the mortgaging of the railroad.

In response, the legisla

ture permitted the Pontchartrain Railroad Company "...to negotiate
such loans as they may deem necessary, upon their bonds...and to secure
the payment of the same by granting mortgages upon their Rail Road or
any other property..." belonging to the company.
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In this manner, the

6)0
Louisiana, Acts, 12 Legis., 2 Sess., 1836, pp. 39-42.
Chapter 1, p. 7.
-^Louisiana, Acts, 13 Legis., 2 3ess., 1837-38, p. 2.

See also,
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Pontchartrain Railroad Company limped along on a hand to mouth exis
tence throughout the remainder of the 1830*a, and all during the 1840'a.
During the railroad boom of the 1850's, the company again embarked upon
a program of expansion, this time to Mobile, but the venture was unsuc
cessful. ^
In addition tc the chronological account of the Pontchartrain
railroad's construction, and its economic fortunes and misfortunes,
there were many other facets of the company's operations that were of
interest and importance.

While many of the activities of the railroad

were the outgrowth of its functioning strictly as a railroad, others
were not.

Occasionally the company branched out into areas of economic

activity not directly related to the operation of a railroad, of which
the construction of a harbor was only one.

Some of the experiences of

the railroad as a construction company, as a business organisation, and
most important of all, as a pioneer railroad in an era without guides
and precedents for pioneer railroads, should be aired.

These areas of

activity crossed a variety of subjects, Including labor problems, rolling
stock and locomotion, auxiliary transportation to the railroad, accumu
lation of railroad property and real estate developments, responsibilities
of common carriers, and railroad tariffs.

^ / a l t e r Prichard, editor, "A Forgotten Louisiana Engineer:
G. W.
R. Bayley and His 'History of the Railroads of Louisiana,"* Louisiana
Historical Quarterly, XXJC (October, 1947), 1119*
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Finding skilled labor in New Orleans proved to be difficult, if
not sometimes impossible, and most of the specialized work on the
Pontchartrain railroad and harbor was done by contract labor from the
North.

At times, it was even hard to procure a sufficient force of un

skilled laborers.

The cost of labor represented a surprisingly large

percentage of the construction costs of the railroad, at least during
the first eight months of operations.

In December, 1830, the rail

road directors reported that $71*888.58 had been spent up to that time
in building the road.

This amount included costs of labor, timber and

iron supplies, draft animals and vehicles, and the expenses of main
taining the railroad offices.
per cent, went for labor.

Of this sum, $34*715.72, or nearly fifty

Itemized, the labor expenses included the

salaries of the engineers, $3,032.57* the wages of common laborers,
including victualling, $23,049.90; and the wages of carpenters, $8,375.09.
The laying of the superstructure and the building of the harbor, having
begun after this December report was submitted, it could probably be
assumed that the labor costs of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company later
occupied a greater proportion of the total costa of construction because
these tasks required more highly paid skilled laborers.
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The high cost

of labor worried the Pontchartrain railroad directors, and proposals
were occasibnally made to purchase slaves.

Although the railroad com

pany frequently hired slave labor to perform some of the unskilled

^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 68.
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tasks in the construction of the railroad, it owned no slaves until 1833*
At that time, the directors decided to buy eleven slaves for $10,170,
and in 1835* eleven more for $11,435.

This heavy expenditure for slaves

was justified with the high cost of labor argument.

"For when it is

considered that more than $50,000 of wages have been paid since five
years, it will be seen how advantageous it would have been..." to have
purchased slaves at the beginning.
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The directors, in estimating the

cost of labor at $50,000, probably placed the figure much too low.
Nevertheless, it would have been impossible to dispense with imported
skilled labor and substitute slave labor in building the railroad
despite the beliefs of the directors to the contrary.
If labor was scarce and costly, so also was the available supply
of rolling stock.

The railroad directors placed the first order for

rolling stock in England almost as soon as workmen's axes began clear
ing the forests along the right of way to the lake, but the English
firms were incapable of filling the orders immediately.

By 1831,

with the opening of the railroad expected in the spring, the directors
began looking elsewhere for coaches and freight cars, but were only
slightly more successful.

They found only one passenger car and one

baggage car, and purchased the same from Richard Inlay of Baltimore
for $1 ,259.75.

In the meantime, the railroad management, almost in

desperation, sent to both Baltimore and New York for carriage parts
to be assembled in New Orleans.

% b i d ,. 392.

From New York, they received "four
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setts of wheels" upon which local carpenters would construct carriage
bodies, while "...the president

authorized to correspond with

Mr. Williams of Baltimore to obtain the running gear of two carriages,
on his improved patent plan...", if the price did not exceed #200 each.
delivered in Baltimore.
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Finally, the railroad company turned to local

craftsmen to manufacture metal parts for railroad carriages, but the
results were sorely disappointing.

The directors "...applied to the

establishments in our city to make the necessary castings and works
for additional carriages.

They regret to say that, although they

agreed to pay high prices...the materials have proved bad and the
workmanship worse.

The shortage of passenger and freight cars con

tinued throughout 1832.
In the matter of motive power for the railroad, the management
vascillated between horse and steam power.

After deciding on steam

power, however, the orders placed in England for locomotives could
not be filled immediately.

Thus the Pontchartrain Railroad Company

had to rely upon horse power for nearly a year and a half after the
opening of the railroad.

Although the directors for a time contracted

for horses to draw the cars, they later decided to purchase draft
animals for the railroad, and eight horses, valued at #130 per head,
came into the possession of the company.

The period of horse drawn

vehicles on the Pontchartrain railroad would be short, for the company's
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locomotive arrived from England in September, 1632.

This "steam car",

the first railroad locomotive to operate in Louisiana, puffed along
the tracks of the Pontchartrain railroad for the first time on September
IS, 1832, and perhaps caused more excitement and enthusiasm than even
the opening of the railroad.

The Pontchartrain. as the new locomotive

was named, could transport ” ...one hundred passengers at a speed of
thirty miles the hour, and can convey to the lake in twenty minutes
the cargoes of the largest vessels in that trade.”

The railroad

management was most satisfied with their new acquisition, and claimed
that the use of horse power ” ... caused more than double the expense
attending the use of steam...” ^nd was five times less efficient.^
The Pontchartrain had been operating only three days when mis
fortune befell the new steam engine.

As the locomotive with its cars

returned to New Orleans from a trip to the lake, ” ...she came in contact
with a cow between Hopkins’ plantation and Marigny's Canal, which
...threw her off the road into the ditch.”

None of the passengers

suffered injury or loss of life, but the Pontchartrain was damaged,
causing its disability for a few days.
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Railroad officials as well

as railroad well-wi3hers took all precautions possible to prevent
accidents which ” .,.are highly prejudicial in the infancy of all great
clashing interests."^

One cause for alarm to the Pontchartrain rail

road management, especially during the early days before the novelty

67Ibld.. 143-144, 234-235.
£§New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser. 20 September 1832.
69Ibld.. 26 April 18^1.
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of the railroad wore off, was the "...motley groups of children of all
colors, ages and descriptions who, in spite of remonstrances and the
whip, not only too closely approach, but actually attach themselves to
the Cars...".
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Nevertheless, loss of life on the Pontchartrain rail

road was seldom heard of, while injury occurred only occasionally when
some incautious person like "...Dr. Dalton of this city...fatuitously
^/plzj followed the engine when separated from the cars, which diverging
into a different track threw him down unawares; and broke one of his
legs."

71

After nearly four years of operations, the railroad management

reported with some satisfaction that almost 498,000 passengers had been
transported over the Pontchartrain railroad with the occurrence of only
one injury . ^
The introduction of steam locomotion on the Pontchartrain railroad
had its hazards and annoyances as well as its benefits.

In addition to

the profusion of unearthly noises that accosted contemporary ears un
accustomed to It, volumes of escaping sparks from the chimneys of the
pine-burning locomotives created a fire hazard to buildings adjacent
to the railroad as well as irritation to the passengers in the open
coaches.

The railroad management accepted this situation passively at

first, but eventually they decided something must be done about the
sparks.

Thus, advertisements appeared in the New Orleans papers offer

ing $500 for the invention "...of a machine or plan to prevent the

70ibid.
7lNew Orleans Bee. 31 June 1835# p* 2.
'^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 351.
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escape of sparks from the chimney of locomotive engines."'^

Throughout

the summer of 1836, the railroad company put aside one of its locomo
tives for use experimentally by the various spark control inventors,
and by September success was achieved.

Mr. H. Turner, a New Orleans

engineer, Invented a contraption that not only controlled the sparks
from the locomotives, but also prevented " ...those sooty particles
escaping, which are nearly as injurious to clothing as the sparks."
In a trail run from the Mississippi River to the lake, "...the Fulton
locomotive was placed...at the head of a train of freight and passage
cars, with a car reserved for the directors in the rear, without a

v

cover...^nd^ not twenty sparks could be discerned from the chimney of

ni
the locomotive..."
In addition to operating the railroad, the directors were also
interested in other modes of transportation.

Mention wa9 frequently

made in the company Minutes of water craft on Lake Pontchartrain be
longing to the railroad company, including scows, skiffs, and the steam
boat General Coffee.

The railroad company apparently acquired the

steamboat ^arly in 1830 to use in hauling shells, both for use on the
harbor and roadbed, and for sale in New Orleans.

For the maintenance

of the General Coffee, the directors had to hire a full time employee,
the "patron of the boat," at thirty dollars per month.

The operation

of the steamboat wa3 not lucrative before the pier and harbor were

New Orleans Bee, 26 May 1836, p. 2.
7^Ibid,, 7 September 1836, p. 2.
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readied to handle lake boat cargoes, thus, when it was obvious to the
directors "...that the expenses of the steamboat General Coffee exceeded
her earnings, it was on motion resolved that...she be laid up until
shells can be brought to better advantage..."

Later, after the com*

pletion of the pier, the railroad company successfully used their
steamboat to tow rafts of timber across the lake.

With this innova

tion, the directors claimed to have greatly lowered the price of timber
in New Orleans.
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The railroad directors were also interested in developing auxiliary
land transportation, and readily listened to proposals of teamsters to
operate passenger carriage service in conjunction with the railroad.
In response to "...the proposition of M e s s r ’3 Lewis and Pitcher to
establish omnibus carriages to run in connexion with the rail road
cars, from Canal street to the head of Canal Marigry, at the fare of
12i cents..." per passenger, the directors in 1831, contracted with
these men to operate two carriages for six months.

They agreed to pay

the teamsters $100 per month "...on condition that...said carriage run
at least 7 times each day at such hours as to meet the tildes of depar—
ture of the railroad cars."
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In the meantime, another teamster appar

ently began carriage service on his own initiative.

In April, 1831,

C. Robertson informed the public that he would operate the City and
Faubourge State three times daily from Belle Chasses in Lafayette Parish
to the railroad.7*^

7 $Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 25, 131, 238
7feIbld. . 91.
7YNew Orleans Mercantile Advertiser, 7 April 1831.
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The Pontchartrain Railroad Company adopted its first formal tariff
in August, 1834, nearly two years after the opening of the railroad to
freight traffic.

Although the Louisiana legislature had established

maximum rates on selected bulk commodities in the railroad charter,

78

the tariff drawn up in 1834 by the directors bore little resemblance
to this crude statutory rate fixing.

The new rate schedule extended

far beyond the legislative rates to include numerous additional commo
dities.

Rates were quoted on the basis of different commodity charac

teristics such as weight difference, size of container, and sometimes,
value.

TTiese early railroad rate fixers probably never heard of the

more modern concept of commodity rates and class rates, although they
probably comprehended in a rudimentary way the principle involved.

For

example, some of the rates were discriminatory in favor of bulk commo
dities such as cord wood, lumber, sand, shells and bricks, items which
today would be listed under commodity rates.

Because of the low value

of these items in comparison with their bulk, lower rates were necessary
in order to get the commodity to move, called commodity rates.

The

other listed commodities were priced according to particular character
istics such as size and weight, with the emphasis on size as the basic
measurement.

Thus, the Pontchartrain railroad directors placed rates

on certain commodities according to their packaging, with pipes, hogs
heads, boxes, casks, crates and tierces commanding rates between twenty

"^See Chapter 2, pp. 29-32.
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and thirty two cents each.

But there was also discrimination among

commodities according to their value.

A hogshead of valuable liquor

or sugar was transported for thirty two cents, whereas hogshead filled
with hams or bacons, or completely empty, commanded a rate of only
twenty six cents.
rate system.

Perhaps here was a crude forerunner of the class
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Passenger rates of thirty seven and one-half cents one way had
been written into the charter by the legislature.

Nevertheless, even

in those early days of railroading, there was a way to avoid the rates
and practice discrimination among persons.
free passes.

The chief way was by issuing

The company made a practice of giving free passes to

stockholders and other privileged persons.

Thus, "...each stockholder

received each month one ticket for each share of stock held in the
company.”

”The lesee /sic/ of the company establishments at the lake...”

had permission ”...to pass on the railroad gratis," while the cooks
at the railroad owned Washington Hotel at the lake, rode on the rail
road to do their marketing once every day free of charge.

The rail

road directors also issued passes for more dubious purposes.

They

used free passes to induce buyers to purchase lots in the railroad
company’s real estate development.
of lots in the new

In an attempt to promote the sale

Faubourg Darcantel, the company management ruled

that"...each person who may purchase a lot of the company in said
fauxbourg, improve and reside on the same, shall be entitled to pass

^^Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 340.
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on the road in the company care between aaid fauxbourg and the city
Gratia..."
of 181*0.

This privilege, extended in 1832, lasted until the end
The utilisation of free passes for this purpose was an

example of the abuse of a monopoly privilege granted to a transporta
tion agency in order to further Its other enterprises and discriminate
against competitors who also owned land along the route of the rail-

ro^d,«80
In the matter of real estate development, however, it was quite
natural and expected that the Pontchartrain railroad directors would
take advantage of the Increasing property values resulting from the
construction of their own internal improvement.

In acquiring a right

of way, the company, almost reluctantly at the time, came Into posses
sion of much property which later proved to be very valuable.

These

acquisitions included the Darcantel plantation, land along the Marigny
Canal, property at the lake terminus of the railroad, and lots in
Faubourgs Marigny and Franklin.ox

It was ironic that the businessmen

who promoted the Pontchartrain railroad complained so loudly when the
company was almost forced to buy the Darcantel plantation.

Certainly

if these men never heard of the words 'unearned increment,* they
understood their practical application.

Having witnessed the rapid

expansion of New Orleans' population and trade during the 1820's, and
being aware that this trend would continue, only fools could fail to
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comprehend the value of lots along a successful railroad.

The

Pontchartrain directors grasped this fact by the summer of 1830, if
not earlier.
In June, 1830, the railroad management ordered the Executive
Committee to make plans of all the company real estate holdings
"...that the same be divided or laid off in Lots In such manner as
may appear to them best calculated to promote the interests of the
company should a sale of it at any time be deemed expedient."
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The

sale of lots by the company began almost before the opening of the
railroad and proved to be most profitable.

In Faubourg Franklin, lots

40 feet by 120 feet were surveyed and offered for sale in March, 1831.
The railroad company extended long term payments to the purchasers,
one quarter within four months, and the balance within one to three
years.
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The directors put across a very astute real estate trans

action when they sold the property acquired from the Destrechan plan
tation.

This "six squares of ground," purchased by the railroad

company for $5,000, sold in 1831 for $37,195, leaving a profit of

$32 ,000.®^
One of the most valuable, and also, most controversial, of the
Pontchartrain Railroad Company's real estate developments was the
Darcantel plantation.

?3ibid.t 92.
8*Ibldli 159.

Obviously, the longer the railroad company
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retained this property, the more valuable it would become, but the
directors for some unknown reason seemed in a hurry to dispose of it.
In June, 1831, they voted to sell it at public auction after the land
had been laid out into lots, but the auction was not held.

In May of

the following year, the directors again decided it was time to dispose
of this property and "...resolved that the Darcantel plantation be
sold at public auction on Monday the 4 June on a credit of 1.2.3.4. &
5 years..."

Whether this decision was made surreptitiously without

informing the stockholders, whether the directors connived to sell
the property for the personal gain of themselves and their friends, or
whether they merely wanted to bring money into the insolvent railroad's
treasury, could only be surmised.

Nevertheless, twenty minutes before

the auction began, the commissioners in charge received a written
declaration from some of the railroad stockholders protesting the sale.
Because of the lateness of the protest, the auction began on schedule
and the property sold, but the matter was not closed.

In a message to

the President and the Directors of the railroad company a few days
later, the opposition stockholders warned that they could not "...suffer
the circumstances of the Darcantel plantation being exposed for sale
at the worse season of the year and under the worse unfavorable circum
stances to pass unnoticed..."

In fact it was alleged, the railroad

company could not even give a clear title to the property because many
of the Darcantel'9 heirs were not of age.

If the directors proceeded

to consummate the sale, the protesting stockholders threatened to con
test its legality and hold each director "...personally liable for the
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damages they will suffer."

The outcome of the controversy remained

unknown, but it did represent the first Instance of serious dishar
mony within the ranks of the company.
If the railroad management did not always make the best decisions
on the sale of company real estate, they exhibited far-sighted plan
ning In the construction of recreation facilities it the lake.

Even

before the completion of the railroad, some of the directors suggested
that a "house of entertainment and reception" should be built to take
care of passengers at the lake.

"The company would expose themselves

to the Just ridicule of the public...if they propose to carry down
passengers and empty them out on the lake shore without shelter or
retreat."

The proposal was adopted, and during the spring and summer

of 1631, the railroad company built an hotel costing #6,OCX).

Later,

bathing facilities for both ladies and gentlemen were added.

Whether

the directors originally intended to manage the hotel themselves was
uncertain, nevertheless, in the summer of 1632, they leased the
company's Washington Hotel for one year at $1,200.

The railroad manage

ment glowingly described their hostelry on the lake shore as "...one
of the most extensive hotels in the southern country..."
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Although

these claims were grossly exaggerated, the establishment was a necessary
and important innovation, and a haven for lake boat travelers to Port
Pontchartrain as well as an attraction to city dwellers seeking

., 122, 190, 194-195.
., 86, 162, 233-234.
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recreation and escape.

The existence of the Washington Hotel and

other facilities at the lake probably increased considerably the
passenger receipts of the railroad*
Although the overwhelming majority of the passengers using the
Pontchartrain railroad were sight-seers seeking recreation at the lake,
the railroad, as a link in the transportation 3ystem between New Orleans
and the east, also accommodated numerous passengers traveling to and
from Mobile and elsewhere.

This type of passenger traffic placed

extra duties on the railroad in handling baggage and providing other
passenger accommodations, responsibilities which the company was not
always willing to assume.

During this early period of railroading,

the responsibilities of common carriers still were not clearly defined
either by statute or by court action, thus the railroad company held
almost arbitrary power in deciding whether or not it was negligent in
the loss of baggage and freight, and if so, the damages it should pay.
Under these circumstances, the Pontchartrain railroad directors could
resolve in 1832 ”...that the Railroad company cannot recognize the
claims of Mr. Francisco Martinez for the contents of a trunk said to
have been lost on the Road . ”
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The directors were not always loathe

to assume responsibility, especially if a claimant for damages was in
a position to bring the company to task, either by exerting economic
power, or by the courts.

When Captain Webb of the schooner Magnolia

complained that the railroad lost ” ...2 casks of hams and one barrel

^ Ibld.. 241
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of whiskey, for which he had the receipt of the company and which were
not found on board on landing the cargo at Mobile...," the director*
decided to accept responsibility and pay damages.

Another time, the

company assumed responsibility for the loss of "a box of merchandise"

gg
when the complainant threatened a law suit.
In 16JV4, the problem of the responsibility of common carriers in
Louisiana received an airing in the case of Loban versus the Pontchar
train Railroad Company, tried in the Commercial Court of New Orleans
under Judge Watts.

Actor C. A. Loban, while transferring from a Mobile

packet to the railroad, suffered the loss of a trunk containing highly
valuable and immediately irreplaceable costumes and other effects
connected with his profession.

Upon failing to receive satisfaction

from the railroad directors, he initiated litigation against the
Pontchartrain Railroad Company for damages.

The issue in the case was

whether the trunk constituted baggage, or freight.

"If carried as

freight, it is delivered to the clerk, booked and paid for.

If carried

as baggage, it is supposed to be accompanied by the person of the
passenger, whose presence and the degree of attention which he gives
to his personal baggage, materially lessens the responsibility of the
carrier."

The absurdity of classifying actor Loban’s trunk as baggage

was readily obvious.

In his decision, Judge Watts ruled that "...if a

package in the shape of a trunk, and having the appearance of personal

83Ibid.. 270-271, 276
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baggage..,is not accompanied by the passenger...it ought to be
delivered to the clerk, addressed to a consignee, and treated and
paid for as freight."

He observed that both railroad companies and

steamboat owners in the South and Southwest failed to assume their
proper responsibilities, and in this particular case, the Pontchartrain
Railroad Company was negligent in caring for the baggage of the pass

enger.

The court awarded Loban ■$812, plus costs of the suit.®9

The story of the Pontchartrain railroad has quite often been a
somber one.

The darker aspect of its history embodied it3 troubled

financial existence from which there was no escape.

Not only was the

company unable to reward its stockholders for their capital risks,
but it could not even balance its own books.

Nevertheless, the rail

road that never paid dividends in its early years had important
economic effects upon the area it served.

Its emergence into the

economic life of New Orleans in the 1830's altered the course of the
eastern trade for smaller craft capable of sailing on Lake Pontchar
train.

The Pontchartrain railroad, with its costly Port Pontchartrain,

as its builders intended, gave impetus to the intrastate trade on the
lake as well as the coastwise trade from New Orleans to Florida.

One

consequence of the railroad was the opening of steamboat operations
across Lake Pontchartrain to the Florida Parishes.

This service began

soon after the opening of the railroad and continued irregularly at
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New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, 25 March 1844*
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non-scheduled intervals until 1639.

In that year, the steamer Mazeppa

began regular service between New Orleans and Covington, with stops at
intermediate points along the way.^
trade were communications to the east.

More important than the lake
For years before the opening

of the railroad and port, the swiftest means of travel eastward was by
packet through the canal, Bayou St. John, and Lake Pontchartrain, to
Mobile.

For want of anything better, this route was laboriously

followed by travelers as well as by the United States mail.

With the

completion of the railroad and the inauguration of steam packet service
in the coastwise trade, travel was easier, faster and safer.
So was trade in comparison with the old water route to New Orleans.
A short time after the opening of the railroad for freight traffic in
1632, the directors reported that several vessels unloaded their car
goes at Port Pontchartrain and departed, "...while from the low stage
of water at the bayou no vessel could during that period either enter
or depart with cargo."
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The shallowness of the bayou prohibited many

a captain from loading his vessel with a full cargo.

For example,

Captain Loomis of the vessel Mobile, claimed that "’...if I were sure
of plenty of water, say six feet at low water, I would bring in at
least eighty tons, and take out at least fifteen tons more, which would
increase the amount of tonnage seventy five tons each trip...But in
consequence of the law water, we do not like to bring those heavy

9^1bid.. 2 April 1839, p. 2. Babin, "Economic Expansion of New
Orleans," 155-156.
^Ipontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 235.
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articles except for ballast.'"^
There was no doubt that ''trading up the bayou" left much to be
desired fro;, the standpoint of time, expense and efficiency.

Captain

Loomis reported that it coat over fifty dollars in "bayou fees" to
bring his sixty-seven ton vessel from the lake to New Orleans.

In

addition, "'...the time in coming up and going down the bayou... in
consequence of low water is at least four days each trip."1
four days cost the thrifty captain dearly.

These

For his regular crew of

eight men, he paid $ 1.25 per day, or a total of forty dollars, and
for the trip on the bayou, it was necessary to hire two extra men
each way at $2.50, or a total of ten dollars.

The cost of labor,

along with other expenses, brought the direct and indirect costs of
using the bayou to 3107.00.
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Obviously, the completion of the Pont—

chartrain railroad was a boon to smaller vessels in the eastern trade.
The existence of the railroad also speeded up shipping o.. the
lake.

After the railroad was finished, "...a vessel engaged in wring

ing wood has made her trips every forty-eight hours while the same
vessel averaged a trip per week when trading up the b a y o u . S i n c e
one vessel could deliver in a week three times as much wood as before,
there probably were lower prices for wood on the New Orleans market as
a result of the more plentiful supply.

In the timber trade, the rail

road directors showed no hesitation in claiming credit for reducing the

9?Ibid., 235-236.
94lbid.
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price of timber in New Orleans.

They accomplished this price reduction

by towing rafts of timber across the lake by steamboat.

As a result

of this innovation, it was claimed, the price of timber was reduced
95
from twenty-five cents per foot, to seven and eight cents per foot. x

Although the Pontchartraln railroad opened a new avenue of commerce
for small coastal vessels, this accomplishment was probably not its
greatest economic contribution to New Orleans.

The city certainly

needed more accessible port facilities, but the Pontchartraln rail
road did not, and could not provide the type of port necessary because
of the physical limitations of shallow Lake Funtchartrain, whereby
only small vessels could ply its waters.

Two illustrations of the

failure of Port Pontchartraln were, first, the attempt of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company itself to build an extension to Lake Borgne,
and later, the efforts of the Mexican Gulf Railroad Company to connect
New Orleans by rail with the Gulf of Mexico.

The reliance of the

Pontchartraln Railroad Company upon the lake trade proved to be a failure
financially, and did not justify the project economically.

Despite

the large number of entries reported at Port Pontchartraln in 1635*

96

there were not enough small coastal vessels to provide the port and
railroad with a volume of business necessary for profitable operations.
In the meantime, the railroad after 1835 suffered from the competition
of the New Orleans Canal.

95Ibid., 238.
96s«e above, p. 132.
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If the most Important economic effect of the Pontchartraln rail
road was not the stimulation of lake trade and commerce, what then
was left, since the promotion of this trade was the chief goal of the
railroad's promoters?

A clue to the answer, and also to the future

of the railroad, was seen in the early reports of the Pontchartraln
railroad directors on the passenger traffic over the road.

In fact,

passenger receipts were the most comforting aspect of the whole finan
cial picture of the railroad.

In December, 1831, the directors

reported that 54,437 passengers rode on the railroad since its opening

in April, grossing the company over $20,000.
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During 1832 and 1833,

before the railroad began handling lake boat freight, passenger re
ceipts averaged between $20,000 ancj .$30,000 each year, and by the end
of 1834, the company reported that nearly 498,000 passengers had
traveled over the railroad since its opening.9®

While the lake trade

failed the railroad, the passenger traffic did not.

Looking at the

Pontchartrain railroad in retrospect, there was evidence even in 1835
that the destiny of the road would be linked with an embryo New Orleans
street railway system.

The passenger schedule published in June of

that year was indicative of this fact."
Perhaps the most important function of the Pontchartrain railroad
in the two decades before 1850, then, was the role it played in the
settlement of New Orleans' expanding population.

This period was one

of unprecedented growth in population, with hoards of settlers flooding

"pontchartrain Railroad Company, Minutes, 159, 163-164.
98Ibld.. 351.
^ N e w Orleans Bee, 29 June 1835, p. 1.
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into the city and overflowing into the faubourgs.

The Pontchartraln

railroad facilitated a great real estate development, and at the same
time, unwittingly provided for its own future.

People who settled

along the railroad became its fare-paying passengers.

The recreation

facilities at the lake, made possible by the existence of the railroad,
were also important passenger attractions.

Even while the directors

and stockholders of the railroad were thinking in terms of the lake
trade, the true function of the Pontchartrain railroad as a part of
the street railway system of greater New Orleans was already appearing.
Much has been said of the real estate developments of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company, but there were also other land developments of
some significance along the railroad.

One property holder on the route

of the railroad who exploited the increasing value of his land was
Alexander Milne.

This sharp Scotsman, long before the introduction of

the steam railroad, became impressed with the idea that land along
the shore of Lake Pontchartraln would someday be valuable.

Over the

years he invested large sums of money in lake shore property, and by
1838, had acquired some twenty miles along the lake extending from the
Rigolets to Jefferson Parish.

When the Pontchartraln^Railroad Company

began building its railroad, Milne's day had arrived.

In 1830, he

began surveying his land for lots even ahead of the railroad company,
and his land operations made him a wealthy man.

Estimates of the

extent of Milne's real estate transactions, bused on hearsay evidence,
ranged as high as $3,000,000.

100

Once he received a sum of $3,600 for

*00Kendall, History of New Orleans. II, 6^0.

one lot, and it was reported that he took in $122,445 for the aale
of 121 lots in his lake shore suburb, later named dilneburg in hia
honor.
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Probably other property holders along the railroad also

did well in developing real estate.

The stimulation to urban settle

ment was a unique contribution of the Pontchartraln railroad.

As the

economic fortunes of the irea changed, and the lake trade declined in
importance, the financially battered Pontchartrain Railroad Company
fell back upon the people in the faubourgs it helped create.

^^Winston, "Notes on the Economic History of New Orleans," 221.
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Chapter V
NEW ORLEANS AND HER LOCAL RAILROADS (PART II)

With the opening of the Pontchartraln railroad in 1831 and ite
completion in 1833# the promotion of railroad construction around
New Orleans had barely begun.

Three other railroad companies were

chartered by the legislature between 1833 and 1837 with the purpose
of improving New Orleans' transportation system.

The supporters of

these three companies, the New Orleans and Carrollton, the New Orleans
and Nashville, and the Mexican Gulf, unfolded plans which, they claimed,
would not only bring greater glory and commercial prestige to that
expanding entrepot city on the lower Mississippi, but also provide a
rich harvest of stock dividends to the promoters.

One of these rail

roads, the New Orleans and Nashville, a most ambitious project for
the times, was a story in itself, and could not be classified as a
purely local New Orleans railroad.

The other two railroad companies

chartered during this period had more modest goals directly related to
New Orleans' local transportation problems.

The New Orleans and

Carrollton Railroad Company, created to operate an eleven and onehalf mile railroad along the Mississippi River between New Orleans
and the rural Carrollton district, greatly facilitated the settle
ment of New Orleans1 suburbs and eventually became part of the street
railway system of the city.

The Mexican Gulf railroad, constructed

to provide New Orleans with a deep water port on the Gulf of Mexico,
was never completed and contributed nothing to the growth of New Orleans.
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This railroad company left behind a legacy of debt to the state of
Louisiana, which unwisely extended financial support to the illconceived venture.
THE NEW ORLEANS AND CARROLLTON RAILROAD

The Mew Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company, incorporated
three years after the Pontchartraln Railroad Company, built New
Orleans1 second railroad.

Chartered by the Louisiana legislature in

the spring of 1833, the new company received authorization to build
a railroad from the American sector of New Orleans, Faubourg St. Marie,
Into the suburbs and rural areas up the Mississippi River.

The legis

lature capitalized the company at $300,000 and granted the power of
eminent domain to secure a right of way 120 feet wide.

While the

monopoly privileges contained in the charter lasted fifty years, the
company would lose its charter unless construction of the road began
within one year, and the railroad was operating within three years
after the act of incorporation.

Although the charter members of the

new corporation included names for the most part obscure and unknown,
one of the original supporters of the New Orleans and Carrollton rail
road would rise later to national importance.

His name was John

Slidell.1
Since the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad would have to
operate in the city of New Orleans as well as the relatively rural
area outside, the railroad planners found it necessary to approach two
levels of government, state and city, in obtaining authorization for

^Louisiana, Acts. 11 Legis., 1 Sess., 1833* PP* 9-14

172
for the route of the railroad.
no problem.

In dealing with the former, there was

The Louisiana legislature readily gave the railroad

company power to construct their line “...from so:ue point in the suburb
of St.. Mary, through Naiades street, to its termination in the suburb
Livaudais, and from thence to a street named First street— on a plan
made of the plantation formerly belonging to Barthelemy Macarty...,"
and then to the Mississippi River.

But the company officers h^d still

to deal with the city council to determine the railroad's route through
the city of New Orleans.
a problem initially.

Getting concessions from the council was not

Shortly after the granting of the railroad charter

by the legislature, the city council gave the New Orleans Carrollton
Railroad Company permission "...to place a single rail track from the
lower limits of the Nun's plantation down Naiades street, across
Tivoli place ^ e e Circle/, down Triton and Baronne street..." to
Canal Street.

2

The council warned, however, that the track must per

mit carts, drays, carriages and single horses to pass, and not impede
water from running into the gutter.

Further, the railroad cars should

not exceed a speed of four miles per hour, and the "...Company shall
at all times provide the cars or steam carriages with breaks /sic/ and

3

safety guards."^

These prohibitions seemed reasonable enough, but other qualifica
tions placed upon the railroad company's use of the city streets were

Slew Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company. 10, New Orleans and
Carrollton Railroad Company collection, Box 2, 1836-1896, Legal, Tulane
University Archives, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
3Ibid.. 10-11.
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unduly restrictive and highly frustrating to the railroad company.
If "...the majority of the inhabitants and property holders through
which it ^ h e railroad/ passes should complain thereof as a nuisance...,"
ruled the city council, the company after thirty days notice from the
Mayor "...shall cause said rail track to be removed and the street put
in the same order as it was before..."

If the railroad company re

fused, the Mayor could order the tracks taken up and the street repaired
at the expense of the railroad company.**

This action by the city coun

cil undoubtedly reflected the antipathy of a large number of New
Orleans citizens to the new improvement.

Such a provisional grant of

authorization for a right of way through the streets of New Orleans
resulted later in much bitterness and many quarrels between railroad
company and municipal corporation, precipitated by the opposition, as
well as the whims, of city residents along the railroad line.
Nevertheless, with charter permission for the route to Carrollton
granted by the legislature, and with provisional permission to traverse
specific streets given by the City Council of New Orleans, the directors
of the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company wasted no time in
getting construction started.

Apparently the railroad was built from

the city outward, and construction began first at the Junction of Canal
and Baronne Streets, continuing out Baronne to the settlement of
Jackson in the town of Lafayette.

Meanwhile, the directors secured

from the city council authorization to extend a branch line to the river

^Ibid.

via Magazine, Poydras and Lacourse Streets, under the same conditions
and restrictions applying to the railroad's use of other city streets.^
Since the demand for transportation was so great, the company began
operating cars as soon as a segment of the railroad was constructed.

Horse cars first ran across the tracks of the New Orleans and Carroll
ton railroad during the latter part of 1834, between Canal Street and
Jackson, and over the branch line to the river.

In fact, the directors

of the railroad hurried so fast to open the road to the public that
there was no time to obtain rolling stock.

Although the company sent

a representative to England to purchase cars and engines, the order
was not filled in time for the opening of the first section of the
road.

Consequently, it was necessary to purchase a horse car from

the Pontchartraln Railroad Company.^
Construction of the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad .was carried
out under the direction of Charles F. Zimpel, a Oerman engineer whose
experience proved valuable to many early railroad promoters in Louisiana.
Zimpel planned the overall construction of the railroad, supervised
the work of the various contractors, and had charge of procuring supplies.
Hie acquisition of timber supplies for the New Orleans and Carrollton
railroad was of special interest bee xuse the company, for a time, con
sidered using the transportation facilities of the recently opened
Pontchartraln railroad.

In the fall of 1833, the New Orleans and

?Ibld.
“Wilton P. Ledet, "The History of the City of Carrollton," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXT (January, 1938), 236.
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Carrollton directors, in a letter to the Pontchartraln Railroad
Company, requested "...to be informed upon what conditions the com
pany would be willing to transport their timber from the lake to the
city..."

In reply, the Pontchartraln Railroad Company asked a rate

of three cents per running foot.

On the basis of the advertised timber

needs of the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad— 6,500 running feet
of timber, eight by ten inches; 18,000 running feet, ten by twelve
inches; and 700 piles, fifteen to forty feet in length— the quoted
price of three cents per running foot would have brought timber trans
portation charges over the Pontchartrain railroad to $735, plus the
cost of carrying 700 piles.

Whether the cost of transportation was

too high was uncertain, nevertheless, the New Orleans and Carrollton
Railroad Company probably received most of its timber supplies via
7
flatboats at the Mississippi River wharves.
The railroad construction proceeded sc rapidly that the line to
Carrollton was finished by the fall of 1835, the first trip on the
railroad, between Canal Street and Carrollton, being reported on Septem
ber 26.®

Almost as soon as the railroad was completed, the company

built a depot and constructed recreational facilities in Carrollton to
attract passengers as well as settlers to the area.

But the directors

^Pontchartraln Railroad Company, Minutes, 295* William H. Willians,
"The History of Carrollton," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. Vol. XXII
(1939), 190-191. Engineer Zimpel to the President and Directors of the
New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company, 9 April 1834* New Orleans
and Carrollton Railroad Company collection, Box 1, 1834-1896.
®Ledet, "City of Carrollton," 237-238.
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soon found that much work remained to be done on the railroad.

After

less than two years of operation, the faultiness of its construction
became apparent.

Insufficient attention had been given to grading and

ballasting the roadbed, and consequently, the ride between New Orleans
and Carrollton "...subjected the passengers to constant and unpleasant
jolting."

Much of the line had to be rebuilt in order to spare the wear

and tear on both passengers and rolling stock.

By November, 1837, the

New Orleans Bee could report that the railroad was repaired and appeared
to be "...as smooth as a shaven lawn, and level throughout the track...
We are confident it will be found a pleasant and swift mode of convey
ance."

Probably the ride behind the soot-puffing locomotives of the

New Orleans and Carrollton railroad was not always pleasant, but it
must have been convenient.

In 1836, "steam cars" departed from Carroll

ton every two hours between six in the morning and eight in the evening
seven days per week, and from New Orleans every two hours from seven in
the morning tn seven in the evening.

9

Much of the attention of the railroad directors was occupied by a
three-cornered struggle among the railroad company, disgruntled citizens
of New Orleans opposed to the railroad, and the city council, which
championed the viewpoint of the railroad's opponents.

The council planted

the seeds for this conflict when it granted the railroad company only
provisional rights of way through certain streets in New Orleans.

This

policy was consistently followed by the council in all of its dealings

9New Orleans Bee. 4 November 1837, p. 2; 2 April 1836, p. !•
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with the railroad.

In February, 1833, the right of way through Baronne

Street to Canal Street was conditional, and could be terminated if a
"...majority of the inhabitants and property holders..." along the rail
road line so petitioned.

Again in August, 1834, the council granted a

right of way for laying tracks on Magazine, Poydras and Lacourse Streets,
but the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company would have to tear
out the tracks and repair the street "... without delay...in case the
work should prove injurious to public interest...," of which the council
was the judge, or "...in case two-thirds of the proprietors of lots
situate ir. front of streets where said rail way is to pass, should
bring a complaint against its establishment..."^
Trouble began for the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad when
residents and property owners began petitioning the city council for
removal of the railroad tracks from certain parts of the city.

Vested

interests on Magazine Street, for example, expressed "...their decided
conviction that the introduction of the Carrollton Rail road into the
parts of Magazine where their property lies, is...a great public incon
venience and especially calculated to diminish the value of their pro
perty."

They asked that the monopoly be discontinued.

The city council

received similar petitions from residents of Lacourse Street and other
sections of the city.^

The council was not slow in responding to some

of these complaints, and in the case of Magazine Street, they ordered

. Charter of the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company. 10-13.
Petition of the Residents of Magasine Street, n.d. Petition of
the Residents of Lacourse Street, n.d. New Orleans and Carrollton
Railroad Company Papers, Box 2, 1835-1896, Legal.
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the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company to cease operating Its
cars and remora the tracks.

The railroad, having considerable money

invested, refused to comply with the order, kept its cars in operation
on Magazine Street, and obtained an injunction against the Mayor and
the city surveyor to prevent interference with the operations of the
railroad.^
As a result of this recalcitrance on the part of the railroad
company, the tempers of the Mayor and the city councilman approached
the boiling point and in a series of rash resolutions, they sought to
humble the corporate creature that defied than.

First, the council

gave the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company fifteen days to
tear up the tracks.

If the company failed to do so within the allotted

time, the council resolved that, regardless of the railroad company*s
injunction, "...the mayor shall immediately place at the disposal of
the city surveyor fifty labourers... and twenty five carts, to be
employed for the removal..." of the railroad track from Magazine dtreet
between Poydras and Delor Streets.

The rails would be stored by the

city for fifteen days, and then sold if the railroad company did not
call for them.

Further, the council ordered the city surveyor to

"...keep a regular account of the days works of the labourers and carts
employed...** so that the city attorney could "...enforce the payment
from said company, in a competent court of justice."

Apparently the

city council anticipated violence if their resolutions were carried out,

^ N e w Orleans Bee, 15 July 1835, p. 2.
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because they provided for twenty city guards to be placed "...at the
disposal of the city surveyor to protect the labourers employed by the
corporation in the removal of said railroad."

In fact, the city fathers,

aware of the possible illegality of their acts, were even prepared to
accept personally the legal responsibility for the action contemplated
against the railroad.

They resolved that the council would be fully

responsible for any suit which might be Instituted by the railroad
13
company against the Mayor, the city surveyor and the laborers. J
These precipitously conceived resolutions were probably never
caTied out.

Nevertheless, the rashness of the city council did arouse

the New Orleans Bee to comment sarcastically about the "...purile play
of the council, [jinj granting permission to construct railways in the
street; and then ordering them to be demolished when the company had
suffered large outlays in their construction."^

It was difficult to

account for the torrid hostility of the council toward the railroad on
the basis of pure peevishness at the company's refusal to comply with
council orders.

But only speculation could suggest that vested economic

interests, which stood to lose heavily because of declining property
values caused by the railroad, were backing the city council.

Whatever

the case, the New Orleans Bee reported late in 1835 that the hostility
of the council to the railroad still existed in spite of conciliatory
offers by the railroad directors to grade the streets to a level with

13Ibid.
I4tbid., 11 November 1835, P- 2
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the tracks, and smooth out nearly impassable places in the street.^
The issue of the railroad, tracks on Baronne Street, at least, had to be
settled by the Louisiana legislature.

In 1843, the legislature author

ized the railroad company "...to run their locomotive and train of cars
to and from the corner of Baronne and Poydras streets, and their horse
cars to and from the corners of Canal and Baronne streets, to Carroll
ton.

Even the apparent finality of this legislative act did not

quiet the opponents of the railroad, for in the following year, M ...sundry
citizens residing in front of and in the neighborhood of the Carrollton
R a i l r o a d . " petitioned the legislature to prevent the cars "...from
running a3 far as Canal street."I?
The railroad company and the city council also quarreled over the
erection of a market place on a railroad owned lot on Poydras Street.
The railroad directors proposed to build a market for the sale of fish,

meat, vegetables, and other produce that, because of the existence of
the railroad, could now be brought into the city from rural areas to
great advantage.

Besides the revenue to be derived from the sale of

these commodities, the railroad company also planned to rent stalls in
their market to private vendors.

Unfortunately, the animosity between

the railroad company and the council carried over into the railroad's
market project.

The city councilman, almost slyly it would seem, with

held approval of the market place, forcing the railroad directors to

^•^Ibld. . 4 December 1635* P- 2.
l^Louisiana, Acts, 16 Legis., 1 Bess., 1643* p. 10?.
^Louisiana, House Journal. 16 Legis., 2 Sess., 1844, p. 82.

bargain for the council's permission.

Finally, the directors offered

to give the municipal corporation the lot on which the market would
be built along with other railroad property in the city, in return for
the council’s sanction for the market place.

The Bee fumed at what it

thought was the high-handed dealings of the city council with the rail
road.

"We smiled in very sadness," said the Bee, "to think that a

company of American citizens should prostrate themselves and their
rights and property at the footstool of the corporation where they
have been previously reviled and trampled on."

The Bee even chided

the railroad directors for exhibiting "little energy" and "little re
publicanism" when they compromised with the city council by "...making
a proposal...to cede part of their lots...provided their high might
inesses of the municipality would graciously condescend..." to grant
permission for a market.

As a matter of fact, said the Bee, after

consulting the city charter, "...the council cannot interfere in the
erection of any kind of markethouse..
the "...legal privilege of inspection."

even though they did possess
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If the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company had its troubles
with the city council of New Orleans, the favors and privileges received
from the Louisiana legislature more than compensated for this setback.
In 1835* the railroad company embarked upon a program of expansion,
the fruition of which partially depended upon generous legislative
consideration.

In the wild promotion of internal improvements that

swept Louisiana before the panic of 1837, it could hardly be expected

~^New Orleans Bee, 11 November 1835, p. 2.

that the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad directors would be immune
to expansion fever, or satisfied with a railroad merely eleven and one
half miles long, with a few branches along the line.

A bigger project

beckoned them, and like the promoters of the Pontchartraln railroad
extension to Lake Borgne, the directors of the New Orleans and Carroll
ton railroad looked beyond the terminus of their short railroad.

What

they saw in that direction was a cluster of houses called the town of
Bayou Sara, 150 miles up the Mississippi River by water, but only
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ninety miles by rail, or so it was claimed. '

Apparently the most

intriguing attraction that Bayou Sara had to offer was the possibility
of a junction with the chartered, but not yet constructed, West
Feliciana railroad, projected from Woodville, Mississippi, to Bayou
Sara.

Otherwise, had the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad directors

examined the resources of this whole region, they would have found only
an annual production of a few thousand bales of cotton to provide
freight traffic for the proposed railroad, with stiff competition from
Mississippi River steamboats.

Nevertheless, in the spring of 1835,

months before the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad was completed,
its directors applied to the Louisiana legislature for authorization
of the Bayou Sara extension, and they were not disappointed in the
results*
The Louisiana legislature gave the New Orleans and Carrollton Rail
road a monopoly for thirty years to construct and operate a railroad

19Ibld.. 17 December 1835, p. 2
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from Carrollton to Bayou Sara, "...along or as near as conveniently
may be, to the left bank of the Mississippi, straightening the route,
however, at such parts as...shall seem expedient..."

To finance the

project, the capitalization of the railroad company was increased to
$3*000,000, and the company was given banking privileges.

The legis

lature ordered the newly created Carrollton Sank in New Orleans to set
up offices of discount and deposit in Lafiyette, bayou 3ara, Providence,
Idropolis, and Baton Rouge.

These offices, or banks, could "...deal

in exchange, discount notes, or bills of exchange, or drafts, at a
rate of interest not exceeding six per cent per annum for all dis
counts..." under four months, and seven per cent per annum for dis
counts over four months, "...and lend on mortgage or pledge of stock
of any incorporated company."

20

The banking powers granted to the.

New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company were, in the opinion of
some representatives in the legislature, too broad and loose, and
there were attempts to impose restrictions on the operations of the
Carrollton Bank.

Thus, one legislator proposed that the Carrollton

Rank be prohibited from commencing "...banking operations until the
whole capital shall have been paid in gold and silver..."

In those

days of loose banking procedures, this suggestion was voted down.*”1'
The capital stock of the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad and
Banking Company, as the expanded corporation was called, went on sale
in May, 1835, when subscription books were opened in New Orleans.

^OLouisiana, Acts, 12 Legis., 1 Sess., 1835.
^Louisiana, House Journal. 12 Legis., 1 Sess., 1835, p. 112.
ew Orleans Bee, 19 May 1835, p* 1.
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Presumably railroad stock was sold also in settlements and towns along
the projected route of the railroad.

Although much stock in the rail

road compary was reportedly taken by eastern capitalists, the company's
stock remained greatly undersubscribed.

Almost a year after the sub

scription books were opened, the directors reported to the stockholders
that only $828,175 of the $3*000,000 authorized capitalization had been
paid in, and this amount included the original capitalization of
$300,000.^3

In the years to come, additional purchases of stock

brought the amount subscribed to $1,949*350, a sum which represented
about two-thirds of the authorized capitalization.
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If reports were

true, the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad and 3anking Company was
nore soundly grounded financially than many of the numerous improve
ment companies that sprang up In Louisiana before the panic of 1837*
The New Orleans Bee claimed that in purchasing the stock of the com
pany, "...no property is mortgaged
a lien on the lands of any

i
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return for stock/* nor is there
u
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The chartering of the Bayou Sara extension and the sale of rail
road 3tork stirred up excitement in some of the areas north of New
Orleans, and also aroused much favorable comment in the New Orleans
press.

Many citizens of Baton Rouge, aware that the town was not

located on the direct route between Carrollton and Bayou Sara, held a
meeting to discuss "...the best means of leading the Carrollton and

iPlbid., 20 June 1835, p. 2; 14 May 1836, p. 2.
.(♦Ibid., 5 February 1831, p. 2.
5l S d . , 20 June 1835* p. 2.
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Bayou Sara railroad to their town...**

Supporters and enthusiasts

of the railroad in both Baton Rouge and New Orleans were most impressed
by the possibilities for greater speed in marketing plantation staples
like sugar and cotton.

Moving produce to the New Orleans factors

during times of high prices was most important, and could mean the
difference of perhaps hundreds of dollars to the producer.

Steam

boat service was so bad, it was claimed, that the planter sometimes
waited weeks for a steamboat to pick up his produce and take it to
New Orleans.

With a railroad, time would be reduced from days to hours.

"Time, money, and labor will be saved to the honest farmer,” said the
Louisiana Advertiser.
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”What more can be desired?”

Obviously, much

more had to be desired from the railroad's point of view, and not the
legist requirement was sufficient quantities of freight to insure the
railroad a profit.

But this fact escaped the promoters of the Bayou

Sara extension as well as many other railroad builders during this
period.
Soon after the sale of stock began, the New Orleans ani Carrollton
railroad directors turned their attention to the problem of determining
a route for the raod to Bayou oara.

A preliminary survey of the area

indicated that the most direct route must cross public land.

28

This

situation would have certain advantages for the railroad company if
permission from Congress could be obtained for a right of way.

For one

thing, the necessity of purchasing a right cf way across the valuable

jj^rbld., 2 December 1835, p. 2.
'Sew Orleans Louisiana Advertiser. 27 March 1835.
2*Tfev Orleans Bee. 17 "December 1835» P* 2.
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alluvial land of the plantation owners along the river would be partially
eliminated.

In addition, there was always the possibility of acquiring

a laitd grant from the federal government along with a right of way.

The

directors petitioned Congress in March, 1836, asking for the portions of
land necessary to construct the railroad, for contiguous land along the
right of way to help defray construction expenses, and for permission
to take timber and building materials from unoccupied government land
along the route.

As a result of the railroad's existence, they argued,

capitalists and farmers would begin developing land along the railroad,
29
causing more sales of government land.
Although the New Orleans and
Carrollton railroad petitioners failed in obtaining many of their
requests, Congress did grant the company an eighty foot "...right of
way through such portions of the public land remaining unsold...," and
the right to take construction materials such as earth, stone and wood
from unsold lands in the vicinity of the riilroad.

The grant would

become void if the company failed to begin building the railroad within
two years, or did not complete the road within six years.

30

Despite the land granted by Congress, and the special privileges
given by the Louisiana legislature, the Bayou Bara extension of the hew
Orleans and Carrollton Railroad and Banking Company hardly got started
before it failed.

Although some railroad iron was purchased for the

project in 1836 and 1837,

it was unlikely that very much construction

^United States, Senate Documents. No. 245, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. II,
1836.
30united States, Acts. 24 Congress., 2 Sess., 1837, p. 89.
^United States, H )U9®
p No* 9^-1 2^ C
* p 1 ^bss»| Vol« X |
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on the line was accomplished.

The panic of 1837, which paraliaed all

business activity, became the nemesis of the New Orleans and Carrollton
expansion folly.

The Bayou Sara extension, symbol of the company’s over

expansion, was like a millstone to the otherwise financially stable rail
road company.

There was little doubt that the New Orleans and Carrollton

Railroad Company, before the enlargement of its operations, was economi
cally feasible and financially sound.

In the spring of 1836, for example,

the railroad directors reported gross receipts of $40,516.

After deduct

ing expenses, there remained a net gain of -,£25,022 for less than one year
of the railroad's operations.

The total cost of the railroad was listed

at $295,718.32
The crash of 1837 blighted the financial world, while its poisonous
effects quickly deadened the activity of all business enterprises.

In

the spring of 1837, the Carrollton Railroad Bank, along with most of the
New Orleans banks, suspended specie payments, and by April, the New Orleans
and Carrollton railroad was leased "for a term of years" to the New Orleans
firm of Harper and Merrick, which assumed responsibility for all the contracts and other obligations of the railroad company-

33

Harper and

Merrick also leased the railroad owned Carrollton Hotel and purchased all
of the company's s l a v e s . I n

the period after the panic, the directors

devoted most of their energies to banking and allied activities.

-^New Orleans Bee. 14 May 1836, p. 2.
33rbid.. 5 April 1837, p. 1.
34Ledet, "City of Carrollton," 239.

After
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the Carrollton Bank drifted for several years from one crisis to the
next, the stockholders voted early in 1844 to sell most of the real
estate owned by the company, retaining only what was necessary for the
operation of the railroad.

35

The termination of the banking activities

of the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company came soon afterward,
and in March of the following year, the stockholders voted to begin the
liquidation of the b a n k . ^

Henceforth, the New Orleans and Carrollton

Railroad Company apparently concentrated its activities on what should
have been the real function of the railroad from its inception.

The

company expanded its operations within New Orleans, building branch
lines throughout the city, and eventually became New Orleans* first
street railway system.

37

One of the more interesting activities of the New Orleans and
Carrollton Railroad Company was the erection of a hotel and recreation
facilities in Carrollton, at the terminus of the railroad.

The hotel,

completed early in August, 1835, stood ready to receive guests by the
time passengers stepped out of the railroad cars from New Orleans for
the first time in mid-September.
quite spacious.

The hotel building and grounds were

The building itself was "... ninety feet square, two

stories high, with a basement; the ground surrounding it, and which is
enclosed by a board fence, contains about four acres intended for a
public garden."

There was also a livery stable with a front 150 feet

^ e w Orleans Bee. 2 February 1844, p. 4.
^^Proceedings of the Meetings of Stockholders, New Orleans, 31
March 1645, New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company Collection,
Box 1. 1834-1896.
” Ledet, "City of Carrollton," 242.
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long, and a width of thirty feet.

38

The railroad management initially

did not intend to operate their new establishment in Carrollton, and
throughout the summer of 1835* they attempted unsuccessfully to rent
the hotel and other facilities.

Finally, the company engaged the ser-

vices of "...Mr. John McDonnel, a gentle: <an fully qualified by urbanity
and experience to ensure success...,"

to superintend the company estab

lishments in C a r r o l l t o n . T h e company gradually added to the number
of recreational attractions in Carrollton,

The New Orleans Bee informed

its readers in October, 1835, that "...healthful amusements and social
engagements are in progress at the hotel...,"

including a shooting

gallery, a bowling green, a cricket club, and a tenpin alley.

"Walks

In gardens will be fashioned for ladies; for whom comfortable rooms
are nearly prepared; and besides various rooms for gentlemen, they can
be accommodated in playing cards, chess or other customary games .”^*0
The Carrollton hotel and its facilities cost the railroad company about
$37,000, and brought into the company treasury a little- over $3,100 after
six months of business, between October, 1835, and April, 1 8 3 6 . ^

The

pleasant pastimes provided by the Carrollton Hotel ended temporarily in
1841 when the building burned, nevertheless, the business had been so
profitable that another hotel was soon erected.

One of the favorite

diversions of many "hospitable people of New Orleans" was a trip by
steamboat up the river to Carrollton where, after a few hours of enter
tainment at the Carrollton Hotel and Cardens, the sight-seer would go

3®New Orleans Bee. 20 June 1835, p. 1.
3 9lbld.. 18 September 1835, p. 2.
^ ftbid♦. 8 October 1835, p. 2.
W-Ibid., 14 May 1836, p. 2.
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back to the city on the railroad.^

The New Orleans and Carrollton railroad undoubtedly influenced
appreciably the expansion of New Orleans during the fifteen year period
between 1835 to 1850.

Any attempt to assess the economic effects of this

railroad, however, must of necessity, take into consideration many vari
ables in the economic background of the period under consideration.

The

railroad should be evaluated in terms of what was happening in the whole
economy before, during, and after its construction, and the variables to
be considered were population expansion around New Orleans, the business
cycle and its ramifications, and the depression.
One economic factor that existed before the railroad, and would have
continued regardless of the building of the railroad, wa3 the rapid
growth in the population of New Orleans.
lation of the city increased rapidly.

From 1820 to 1850, the popu

In the decade of the 1820's, the

number of people living in New Orleans increased by twenty per cent, and
in the following decade, by fifty per cent.

The population continued to

grow in the 1840'**# while during the last five years of that decade, a
yearly average of 30,000 immigrants alone arrived in the city.

Although

a large number of these people were transients on their way to the inter
ior, many stayed behind to make their homes in New O r l e a n s . T h u s ,

from

the viewpoint of expanding populations, the New Orleans and Carrollton
railroad was, in a way, a result, not a cause.

It answered the existing

^Ledet, "City of Carrollton," 239-240.
^3united States Fifth Census, 1830. United States Sixth Census, 1840.
Waring and Cable, Condition of New Orleans. 44, 48*
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need of the teeming thousands in that often disease invested city for
quick transportation to desired homes in the suburbs.
Another factor inherent in the economy during this period was an
extreme inflation in land values.

The land boom, fanned by reckless

speculation, was sweeping the whole nation, and in New Orleans,
lation pressure contributed to the rising land prices.

popu

Contemporary

writers in New Orleans spoke of illogical rises in land values, of towns
surveyed in the middle of cypress swamps, of prairies burned away, and
of speculators purchasing insignificant islets.
completely covered by water rose in value.

44

Even the price of land

"According to one of the

leading journals, where ’swamps, snakes, and li/.ards flourished a decade
ago, streets, 3tores and dwellings now abounded.'”^5

Thus, inflation in

land values already existed in New Orleans before the railroad, but the
New Orleans and Carrollton railroad contributed to this inflation in the
period before the panic.

For example, three of the planners of the rail

road were also land speculators.

These men, Laurent Millaudon, iamuel

Kohn and John Slidell, tied the railroad to their land speculation
schemes in the Carrollton area.

They purchased the McCarty plantation

at the end of the railroad and laid it out into a huge real estate develop
ment.

Obviously, the success of this development over ten miles from New

Orleans depended upon the success of the railroad.

Land values in the

Carrollton area began rising in the spring of 1833 shortly after the
chartering

f the railroad.

In May, 1833, even before the line was sur

veyed, the New Orleans Canal and Banking Company made a profit of $158,000

^*E. Bunner, History of Louisiana. 254-255.
^Winston, "Economic History of New Orleans," 223,
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by selling land at Carrollton for $250,000 which previously had cost the
company $92,000.^

A lot in the suburbs, in the healthy semi-rural areas

away from the city, appealed to the prospective home owner, when it was
located near the railroad "...only half an hour from the business part of
the city..."^7
The growth of the town of Carrollton as well as the suburban area
between New Orleans and Carrollton, was probably the most significant
economic consequence of the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad.

In

fact, the development of this region and the existence of the railroad
were practically inseparable.

The railroad provided easy communication

to New Orleans for town dwellers whose passenger fares, in turn, kept
the railroad prosperous.

Although the town of Carrollton sprang up

during the speculative period before 1837, and was partially the result
of the artificial stimulation of that period, the steady population
increase of New Orleans and its environs was equally responsible for
the rise of Carrollton, and its growth continued after the panic.

In 1835,

this embryo town saw the erection of its first four houses, the railroad
depot, and <he Carrollton Hotel.
nine in 1837.
slower pace.

Ten new houses were added in 1836, and

In the years aft-jr the panic, building continued, but at a
Four houses were erected in 1838, four In 1839, three in 18i+0>

and two in 1841.^®

Nevertheless, real estate values declined appreciably

^^Njles1 Weekly Register. XLIV (May 25, 183>), 199*
^?New Orleans Picayune. 21 March 1337> Vol. I, No. 47.
48Ledet, "City of Carrollton," 231.
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around New Orleans during the depression.

Lots in the heart of the city

that previously brought $25,000, sold for only $5,000 in 1840.^

Real

estate values undoubtedly declined in Carrollton also, although the town
continued to grow in spite of the depression.
In addition to the town of Carrollton, there was evidences all along
the route of the railroad of its influence upon settlement in the New
Orleans area.

"There were small railway stations at different faubourgs.,,"

that sprang up along the railroad.

Important stations came into existence

at such places as "...Greenville at Broadway, Burtheville at Henry Clay
Avenue, Bouligny at Napoleon Avenue, Jefferson City at Louisiana Avenue,
and the city of Lafayette at Jackson."

50

In addition to encouraging

settlement, the railroad may have been instrumental in extending New
Orleans' port facilities up the Mississippi River.

The suburb town of

Lafayette, for example, forced the railroad company to "...cause a good
and substantial wharf to be constructed on the River Mississippi at the
end of Jackson street..." as a condition for a railroad right of way
through thf> town.

51

Frequent references occurred in contemporary writings

about the desirability of extending port facilities farther up along the
river bank, a project the railroad could well have made possible.
In conclusion, it probably was true that the New Orleans and Carroll
ton railroad was the most important railroad constructed in the state of
Louisiana before 1850, when a new era of railroad promotion began.

Except

for the Bayou Sara extension and the speculative banking operations of the

*»9siles1 Weekly Register. LVIII (May 2, 1840), 136.
SOLedet, "City of Carrollton," 238.
5lResolution of the Lafayette City Council, 1 January 1835, New Orleans
and Carrollton Railroad Company collection, Box 1, general, 1834-1896.
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company, the railroad management generally observed sound business
policies, enabling the company to pay expenses and also to make money.
Its effect upon the distribution of New Orleans' growing population was
vital.

THE MEXICAN GULF RAILROAD

1

If the directors of the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company
planned the ill-fated Bayou Sara extension during an irrational period
in the business cycle of the 1930'a, they at least chose a rich farming
area through which to build their railroad.

The promoters of another

railroad project In the New Orleans area, the Mexican Gulf railroad, did
not even use this much Judgement.

Their railroad wa^ projected mainly

across swamps, shallow lakes, bayous, islands and bays in order to get
to its destination.

The Mexican Gulf Railroad Company received its

charter In March of 1837* during the dizzy climax before the crash in
1837.

This railroad company with its privileges, embodied and symbolized

the era of speculation.and wild improvement company planning which pro
ceeded its chartering.

Its rather large capitalization of $1,000,000

could be increased to $2,000,000 if necessary, and its stock could be
subscribed for only two dollars per $100 3hare.

Other features of the

charter freed the capital stock forever from taxation, while the rail
road company and its property enjoyed tax exemptions during the sixty
years that the monopoly lasted.

In addition, the legislature generously

gave this seemingly favored child among the railroad com^nies three
year3 to begin building the railroad, and ten years to complete it.52

^Louisiana, Acts. 13 Legis., 1 Gess., 1837* pp. 54-59.
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The route of the Mexican Gulf railroad seemed quite ridiculous.
Nevertheless, in fairness to the planners of the Mexican Gulf railroad,
it should be pointed out that, there was only one direction to build the
railroad.

If the company supplied the service it was created to do, the

establishment of port facilities for New Orleans on the Gulf of Mexico,
the railroad must cross the marshes to the sea.

The promoters of this

railroad seriously supposed they could build a seventy mile railroad
from New Orleans to the tip of the Isle of Pitre, across from Cat Island,
where harbor facilities for ocean vessels were supposedly available.

In

fact, they chartered the company, sold stock, and began building the rail
road even before the entire route was surveyed.

It was not until 1839,

three years after the passage of the charter, that a 3urvey was made
"...to ascertain if the route was or was not practical."
Construction of the first forty-four miles of the route was reason
ably feasible, and covered fairly stable terrain.

"Starting from New

Orleans, it passes over a level cultivated tract of country about 28
miles to the company's sawmill...," and then for about fourteen miles
"...on a ridge of high land belonging to the United Btates, heavily
timbered but too narrow for profitable cultivation."

But the remaining

twenty-eight miles of the route would traverse "...a firm mar3h of no
value...abounding in wild fowl, fish and oysters, and containing a few
shell banks."53

^Engineer's Report, New Orleans Bee. 27 February 18^0, p. 2.
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The engineer's description of the so-called T i n a marsh" was not
especially reassuring from the viewpoint of railroad construction.

Prom

Bayou Loutre, where the company built its sawmill, the proposed route of
the railroad would cross a ten mile stretch before reaching Boudreau Bay,
Over most of this ten miles, the railroad would follow "...a narrow ridge
of wood land..." although there were "...lagoons or ponds to cross nearly
equal to a distance of l£ miles mostly dry at low water, and never exceed
ing in depth J+ feet..."

In crossing Boudreau Bay, two— thirds of the

route would fall on islands, while "...over the balance of the distance,
say 7\ miles, an embankment may be made with earth taken out of the lake
on each side of the road."

The engineer expressed assurances that the

"...bottoms of Lake Bouttreau ^Boudreau 3 a a n d

of the lagoons and bayous

are firm and solid enough to support the embankment..."

The bay itself

was one to four feet deep, with a "hard shelly bottom" in some places.
"I have crossed many of the lagoons on foot without difficulty...," wrote
the engineer, while a large part of the marsh would support a man on
horseback.

There were numerous islands between Boudreau Bay and the open

Gulf that would protect the railroad embankment and pilings from the
pounding of the ‘
waters of the sea, but as an extra precaution, in the
lagoons, "...barricks b a r r i c a d e s / made with ordinary cypress pickets.
could be constructed.

5U

Moving on from Boudreau Bay toward the Isle of Pitre, the proposed
railroad would continue for five and one— half miles before reaching Grand
Pass.

Over this short distance, there were about one and one— quarter

miles of ponds or lagoons, and "...four bayous, two of which are 130 feet

54Ibid.
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wide, 5 feet deep— one 150 feet wide, 5 feet deep, and the other 3 feet
wide, lj feet deep.

The greatest challenge of all wa3 crossing Grand Pass.

This waterway contained "...three channels, one 100 feet wide, and the other
two, 50 feet wide— each 12 feet deep..."

The distance across the pass was

nearly half a mile, with only one island located in the middle of the
channel.

To cross Grand Pass, it would be necessary to construct a bridge

system 200 to 300 feet long, resting on piers between fifteen and eighteen
feet above the channel bed.

There was a good harbor at Grand Pass, and it

would have been possible to make this waterway the terminal point of the
railroad, but only vessels drawing only twelve feet of water and less
could be accommodated at this spot, however.

If the trouble and expense

were taken to bridge Irand Pass, said the engineer, what lay beyond would
be well worth the effort.

oetween the Isle of Pitre and Cat Island was

"...the best harbor found on the coast of the United dtates in the Gulf
of Mexico, with the exception of Pensacola...
The harbor to which the engineer referred was located "...about one
mile frc-n the Isle a Pitre, in a northerly direction, and towards Cat
Island."

It consisted of a basin in South Pass called the Deep Hole,

over forty-eight feet deep, with a diameter between one-quarter and onehalf mile.

The harbor "...is protected naturally from all winds on the

N. and N.E. by Cat Island, on the w. by several shell keys, on the south
by Isle a Pitre, and on the E. by a long sand spit extending southwardly
from the east end of Cat Island."

The sea approach to the Deep Hole would

accommodate, at low tide, all ocean vessels drawing eighteen feet of water

55Ibid.
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or less.

With the proper light house facilities on the Isle of Pitre,

and with buoys at the shell reef and Cat Island spit, the harbor would
be easily and safely reached by all vessels.^
The engineer of the Mexican Gulf railroad, after presenting the facts
of his survey, gave his unqualified approval to the project.

In fact,

after the survey was completed, he was even more optimistic than before.
"The result of a thorough examination of every part of the route, proves
that a railroad may not only be constructed from New Orleans to Cat Island
Harbor, but also that its costs per mile will not be
first contemplated."

30

great as was at

For example, the engineer believed that the cost of

constructing the embankment over the most difficult section of the rail
road, between Bayou Loutre and the Isle of Pitre, would not exceed "...one
thousand dollars per mile, excepting the work required at the Grand Pass."
His estimates covered the construction of an embankment between "...two
to three feet above the ordinary level of the marsh, an elevation to
guarantee against all overflows excepting those caused by hurricanes."^
The report and the estimate of costs never came to trial by practical
experience because the Mexican Gulf railroad was not constructed for even
one-third of its projected route.

In view of the experiences of the Pont-

chartrain Railroad Company in filling the swamps between New Orleans and
Lake Pontchartrain, however, it appeared that the conclusions drawn by the
Mexican Gulf Railroad Company's engineer, were either a curious blend of
ignorance, wishful thinking and imagination, or outright prefabrication.

&SJ1-

5"lbid.

199
Whether or not the route was practical, subscription commissioners
went ahead and opened offices for the sale of Mexican Gulf railroad stock
in May, 1337* less than two months after enactment of the charter and
three years before the survey was completed.

eg

stock failed almost as soon as it started.^

But the attempt to sell
Shortly before the sub

scription books opened, the banks of New Orleans, caught by the financial
crash of 1837, began suspending sp>ecie payments, and "...universal doubt
arxi distrust kepyt all business in suspense...the commissioners thought it
prudent to defer the reception of subscriptions to a more favorable
moment."

59

The "favorable moment" came a little over a year later, in

June, 1838, and the railroad commissioners again opened their subscription
books to the public.
the railroad.

But this time the cards were stacked in favor of

At the previous session of the Louisiana legislature, the

Mexican Gulf Railroad Company was granted a loan of $100,000, provided
that the company could give satisfactory security.^

In securing this

loan, it probably did the railroad company no harm in having its president,
Felix Garcia, sitting in the legislature a3 a member of the Genate.

The

railroad promoters, with so much encouragement at a time when money was
hard to come by, depended upxm stock subscriptions for the needed security,
and bent every effort to promote the project.

Within only a short time

after the stock went on sale in 1838, it was reported that $60,OCX) had

5 % e w Orleans Bee, 28 March 1837. P. 2.
Orleans Courier. 13 June 1838, p. 3*
^Louisiana, Acts. 13 Le^ls. . 2 3ess., 1838, p. 85.
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been collected.^

The public responded to the comparer's call to buy

railroad stock in sufficient force to qualify the Mexican Gulf Railroad
Company for the authorized state loan.
Construction of the railroad began almost immediately, and by the
end of 1639, the line was completed from the New Orleans terminal at Good
Children Street to the town of Versailles.

In January, 1840, the company's

locomotive began making trips over the railroad twice daily. 62

By the

following year, the railroad extended about nineteen miles as far as the
Ducros plantation south of Lake Borgne, at the entrance to Terre aux
Boeuf, but construction of the Mexican Gulf railroad never went farther
beyond the Bayou Loutre headwaters.

At a place called Ducros landing, at

Bayou Loutre, the company built a house called 'The Railroad Hotel,' which
was used as a station house also.

63

Financial woes soon overtook the haples3 railroad, already existing
on borrowed time.

By the fall of 1841, the Mexican Gulf Railroad Company

failed to pay the interest on #50,000 of the state loan, due in Geptember.
The interest amounted to $1,500, and was owed to the City Bank of New
Orleans.
In the events that followed, a

;uarrel developed between the City

Bank, on the one hand, and the railroad company and the state, on the
other, in which there were indications that the Mexican Gulf Railroad

^ N e w Orleans Courier, 11 June 1838, p. 3*
“ New Orleans Bee, 13~ January 1840, p. 1.
°3ibid., 14 January 1841, p. 1; 3 January 1842, p. 2. Gtate of
Louisiana versus Mexican Gulf Railroad Company, New Orleans Bee. 16
October 1844*
p 4N c w Orleans Bee, 24 January 1842, p. 2.
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Company had become deeply involved in Louisiana politics.

By a strange

coincidence, State Senator Felix Garcia, president of the railroad
company, also held the powerful position of president of the Senate at
this time.

When the interest on the Mexican Gulf railroad bonds came due

in September, 1SL1, the cashier of the City dank, of which Samuel Jarvis
Peters was presiient, sent a runner bearing the bond coupons, to the
State Treasurer's office to demand payment of the interest.

Aliy the

runner was not sent first to the railroad company remained a mystery.
Nevertheless, the 3tate Treasurer told the bank representative that he,
the Treasurer, would have to see Senator Garcia, president of the rail
road, before making the payment.

A. week afterward, the bank runner

return®:' to the State Treasurer and this time was told to see the Gover
nor, A. B. Roman.

The meeting with the governor was productive of a

response similar to that of the State Treasurer.
he would contact Garcia.

Governor Roman said

Meanwhile, the State Treasurer had told the

bank runner to come back in about a week and the interest payment would
be settled.

’.Then the runner again returned, "...I found him ^the State

Treasurer/^ in the State House yard and asked if he would pay the coupons.
He asked me if Mr. Garcia had not paid them yet?

1 answered him no.

then said he would see Mr. Garcia and have them settled..."

He

Three weeks

later, upon returning to the office of the State Treasurer, the runner
was informed that the bond interest could not be paid by the state with
out the enactment of a 3pecial law.

This statement was probably untrue,

but the City Bank did nothing more about the defaulted railroad bonds
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until January, 1
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.

If the politicians took the matter of the Mexican Gulf railroad
bonds lightly, Samuel Jarvis Peters of the City Bank did not.

Perhaps

the politicians were carrying things a bit too far in jeopardizing the
credit of the state by ignoring the financial difficulties of Senate
President Garcia's railroad company.

Peters bided his time until the

following January, 1342, and then took steps which greatly embarrassed
both the administration of Governor Roman and the railroad company.

As

a promoter and stockholder of the Pontchartrain Railroad Company, Peters
could hardly have been expected to be sympathetic to the Mexican Gulf
railroad project which, if successful, would probably put his own Pont
chartrain railroad out of business.

Whatever his motives, whether

protecting the interests of the City Bank, or seeking to embarrass the
Mexican Gulf Railroad Company, Peters published in the New Orleans Bee,
sworn testimony of the bank runner who gave the full account of the
efforts of the City Bank during the previous September to collect the
Interest on the Mexican Gulf railroad bonds.

While doing so, Peters

noted, almost too innocently, it would seem, that "...the City Bank might
have made the demand for the interest on these bonds by a notary...but a
proceeding of that character involving the credit of the state would not
have been sanctioned by myself
The answer to Peters' charges that the interest on the Mexican Gulf
railroad bonds could not be collected, came from no less a personage thar.
Governor Roman himself.

He boasted of "...being able to furnish the proof

^Testimony of bank runner, New Orleans Bee. 24 January, 1842, p. 2.
®Samuel Peters to the Editors, New Orleans Bee. 27 January 1842, p. 2.
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that the assertion is unfounded.1*

His explanation for the fiasco rested

on the rather flimsy excuse **...that no official information was ever
communicated to me...or any other officer of the government, that the
interest...had not been paid."

He acknowledged that the bank runner had

informed him "verbally" about the matter, and that later on, after meeting
the railroad company president, the Governor had told Garcia about the
"extra official message" from the bank.

Garcia promised to take care of

the matter before the next meeting of the legislature, and the governor
supposed that the subject was closed.

Governor Roman chastized Peters

and the City Bank for failing to make "...according to the rigid rules
of the law...a legal demand for payment..." before claiming it was
impossible to collect the i n t e r e s t . T h u s the governor- weakly defended
his administration in the almost untenable situation that the Garcia had
brought on.

Roman protested vigorously, however, that the "...security

of the state...is ample, and means would at once have been adopted to
id

meet the demand of the City Bank."

In making this statement, he con

tradicted his own State Treasurer, who had claimed earlier than an act
of the legislature would be necessary before the bond interest could be
paid by the state.
Retribution for the Mexican Gulf Railroad Company came swiftly from
the legislature.

In March, 18iJ2, the legislature ordered the State

Treasurer to pay the interest due the City Bank, and "...to take the most
effectual and speedy measures against..." the railroad company.

The state

^Louisiana, Senate Journal. 21 January 18^*2, quoted in hew Orleans
Bee. 31 January 18J+2, p. 1.
6^1 bid.
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attorney should institute proceedings against the company, seize its
property, and either sell it, or buy it, under the most advantageous
terms to the state.^

The Mexican Gulf railroad thus passed into the

hands of the state and remained there for the next two years.

Early in

1844, the topic of the railroad again came up in the legislature after
Governor Kouton, in a message to that body, recommended that the railroad be sold.'

The House and Senate debates over the disposition of

the Mexican Gulf railroad reached a climax in the latter part of March.
In the meantime, Senator Garcia had been working feverishly to keep the
railroad intact, if possible, or at least to salvage as much of the
wreckage that he could.

Throughout January and February, 1844, friends

of the railroad moved about the parishes of Orleans, 3t. Bernard and
Plaquemines soliciting signatures for a memorial to the Senate.

This

memorial, or petition, requested that the Mexican Gulf railroad be sold
as a unit and kept In operation.

On February 23, 1844, Senator Garcia

himsr-lf presented the memorial to the Senate, which referred it to the
Committee on Finance.

71

Garcia also worked energetically to load the proposed legislation
to dispose of the railroad with amendments favorable to the railroad.
He moved "...that all the property of the Mexican Gulf Railway Company...
included the railroad, engines, machinery and slaves, shall be sold in
block, together with the rights and privileges of said company...the
purchaser binding himself to keep 3aid railroad in operation and in good

^Louisiana, Acts. 15 Legis., 2 Sess., 1842, p. 460.
'Louisiana, House Journal. 16 Legis., 2 Sess., 1844, P» 2.
^Louisiana, Senate Journal. 16 Legis., 2 Sess., 1844, P* 34*
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state of repair..."
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Although this particular amendment was rejected

at the time, Garcia's ideas ultimately prevailed in the final act of
the legislature.

Senator Garcia, in his efforts to save the railroad,

may have had other mot.

^ besides the interests of the people of St.

Bernard arv't Plaquemines Parishes who signed the memorial to the Senate.
It was no secret that the railroad, which had cost the stockholders and
the state hundreds of thousands of dollars, would bring at sale only a
trifling figure.

Whoever purchased the railroad would receive this

costly internal improvement free of the 5100,000 obligation to the state
and the obligations to the original stockholders.
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The Mexican Gulf railroad received much rougher treatment in the
House than in the Senate.

Some representatives thought the railroad

was being given away to the company, and that the proposed provision of
the bill "...requiring the purchaser to keep up the road...was saying
that it should be sold to the stockholders...The company would buy the
railroad property for a mere nothing, because nobody could compete on
the terms proposed."

On the other hand, if the railroad were broken up

and its parts sold separately, the iron, property and rolling stock would
probably command a price at least $5,000 higher.

The principal issue

throughout the House debate was the proviso requiring the railroad to be
kept in operation.

This qualification to the sale of the railroad was

insisted on by Garcia, and perhaps was the key to his real intentions

"^Louisiana, Senate Journal, 11 March 1844, quoted in New Orleans Bee
24 March 1844.
73Louisiana, House deport, 22 March 1844, quoted in Hew Orleans Bee.
25 March 1844.
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about the Mexican Gulf railroad.

Apparently, even though he and hi«

associates had lost the railroad to the state, they still hoped to
get it back, and for a small amount at that.

In the final act, both

houses of the legislature bowed to the wishes of the President of the
Senate.

The legislature directed the State Treasurer to sell "...the

Property, Engines, Lands, Slaves, Privileges and Immunities of every
kind, granted by the State to the Mexican Gulf Railroad Company... Pro
vided that the property...be sold in mass...and on condition that the
purchasers...shall keep said Roads in operation.,."

The House did manage

to Insert an amendment specifying that the railroad should be sold "...for

not less than fifteen thousand dollars."*^
On November 30, 1844, the Mexican Gulf railroad went up for public
sale at the City Exchange on 3t. Louis Street in New Orleans.

Besides

the nineteen miles of railroad, the property included a shed at the New
Orleans terroinus which served as a depot, a fully equipped blacksmith
shop, a house at Dueros landing, three 2,000 gallon cisterns, four mules,
two families of slaves including four adu?ts and six children, seven
single male hands, and sundry tools and machinery.

The property owned

by the railroad company at Bayou Loutra, consisting of a sawmill, houses,
stables, machinery and other possessions, were sold separately.

The

rolling stock that went with the railroad Included "...two locomotives
named ’Versailles’ and ’New Orleans,1 the freight and passenger cars, the

^^Louisiana, Acts. 16 Legis., 2 dess., 1844, p* 51. Louisiana, House
Report, 22 March 1844, quoted in New Orleans Bee. 25 March 1844*
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Ralls laid or unlaid, four pairs of largo wheels, called *diables,’ extra
setts of wheels, /and/ driving wheels...”

The purchaser of the railroad

would also be entitled to "...all the sums of money due to the company
by Judgement or Notes, or subscription or otherwise..."75
Whoever bought the railroad acquired also, many obligations left
behind by the insolvent company.

For example, there was a claim on one

of the locomotives for almost $1,300.

The United States government had

several suits against the company for duty bonds, amounting to nearly
5^,900.

The firm of Francisco de Lisardi and Company had a claim against

the railroad of somewhat over $5,500.

Ir. pursuit of this claim, the

Lizardi company "...have hitherto seized and bought in at Jheriff's sales.,,
under the Judgement obtained by them on their aforesaid claim, the iron
raiT.3 laid down on 9 miles of said railroad.. ./but/ Lizardi will waive
rails if purchaser will pay the debt with 1% interest."7^
The Mexican Gulf railroad was purchased by Alexander Gordon and a
group of associates who operated the line for several years.

The terms

for the sale were a two year deferred payment in return for a mortgage
on the railroad.

The old dream of a port for New Orleans on the Gulf

was by this time forgotten, however, and the chief function of the railroad was serving the farming community which it traversed.

77

The new

^State of Louisiana versus Mexican Gulf Railroad Company, quoted in
New Orleans Bee, l£ October 1844.
7i>Ifcld7
?VGordon And his associates also purchased the New Orleans and Nash
ville railroad.
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owners of the Mexican Gulf railroad applied to the legislature that met
early in 1845 for extension of the railroad charter.

This request pro

duced mixed feeling among the legislators, especially in the House.

There

was general agreement that some sort of charter should be enacted, but
the question was whether the old charter should be renewed, or an entirely
new charter drawn up.

Many representatives were eager to see "...some of

its ^bhe railroad's/ improper privileges...lopped off...," and one of the
"improper privileges" particularly under attack was the exemption of the
capital stock from taxation forever.*

Nevertheless, despite the objec

tions of various members of the House, the old charter with most of its
objectionable features was renewed.

Although the Mexican Gulf railroad

had been sold, the state was not done with the project yet, because its
buyers, who purchased the railroad on time, could not raise enough money
to meet payments due in I848. Rather than take back the road, the legis
lature extended more time to Alexander Gordon and associates to pay for
the railroad.

79

The Mexican Gulf railroad was economically unfeasible in its purpose
of providing New Orleans with a port on the Gulf of Mexico, and its pro
moters, in pursuing their objective, planned the project haphazardly, if
at all.

The survey over the marshes to the sea was not completed until

January, 1840, almost four years after chartering the railroad.

The state

of Louisiana, probably through the prodding of the railroad's president,

^^Louisiana, House Report, 21 January 1845* quoted in New Orleans Bee.
22 January 1845.
7?Louisiana, Acta. 2 Legis., 1 Sess., 1848, p. 31.
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Senator Felix Garcia, foolishly squandered $100,00J on the project.

In

spite of state aid, however, only nineteen miles of the seventy iulle rail
road were constructed.

The Mexican Gulf railroad made very little con

tribution to the area it traversed.

Although real estate values were

probably stimulated upward, and the few plantations thereabouts undoubt
edly profited by the existence of railroad facilities, the cost of the
railroad was a terrific price to pay for such small benefits to 3,237
f}Q

people in the partially frog-bouni parish of St. Bernard.
THE JEFFERSON

a ?!"

LAKE P0NTCHARTR AIN RAILROAD

Railroad promoters in the vicinity of New Orle ins built one other
railroad in the suburbs of the city.

This railroad, the Jefferson and

Lake Pontchartrain, «a-< chartered in the spring of 1&J+0 with -a capital
ization of $100,000, with power to increase to $400,000.

It was built

from Carrollton, where it made a junction with the New Orleans and
Carrollton railroad, through Jefferson Parish to Lake Pontchartrain.
Among the original promoters of the Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain

PI
railroad was D. F. 9urthe,~ who earlier had acquired a track of land
along the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad and probably profited
greatly from the increasing real estate values created by that railroad.
Burthe's participation in the Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain project
would indicate that this railroad was partly a speculation venture in
real estate between Carrollton and the lake.

The company built wharves

and warehouses at the lake-, competing with the Pontchartrain railroad

^United States Sixth Census, 1840.
^Louisiana, Acta, 14 Legis., 2 Sess., 1840, pp. 83-88.
Commercial Bulletin. 24 January 1839, p. 2.
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and the New Orleans Canal for the lake trade.

It was reported that lake

steamers, and coastwise steamers from Mobile, used the lake facilities
of the Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain railroad.

Eventually the rail*

road became part of the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad system.
NEW ORLEANS STREET RAILROAD
The first street railroad in New Orleans was built by one J. Arrowsmith sometime in 1835 and early 1836, between St. Claude Street and Bayou
St. John, a distance of one and one-half miles.

The railroad, authorized

by the city council in March, 1835* *as probably the most curious street
railroad of the day, because it was built to carry the dead rather than
the living.

It was built to meet the need for speedy handling of corpses

resulting from the frequent deaths due to cholera and yellow fever in the
city.

The ordinance specified the number of corpses to be carried in each

car, and ordered that white corpses should be carried in separate cars
from slave.

The city paid for most of the funeral traffic over this rail-

. 83
road.
The railroad first opened to the public early

in June, 1836,when

cars left St. Claude Street every hour between six

in the morning *nd

seven in the evening, returning on the half hour.

The passenger fare was

Qt
twelve and one-half cents for adults and half price for children.

The

railway reportedly was built at a cost of $12,000, but the whole project

®^Soniat, "The Faubourgs," 210.
®3Hugh M. Blain, A Near Century of Public Service
8% e w Orleans Bee, 2 June 1836, p. 1,

in New Orleans.41-42*
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nearly failed because of difficulties between the owner and the city
council.

"Owing to the supineness of culpability of the first ounici—

pality council," said the New Orleans Bee in 1636,"it ^ h e railway/ is
useless to the public and a dead loss to the owner."

85

Apparently Arrow-

smlth and the council patched up their differences, for the railroad

ftA
reportedly operated until 1870, when the owner finally went bankrupt.00

^ G i b s o n 1s Guide. 1838, p. 2J+0.
°Blaln. Public Service in New Orleans. 42.
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Chapter VI
THE NEW ORLEANS AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD

The New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company was chartered by the
Louisiana legislature in 1835 to builu a railroad between the two cities
for which it was named.

This venture was different from all railroads

built in Louisiana up to the 1850's.

While the other xvailroads were

local In nature# the New Orleans and Nashville project was a colossus
partly because of the distance involved.

It also represented an attempt

t-' transcend localism In railroad, building in Louisiana.

The project

needed community support on the state and local level3 to achieve success,
The railroad's promoters in Louisiana also found it necessary to seek
cooperation from areas outside Louisiana, in the state-, tlirough which the
railroad would pass, and in the city of Nashville.

The planners of this

railroad estimated that a maximum expenditure of ^6,000,000 would build
the railroad, thu3, in its probable costs, the New Orleans and Nashville
railroad represented one of the greatest single efforts undertaken in
Louisiana up to that time in any sector of the economy.

The details of

this railroad's planning, its financing, and its construction, unfolded
a story of unusual insight on the part of its promoters, and of great
enthusiasm and optimism during the early phases of construction, followed
by bitter disillusionment, and eventually, ignominious failure.
The idea of building large, interstate railroads did not come suddenly
to railroad promoters in New Orleans, but was the result of changing local
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attitudes toward all long distance railroads.

Such projects would have

been unthinkable before people in New Orleans believed that the long dis
tance, interstate railroad was feasible and useful.

As far as the physical

feasibility of railroads was concerned, the Pontchartrain and the New
Orleans and Carrollton were both demonstrating this fact.

But these two

projects were examples of railroading in a local situation only.

Why

should people in New Orleans ever become interested in interstate rail
roads when a great interstate waterway already provided multiple advan
tages for trade and commerce?

One answer was, that trade and commerce

were not mentioned or probably thought of in the first discussions of
interstate railroads.

When the idea of long distance railroads first

appeared in New Orleans, enthusiasts talked only in terms of improved
transportation for the mail and for passengers.
The first official indication that New Orleanians were thinking
about long distance railroads came late in 1833, when the Board of Public
Works, in a report submitted to the Louisiana House, called the attention
of the lawmakers to a proposed railroad from Charleston, South Carolina,
to Milledgeville, Georgia.

The report pointed out that "...a continua

tion of that road to New Orleans...would produce great local as well as
national advantages."^
to say.

What these advantages would be, the report failed

Nevertheless, after this initial suggestion by the Board of

Public Works, the New Orleans press began taking up the cause of the
interstate railroad, while certain members of

legislature speculated

^Louisiana, House Journal. 11 Legis., 2 Sess., 1833, P- 33-
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upon possible routes for such a railroad.

The press, interested primarily

in the mail and the news media, suggested a railroad between New Orleans
and Washington to facilitate communications with the nation's capital and
one railroad enthusiast, State Senator D. F. Bui*the, proposed a route for
the Louisiana branch of this railroad.

Senator Burthe envisioned a rail

road from Mobile across the Florida parishes to Baton Rouge, and then
along the Mississippi River to New Orleans.

Apparently this suggestion

pleased few except the Senator, and least of all, the press.

The Louisiana

Advertiser complained loudly that this railroad would lengthen the dis
tance between Mobile and New Orleans instead of shorten it.

"Wonderful

improvement, indeedI" sneered the Advertiser, when Baton Rouge would be
served with mail before New Orleans.

"Does he ^Senator Burthe/ not know

that the great town of Baton Rouge is not yet of quite so much consequence
as New Orleans?"

2

The attitude of the Louisiana Advertiser toward that particular pro
posal illustrated the naive approach at that time toward interstate rail
roads.

Nevertheless, a few legislators were genuinely interested in the

railroad from New Orleans to Washington, and in February, 1834, a bill was
introduced to promote this objective.

The legislation, sponsored by

Representative Hoa of New Orleans, would "...provide for the necessary
surveys and estimates, with a view to the construction of a Rail Road
from New Orleans toward Washington ci
for..."

and...the necessary funds there

Such a vague proposition was almost bound for failure, ar

House, after a brief discussion, tabled the bill until the next year.^
t

^New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 20 January 1834, P* 2.
^Louisiana, House Journal. 11 Legis., 2 Sess., 1834, PP* 95, 108.
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If the somewhat romantic notion of improving the mail service and
speeding up travel appealed to the earliest New Orleans advocates of a
long distance railroad, more basic economic factors dominated the plans
of other railroad enthusiasts, who were thinking in terms of the western
trade.

By the fall of 1634* the Erie canal had been operating for nearly

eight seasons, cutting deeply into the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley trading
area.

Mr-anwhil*», other coastal cities of the Atlantic states began

emulating New York, constructing both canals and railroads to the West.
Baltimore pushed her railroad toward Cincinnati, while Charleston aimed
at Louisville and Cincinnati.

Even little Mobile, on the Gulf, looked

coveteously northward toward the Tennessee hinterland.

Right in New

Orleans’ own back yard, towns along the Mississippi River such as Natchez,
Vicksburg and Memphis projected railroads toward the interior to tap the
trade which nature almost preordained to be New Orleans'.^
If these new arteries of trade drained New O r l e m s 1 life-blood from
its natural flow, the loss was scarcely perceptible.

As the West filled

with people between 1330 and 1850, production increased so rapidly that
New Orleans’ trade expanded despite the Erie canal and the eastern rail
roads.

Nevertheless, some citizens in New Orlems, surveying the objec

tives and achievements of the transportation revolution in the East,
began by 1834 to show alarm over the danger to New Orleans' western trade.
One by one, cities of the old southwest alligned themselves with cities In
the East in seemingly diabolical plots to build railroads and divert trade

**R. 3. Cotterlll, "The Beginnings of Railroads in the Southwest,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. VIII (March, 1922), 318-319.
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from the waterways that led to New Orleans.
to unite by railroad with Charleston.

Even Memphis made plans

3o it was that railroad promoters

in New Orleans hit upon the idea of an alliance with Nashville, a move
which would bypass Memphis and thrust directly into the heartland of the
old southwest.

The New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company was soon

forthcoming.^
The Nashville railroad proposal probably appeared for the first time
in the New Orleans papers late in October, 1834* and was apparently pre
sented as a compromise to please both the proponents of the railroad to
Washington, and tlie agitators for a railroad to the West.

The New

Orleans Bee declared that "...the real short and certain route from New
Orleans to Washington is by way of Nashville..."

New Orleans' mail from

Washington often came via Nashville, observed the Bee.
Washington and Nashville took only seven days.

The trip between

From Nashville, the mail

was sent to Madlsonville, a four day journey, and then crossed Lake
Pontchartrain by steamer to Port Pontchartrain.

The route to Nashville

was ideal because the country was generally level except for a small
amount of rough ground in Tennessee.
have to be crossed.

Only one river, the Pearl, would

"Two hundred thousand persons would annually travel

such a road to and from the western states only, and when continued to
Washington.• .all the travel East would be in that direction."^

If the

Bee was aware of the larger economic implications of the Nashville rail
road, it never indicated that fact at this time.

ew Orleans Bee. 25 October 1834, p. 2.
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By November, 1834, the Nashville railroad promoters got the project
under way by calling a meeting of all the railroad's well wishers.

Among

the railroad enthusiasts present at this November 21st meeting, the names
of D. F. Burthe, Clarke Woodruff, and Maurice W. Hoffman stood out, while
the guiding hand of Hofftoan was visible in the organizational proceedings.
What happened was practically a repetition of the methods pursued by the
Pontchartrain railroad promoters five years earlier.

First, the members

formed themselves into a New Orleans and Nashville railroad association
to which each contributed $100.

This money went into a fund that would

cover "...a complete survey of the intermediate country, ascertaining...
the materials to be found thereon, in making estimates of the cost of the
work and profiles, plane and maps thereof and to defray other expenses."
Next, an executive committee was appointed to carry on the business of
the association, while another committee of twenty received the task of
7
recruiting additional members for the association.
Obtaining a charter
from the legislature was the next step in the program of the Nashville
railroad promoters.
The project got a good send-off through the legislative halls when
Governor A. B. Roman, in his message to the legislature, expounded at
some length on the desirability of the railroad.

Further, he linked the

Nashville railroad directly with the issue of western trade.

While taking

cognizance of the fact that "...the states of New York, Pennsylvania,
Maryland and Virginia...are expending millions in exertion to approach the
West and dispute with us for their rich productions...," the Governor

^Ibid., 19 November 1834, P* 2j 21 November 1834, p* 2.
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assured the legislature that "♦..the greater part of this coflunerce can
never be taken from ua..."

Ironic prophecyJ

Nevertheless, Governor Roman

urged New Orleans to resist these encroachments no matter how

a

portion of the trade should be captured by New Orleans' enemies.

To do

this, "new communications" were necessary to "...neutralise the effects
of those which are calculated to affect us injuriously..."

In the Gover

nor's opinion, a railroad between New Orleans and Nashville was the answer
to the problem.

8

The Louisiana legislature responded quickly to the request of the New
Orleans and Nashville railroad association for a charter, and incorporated
the organization early in 1835.

The company received the largest capital

ization ever authorized a railroad company in Louisiana before 1850, $6,00)000
with a possible increase to $8,000,000, and stock could be subscribed for a
*

down payment of only five per cent (five dollars) per share.

The promoters

of the railroad thoughtfully remembered to have 5,000 shares of stock reserv
ed by charter provision for the city of New Orleans, and also 5»000 shares
for each of the states through which the railroad would pass, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee.

These shares would be sold to the

public, however, If the states and the city of New Orleans did not take
advantage of this opportunity within twelve months.

The New Orleans and

Nashville Railroad Company, like most of the railroads Incorporated during
this period, enjoyed tax exemption privileges.

Its capital stock was

exempt from taxes forever, and its property, for twenty years.

The charter

provided that rates must not be so high as to bring in an annual net profit

^Louisiana, House .Trmt»na^

X2

Legis., 1 3eas., 1835, p. 7*
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above fifteen per cent of the capitalization.

A charter list of the

oonoissioners charged with supervising the sale of railroad stock include*^
besides Hoffman and Woodruff, some very prominent names in the Hew Orleans

Q

business world, Laurent Hillaudon, Sammel J. Peters, and James H. Caldwell/
Mi]laudon, who owned land along the New Orleans and Carrollton railroad,
had been a promoter of that project, and later was connected with another
railroad, the Mexican Gulf.

Peters was a prominent New Orleans banker who

had promoted the Pontchartrain railroad, and Caldwell was connected with
many New Orleans business enterprises, including a theater and the New
Orleans gas works.

To say the least, the New Orleans and Nashville Bail—

road Company did not suffer from a lack of experienced leaders.
There was one clause in the charter that did not please its promoters,
or serve the best interests of the railroad.

This proviso stated that the

railroad company could not open its subscription books to sell stock until
the legislature of Mississippi chartered the company to pass through that
state.

Since the Mississippi legislators had adjourned early in 1835 and

would not meet again until January, 1836, the Nashville railroad project,
for which much enthusiasm had been engendered, would have to cool off in
a state of limbo while awaiting the pleasure of the Mississippi lawmakers.
Because there were no doubts that the Mississippi legislature would be
favorably disposed to the Nashville railroad, the Louisiana legislature
later in the session of 183i, authorized the company to open its books for
the subscription of stock, but only for one dollar per share instead of

^Louisiana, Acts. 12 Legis., 1 Sess., 1835> pp. 7-16.
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the five dollars authorized In the charter.

The Louisiana legislature,

in this supplementary act, forbade the railroad directors to call in any
installment payments from the stockholders until Mississippi granted the
charter.

In addition. Governor Roaian was authorised to send the governor

of Mississippi copies of the acts passed by the legislature dealing with
the New Orleans and Nashville railroad.

10

No one could have suspected at

that time the trouble lying ahead in procuring a charter for the Nashville
railroad from the state of Mississippi.
In the spring of 1835, the reaction of the Mississippi legislature
to the Nashville railroad appeared to be highly favorable.

The Mississippi

lawmakers were informed of the project by Clarke Woodruff, who went to
Mississippi as agent of the executive committee early in 1635 to lobby for
the railroad charter.

Woodruff "...conversed with the governor and other

public officials of the state, with members of both houses of the legisla
ture, and others well informed on the subject."

After these conversations,

he reported that "...all from the northern, eastern and central parts of
the state seemed enthusiastic for the completion and success of the pro
ject; and that the only opposition which is likely to be encountered is
from Adams county in which Natchez is situated."

Only the early and abrupt

termination of the 1635 session of the Mississippi legislature prevented
the chartering of the Nashville railroad at that time, said Woodruff, but
the project would surely win approval in the session of 1836.11

This early

ffirbid.. 146-147.
^Senate Journal, 3 March 1835, quoted in New Orleans Bee. 4 March
1635, p. 2.
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adjournment of the legislature proved to be an unfortunate twist of fate
for the New Orleans and Nashville railroad, and gave the railroad's
opponents time to organise deadly opposition to the project.
Woodruff's information that some opposition existed in Adams County
and eastern Mississippi was the understatement of the day, as events would
soon prove.
reasons.

The enemies of the railroad opposed the project for differert

In western Mississippi, the river towns of Natchez and Vicks

burg planned railroads of their own.

Natchez wanted to build toward the

Pearl River, and Vicksburg, east to Jackson, Mississippi.

Both towns

planned to capture the trade of their rural hinterlands and develop into
large river ports, ambitions that would suffer frustration and probable
defeat if the Nashville railroad should cut right across their back
yards.

12

Eastern Mississippi, unlike the river towns, favored the Nash

ville railroad, but only if it served that part of the state.

Otherwise,

eastern Mississippians would suffer the project to die rather than bypass
them.

Since the rno3t practical and feasible route for the Nashville r a l t

road ran west of the Pearl River, somewhat parallel with the Mississippi
River, the N e w Orleans and Nashville railroad directors, after the pre
liminary survey, wisely decided to adopt this route.

But unfortunately,

this route offended both railroad factions in Mississippi, the river towns
because it came too near to them, and eastern Mississippi, because it by
passed them.
la.-vre.

Here was the basis for an alliance in the Mississippi legis-

The situation was serious because "...the largest proportion of

the Mississippi legislature is composed of members from 5E, E, and NE of

12(;ottex*ill, "Railroads in the Southwest," 322
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the state, and they are determined to have the railroad east of the Pearl
river or to have no railroad."

13

Throughout the remainder of 1835, the Natchez press turned out propa
ganda against the Nashville railroad like a gristmill.

nThe Natches

Courier as usual continued to deny the propriety or utility of the New
Orleans and Nashville railroad,"

commented the New Orleans Bee, although

it has not doubted the practicability."

In fact, the railroad even

became an issue in the gubernatorial election of 1835 when citizens of
Natchez and Adams County attempted "...to make the railroad a subject of
qualification in the election of the Mississippi state governor."^*
was no secret that little Natchex had great ambitions for herself.

It
Tet

it bordered almost on the humorous for the Bee to bitterly accuse Natchex
of "...wanting to monopolize the produce of the state of Mississippi..
by opposing the Nashville railroad, when New Orleans herself thrived from
perhaps one of the greatest natural monopolies in history, the Mississippi
River.

Natchex also hoped to become a port of entry, "...and in order to

prove the superiority of Natchez to New Orleans... they ordered a ship to
be towed thither up the Mississippi."

The ship, propelled by a steam

boat, "...was not much longer ascending than a fortnight...," sneered
the Bee sarcastically.

"Tet this they welcomed with a volly ^ s i f r o m

their battery and throats that sent the welkin round."
her port of entry, cried the Bee.

Let Natches have

"Then our merchants can send thither

a ship or two during the year, to export all their produce warehoused
there."

The Bee believed that almost any foolish project would appeal to

Orleans Bee. 25 June 1835, p. 2
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Natchez In preference to a railroad to Nashville, even "...a canal to
Charleston.
Nevertheless, the wishes of the river towns prevailed, and the Nash
ville railroad bill failed in the Mississippi legislature in 1836.

The

opponents of the railroad held the balance of power in the House, and
passed an amendment "...so that said Road shall pass through Pearlington...
on the east side of the Pearl River, thence to Columbia..." and eastern
Mississippi.

Although the Senate 3truck out the offensive amendment, the

coalition of river towns and easterners was unyielding, and agreement
was impossible.
In the 1837 session of the Mississippi legislature, the railroad
charter again came up for consideration.

I p. spite of intense criticism

from many Mississippians, that the planter Interests of the state must
not be sacrificed for the particularism of the river towns, the westeast alliance would have held firm had not other factors intervened.
The river towns of Natchez and Vicksburg, competitors for the inland
trade, trusted one another less than they trusted New Orleans.

Finally,

Natchez withdrew from the alliance and cast her lot with the Nashville
railroad in the hope that by so doing, she could connect her own rail
road with that line.

With the support of Natchez in the legislature,

the New Orleans and Nashville railroad charter passed in January, 1837.

17

Thus it was that Natchez had her way to the end, perhaps initially to

^•^Ibid.. 10 October 1835* p. 2.
! % e w Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company, First Report. 1836. p. 16.
17cotter-ill, "Railroads in the Southwest," 322. New Orleans Bee. 26
January 183 , p. 2.
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the irreparable harm of the Nashville railroad project.

Receiving charter

privileges from the states of Alabama and Tennessee was no problem.

The

railroad directors could announce in their first report that these states,
"...in the spirit which belongs to the commercial interests of the pre
sent day, have become parties to the great work, by granting Acts of
Incorporation, and...^Tennessee/ authorized a subscription to the capital
,

, .,

,

M1S

stock thereof."

Soon after the 1335 incorporation of the New Orleans and Nashville
Railroad Company in Louisiana, stock commissioners lost little time in
opening their subscription books in all the states through which the
railroad would pass.

By the middle of Kay, 1835, citizens in Mississippi,

Alabama and Tennessee could purchase New Orleans and Nashville railroad
stock, and sales began in New Orleans on May 25.

19

On the following day,

the Bee hailed the event with enthusiasm, and pleaded with New Orleanians
to get behind the project.

This undertaking must receive its support

from the great body of our citizens, and upon them now rests its success
or its failure."

Since a down payment of only one dollar per share was

necessary, almost every citizen could subscribe for at least ten to fifty
shares of stock, and "...so 3mall an effort on the part of one thousand
or more citiaens would insure success..."

If the people of New Orleans

failed to support the Nashville railroad, warned the Bee, they "...will
lose forever to our city and state the concurrence of the state of Miss
issippi in this great, work."

The advantages from this railroad, once

l®New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company, First Report. 1836.
PP*

^New Orleans Bee. 13 May 1835, p. 2j 25 May 1835, p* 2.
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completed, would be Inestimable,
miles of traveling would be saved.

Just in distance alone, hundreds of
Whereas Nashville was 1,350 miles

from New Orleans by the river route, said the Bee, the distance was
only 500 miles by land.

In addition, while the river route could at

best be utilized for only half of the year, the land route would provide
continuous communications between the two cities.

The citizens of New

20

Orleans must respond to this challenge, concluded the Bee.

The sale of stock during 1035 apparently began slowly but picked up
toward the end of the year.

In Nashville, for example, "...a good deal

of apathy...on the Rail Road subject..." was reported by Clarke Woodruff,
who went to that city early in June to seek support for the railroad.
Woodruff was fairly successful in stirring up the interest of people in
Nashville, however, and a public meeting was held soon after his arrival,
attended by most of Nashville’s leading citizens.

The group voted to

support the Nashville railroad project and appointed a committee to aid
in selling stock in that city.

Under Woodruff’s influence, a feeling in

Nashville that the railroad to New Orleans would injure her interests
"...is rapidly dying away, and a rail road fever taking its place."

21

Qjr

November, 1035, the Tennessee legislature chartered the railroad "...with
the provision that the subscription books shall be opened in that state
for stock to the amount of one million ^Sollars^..."

Tennessee's interest

in the railroad even went farther than trying to Insure for its citizens
large amounts of stock.

Apparently Nashville was to become the hub of a
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Tennessee railroad system radiating outward from the New Orleans and
Nashville railroad Junction there.

Thus, charters were granted to many

railroads projected from Nashville into the eastern and western parts of
the state.

The Tennessee legislature also authorized subscription for

the 5,000 shares of New Orleans and Nashville railroad stock reserved
for that state by the Louisiana charter.

Even lesser towns in Tennessee

supported the New Orleans and Nashville railroad.

The New Orleans Bee

reported that rt...the small town cf Franklin, alone has subscribed $100,000
towards the Nashville and New Orleans railroad."
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The Louisiana charter had reserved 25,000 shares of stock for sub
scription by state and municipal governments, and 35,000 shares for
private individuals.

Throughout 1835, private subscriptions fell some

what behind the amount set aside, nevertheless, by December, the rail
road’s Finance Committee could report that "...25,000 shares out of the

35,000 reserved to private individuals were subscribed for...,"

enough

by charter provision "...to convert the commissioners appointed to receive
subscriptions into directors of the company..

.

.

Later, in the spring

,

of 1836, the company reported that 34,062 shares of stock had bean sold.

2L

Unfortunately for the railroad company, no installments on the stock
could be collected until the railroad charter was forthcoming from the
Mississippi legislature.

Under these circumstances, it would seem that

the whole project might have been financially paralyzed.

But this was net

^ I b i d .. 3 December 1835, p. 2.j 10 May 1836, p. 2.
^Ibld. . 4 December 1835, p. 2.
24sew Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company, First Report. 1836.
pp. 4-5.
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completely the case.

The r a il r o a d ’s Finance Committee reported in

December, 1335* that ways had been found to carry on the work regardless
of the stock installment restrictions in the charter.

The project was

popular, and there was so much public confidence in the enterprise and
its leaders "...that the company has not only found means to complete the
surveys of the different routes...but to send their principal engineer
to Europe..." to purchase rails for fifty miles of railroad, "...the cost
of which is estimated at $160,000..."

25

One of the "means" found to

raise funds was the use of a voluntary system of collecting installments
on the railroad stock.

Late in November, 1335, the directors offered to

all stockholders who would pay at least twenty dollars per share on their
stock, the opportunity "...to take and subscribe for at the par value of
as many shares of the additional 3tock authorized by the charter, as shall
equal in number to that upon which said instalments shall have been so

26

paid."*’

Probably many private stockholders, anxious to see the project

succeed, and trusting that the Mississippi legislature would grant a
charter in its 1336 session, paid installments voluntarily.
At the same time the railroad directors were asking private stock
holders for voluntary installments, they also turned their attention to
public aid.

In November, 1335 > the New Orleans and Nashville Railroad

Company petitioned the City Council of N ew Orleans to subscribe for the

5,000 shares of stock reserved in the railroad charter for that munici—
pality.

27

The decision of the council in December, to purchase this stock,
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cane by unanimous vote, an indie&tion of the popularity of the railroad.
This municipal aid came also Just in time to keep the project moving
forward.

Unlike the private subscribers, who paid only one dollar per

share, the city of New Orleans floated a bond with the Union Bank of
Louisiana for the entire amount, $500,000, "...by which the company has
been enabled to carry on their works with energy..."

26

The state of Louisiana, on the other hand, never purchased the stock
reserved for it.

The New Orleans Bee thought that Louisiana followed a

most "niggardly policy" compared with the Atlantic states of New Tork and
Maryland, which liberally voted aid for internal improvements.

While the

railroad promoters "...labored so incessantly in its /the railroad's/
behalf..., doing all in their power to accomplish the undertaking...,"
the state of Louisiana and its citizens were most parsimonious in their
support of the enterprise.

Since the state refused aid, then the rail

road "...must be constructed by the liberal and enlightened enterprise
of our merchants and landholders, for it will return to them a profit of
an hundred fold."

If Louisiana and its citizens failed to support the

New Orleans and Nashville railroad, the state "...will remain so far
behind the spirit of the age, that years...will not place her on a par
with her sister states."

29

Nevertheless, the charge of the Bee that the

New Orleans and Nashville railroad was "...very coldly supported by
Louisiana..." and

its citizens was somewhat unfounded.

By states,the

^®New Orleans
New Orleans Bee. 3
*Vftew Orleans
30New Orleans

and Nashville Railroad Company, FirstReport. 1636.
December 1635, p. 2; A December
p. 2.
Bee. 12 August 1635, p. 2; 4 October 1836, p. 2.
Bee. 2 June 1636, p. 2.

p. 8.
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total number of shares of stock held in Louisiana was 30,309, compared
with 21,215 in Mississippi, 5,335 in Alabama, and 10,600 in Tennessee.
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Preparations for construction of the railroad kept apace of the
stock selling efforts.

Surveying operations were under way by the latter

part of April, 1835, when it was reported that four companies of engineers
were covering the entire route between New Orleans and Nashville.

Having

begun the survey before funds were available from the sale of railroad
stock, the company attempted to acquire a state appropriation of $ 5,000
for this object.

This having failed, the railroad company had to rely

on contributions from private citizens.

Even had the state provided the

amount asked for, this sum would have covered only a fifth of the coat
of the survey, which eventually climbed to $25,000.

By September, 1835,

the company's Chief Engineer, il. J. Ranney, had completed surveys of the
three possible routes, and reported that the line between New Orleans
and the Tennessee River could be constructed with grades not exceeding
twenty feet per mile.

Between the Tennessee River and Nashville, however,

a favorable route could be selected, but the costs of construction would
run much ldgher.

The total distance of the route was estimated at 480

to 490 miles .32
Even before the survey was completed, the New Orleans Bee announced
prematurely and completely inaccurately, that "...the New Orleans and Nash
ville railroad company have procured materials for the construction of 50

3lGlbson’s Guide. 1838, p. 239*
32Niles' Weekly Register. Vo. XLVIII (April 25, 1835), 135. New Orleans
Bee. 26 Kay 1835, p. 2; 22 August 1835, p. 2. New Orleans and Nashville
Railroad Company, First Report. 1836. pp. 4, 7*
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miles of their route ."33

Although the Chief Engineer of the railroad left

for Europe immediately after completing the survey to purchase railroad
Iron, serious construction did not begin until April, 1836, and the first
shipment of iron did not arrive until Hay.

This lull in the construction

activities of the company was impossible to avoid because the company at
that time did not possess sufficient means to begin the undertaking.

If

constructl *n temporarily lanquished, there was no dearth of planning on
the part of some of the railroad directors, especially in the u t t e r of
public land along the route of the railroad.

In fact, it was becoming

apparent by the fall of 1835, even to outsiders, that some of the rail
road directors at least, were conniving with the land speculators.
The first hint that speculators were scanning the New Orleans and
Nashville project came from the New Orleans Bee in October, 1835.

There

was much choice land east of the Mississippi Elver "...not yet entered,*
observed the Bee, and "...many are anxious to purchase lands...thro or near
which will be the route of the New Orleans and Nashville railroad.H

But

the railroad directors had "...cautiously forborn to publish the route
decided on or advised...," hence the impossibility for most people to
purchase land.

What reasons had the directors given for their reluctance

to publish the route?

"Not that they or their friends might have the

advantage of selecting such lands as might be convenient to the railroad.••
but that they are fjioJ compelled from want of a quorum; and for the action
Of the Mississippi and Tennessee legislature.,.,"
cally .34

33gew Orleans Bee. 7 August 1835, p. 2.
&7 October 1835, p. 2.

added the Bee, causti
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About a month later, the Bee announced that ite earlier suspicions
had been confirmed, and land speculators were "...being apprized of the
secret of the route...1* Indeed, while the Chief Engineer "...was author
ised to advertise in eastern journals, and tho he gave Information on the
estimated cost, Isngth, etc. of the railroad to those journalists..
New Orleans papers remained ignorant of the details of the Nashville pro
ject.

*Ws have been credibly informed,* asserted the Bee, "that 6ne or

two individuals have realized a fortune within the last 2 or 3 months by
speculating in public lands...” along two proposed railroad lines, the
Clinton and Port Hudson and the New Orleans and Nashville.

In making

these charges, however, the B«e hastened to point out that the president
of the New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company, liaurice W. Hofflaan, was
out of town at the time of the alleged irregularities and n ...would not
have countenanced such scheming.^
If the speculators looked coveteously at the public domain along the
route of the Nashville line, so did the railroad company, which was not
backward in making its desires known to Congress.

Although the company

petitioned for one township somewhere in the Florida Parishes along the
route of the railroad, Congress granted much less than this amount.

In

addition to an eighty foot right of way across public lands still unsold,
Congress granted the New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company small chunks
of land to be used for depots, watering places and workshops.

These pieces

of land were to be laid out in five acre squares, but "...not more than one
such square shall be granted for every fifteen miles of the said road lying

35jbid., 26 November 1635* P* 2
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within the public land,.."

Further, building materials such as earth,

stone and wood might be taken from unsold public land.

The grant became

null and void "...unless the road be begun within the period of two years
from the date of this act, and completed within eight years thereafter."^
Throughout 1336, the railroad directors struggled with the problem of
getting construction underway, while at the same time, they faced finan
cial difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable.

Nevertheless, the

New Orleans press was favorably disposed to the project and the New Orleans
Bee especially, carried on a continuous campaign of promotion.

By this ties

the Bee had discarded its romantic and unrealistic notions about long
distance railroad building.

The visionary arguments about improved communica

tions, faster mail service, and speedier travel facilities had yielded to
the solid economic theme of western trade.

Although the Bee was gravely

concerned about the "...rivalry of ^Tew Orleans/ sister Atlantic states.•
it vented most of its spleen upon Charleston, using that proud, aristo
cratic city and its designs upon the western trade as a bogey to frighten
«

lethargic businessmen in New Orleans into more sustained support of the
Nashville railroad,

"The design of Charleston is evident..,," said the

Bee, and "...should that city obtain the object in view, ^the construc

tion of a railroad to Ioui3ville and Cincinnati/, ...New Orleans must
37
decay and Charleston improve..."^
The Bee also reserved several uningratiating comments for New York,
that commercial colossus of the North which was "...monopolizing to a

3&united States, Acts. 24 Cong., 1 3ess., 1836, pp. 142-143.
37New Orleans Bee. 4 October 1836,p. 2.

great extent a trade which is ligitiioately ours, and making our city a
convenience,*1 New Orleans’ forwarding business already was slipping away
to New York, which "... places her huge paws upon us, and...our accommoda
ting merchants ship the produce to her wharves at a trifling commission... "
while her merchants ship goods here to be forwarded to the Vest.

Whereas

New Orleans1 forwarding merchants formerly supplied the West with its
imports, "...now the country merchants scarcely ever visit our market to
purchase; they have imbibed the opinion that they cannot buy upon as
favorable terms here as in the original market where we purchase ourselves. "
The forwarding business was declining year by year, "...and now as a
further consequence of our folly, we see ships laded with merchandize
passing our Levees bound to Natchez, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, etc..."
Meanwhile, New Orleans merely dreamed about its future, "...leaving to
blind chance that which should be regulated by prudent foresight."

For

New Orleans, the city that commanded all the resources of the Mississippi
valley, this was a pitiful

part to play.

problem.

haveits own railroad to the West, and "...with

New Orleans must

But there was an answer to the

the completion of the Nashville Eail Road we may fairly promise ourselves
that our vassalage will be
York upon equal grounds."

at an end, and we shall then compete* with New
This railroad would "pour millions" into the

lap of New Orleans, and meet the challenge of her sister states on the
Atlantic.^®
The year 1836 witnessed a virtual bustle of activity on the part of

3^1bid.. 12 August, 1835* p. 2; 4 October 1836, p. 2.

234
the railroad directors in constructing the line and purchasing equip
ment.

One of the ever present problems in constructing the railroad was

the mustering of a sufficient labor force.

The company's frequent notices

in the New Orleans papers advertised for hired slaves, and skilled and
unskilled white labor, attested to this fact.

Once the company called for

hired slaves to work In the area of the pine woods, where "...the known
health of the country is relied on as a great inducement with those having
alaves to hire.”

Later the company advertised that it needed at least

100 workmen immediately and urgently.

In November, 1836, "...52 Mechanics

for laying the ways of this road...” arrived in New Orleans from the North.
"These young men are just from the Utica road and unite intelligence and
industry with much tact in their line of work...," said the Bee.

Never

theless, these laborers represented only a fraction of the railroad's
labor needs.

The Bee, for its part In finding railroad laborers, called

upon all young men to "...lend a hand to a work which will be the pride
of our city..." and urged fathers of families to support with their labor
a project that soon would provide them and their families access to the
piney woods north of New Orleans, where healthful recreation could be
enjoyed.

The shortage of labor probably led the railroad company to

invest a considerable sum of money in costly labor saving machinery such
as steam pile drivers, and also to let out contracts whenever possible for
timber supplies.

39

3 ?Ibid.. 6 June 1836, p. lj 28 November 1836, p. 2; 30 November
1836, p. 2. New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. 4 November 1836.
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The acquisition of pile drivers was only a small part of the New
Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company's outlay for machinery and equij>*
ment during 1836 and 1837*

Apparently the railroad directors, and especial

l y its president, Maurice W. Hoffman, were so certain of the eventual
success of their project that they purchased large amounts of machinery
and rolling stock even before there was a railroad on which to operate*
The initial outlay for equipment went for i^on rails, enough to carry the
railroad fifty miles, and costing $160,000.

The arrival of the first

shipment of iron rails in Hay, 1836, was followed throughout the remainder
of the year by other costly railroad equipment.

In November, 1836, for

example, thirty tons of machinery were imported, "...consisting of dteam
Engines for driving piles, portable 3aw Mill, 7 ourthen cars...and much
other machinery..."

Within a few days, a "spacious building" had been

erected In which to store the machinery, while contracts had already been
let on other buildings, including the New Orleans depot of the railroad.
Finally, in February,

1837, 190 tons more of railroad Iron arrived, and a

ir\

locomotive engine.H '
The seemingly lavish expenditure on equipment and railroad iron did
not go unnoticed or unchallenged,
policies began to appear.

and some discontent with the comp a n y 1s

" fWh y invest so large a portion of the sub

scription of the city In machinery and rails?,'" asked the critics.
" 'Why not have proportioned it out on the work generally?'"

In defending

the company, President Hoffman asserted that the railroad management was

^ N e w Orleans B e e . 1/+ December 1835, P» 2.j 30 November 1636, p. 2.j
19 December 1836, p. 2.j 25 February 1637, p. 2*
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operating from the long range viewpoint of completing the entire route
to Nashville.

They did not propose to make "...just as much of it as

the city subscription would reach."

Relying on past experience, Hoffman

said, it was deemed advisable to have on hand sufficient provisions of
rails and machinery to avoid any delays from possible shortages.

Besides,

"...if the undertaking was to be arrested for want of means, it was of
no moment whether the expenditure was in piling, rails or machinery..."
As to the purchase of the locomotives, these were conveniently ordered
by the railroad engineer during his trip to England for iron rails.

"If

we never advance a foot farther,” said Hoffman, "we can claim the merit
of having done as much for the service of Rail Road construction as any
other Company."^Hoffman 1s philosophical approach to the New Orleans and Nastvrtlle
project revealed his own uncertainties and pessimism.

Ety the beginning

of 1^37 there were grounds for believing that the Nashville railroad
might fail.

While New Orleans’ stock subscription was nearly used up,

the railroad directors found most of the banks in New Orleans very reluctant to loan money to the company.

On the other hand, the receipt of

a charter from the state of Mississippi in January, 1837, provided some
basis for hope, because installments on the stock could now be demanded,
although this process would take time and funds were needed immediately.
The calling of installment payments was also beset by other grave rand fl
oat ions.

Would the stockholders, with only one dollar per share at stake,

^ I b i d .. 13 January 1837, p. 2.
A2fbid.. 21 November 1336, p. 2
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be willing to risk more money to save the trifling amount already invested,
at a time when the New Orleans press and even the railroad management
entertained serious reservations about the success of the venture?

If the

private stockholders, who were the financial backbone of the railroad, did
not respond to the call for stock installments, the whole project would
collapse.

It seemed that the curse of the Mississippi River towns would

haunt the Nashville railroad to the end.

The railroad directors met this

crisis by calling for a small installment of five dollars per share, payable by April 20, 1837.
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But they had other irons in the fire also.

Previously, in January, the company petitioned the Louisiana legislature
for a loan, and after the granting of the Mississippi charter, there
seemed to be a good chance for favorable consideration.
The bill to aid the New Orleans and Nashville railroad occupied the
attention of the Louisiana legislature during most of its first session
of 1837.

There were two paramount issues during the discussion of the

Nashville railroad.

First, should the state subscribe for stock and

become a party to the project, or should the state extend a loan to the
company in return for a mortgage on the railroad?
should be thus expended?

3econd, how much money

Throughout the session, Senator Hoa of New

Orleans ably championed the interests of the railroad.

He described to

his fellow Senators the "vigorous struggle" for the trade of the Mississ
ippi valley, and its meaning for New Orleans, mentioning the role that

43Ibid.. 18 February 1837, p. 1.
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would be played by the Nashville railroad in securing the western trade.
As far as the type of state aid to be extended, Senator Hoa preferred a
loan over the subscription for stock, but it really mattered not which
type of aid was forthcoming.

The important thing was the amount.

The

company had asked for $3,000,000, and this sum had been written into the
first section of the bill.

The whole amount was absolutely necessary for

the railroad's success, said Hoa, and "...to move the reduction of the
first section, which is the soul of the bill, is to destroy it at one
blow."

44

There was no need to fear for the security of the loan, said the
Senator reassuringly, because "...subscriptions have been taken for four
or five millions cf dollars, either by the freeholders or by the munici
palities of the city."

In addition, the state of Tennessee had sub

scribed $2,000,000, and Alabama and Mississippi, $500,000 each.

Already

a total. capital of seven or eight million dollars had been subscribed.
It was true, admitted Senator Hoa, "...that the stockholders have paid
only one dollar on each share*.., /but/ they will be compelled to pay
the balance."

In any event, the state must come to the aid of the railt r
road or the whole venture would c o l l a p s e . A c t u a l l y , the senator should

have said, in all honesty, that confidence in the project was waning and
that state aid, liberally extended, might keep the company, with its one
dollar stock subscriptions, from completely folding.

^Senate Journal, 31 January 1837, quoted in New Orleans Bee. 1
February, 1837, p. 2.
45Senate Journal, 9 February 1837, quoted in New Orleans Bee. 10
February, 1837, p. 2.
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The opponents of state aid were admittedly swayed by Senator Hoa's
arguments and enthusiasm, but generally they believed that "...the funds
of the state should not be thus lavished.”

Senator Felix Garcia, who had

his own railroad axe to grind in the Mexican Gulf project, admitted that
the Nashville railroad might benefit Louisiana, but it bothered him greatly
to see the immense profits that must result from its success, falling
into the hands of only a few.

"Who Is to reap this profit?," asked Garcia.

"The answer is, the stockholders of the company, who comprise a very small
fraction of the people of this itate."

It was net the business of the

legislature to appropriate public funds to aid a company under the pre
text that the state would prosper, when the stockholders would be the
beneficiaries.

Thus, if any aid were extended, it should be in the form

of stock subscriptions,^

Somehow, Senator Garcia conveniently forgot

these arguments when the matter of extending state aid to his own Mexican
Gulf railroad came up in the next session of the legislature.
In March, 1837* the legislature finally voted aid to the New Orleans
and Nashville railroad.

In return for a loan of $500*000* the company was

required to give the state a mortgage "...upon all property of the com
pany, immoveables, slaves, rights, machinery, lots, railways, and generally
upon all property which may appertain to said company within the limits
of the State of Louisiana,"

At the same time, the capitalization of the

company was enlarged for a second time, from $8,OCX),000 to $10,000,000.
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This miserly loan was almost like a drop of water to a man dying of thirst.

^Lmiaiana, Acts. 13 Legis. * 1 3ess., 1837* pp. 110-113.

It undoubtedly prolonged the agony of the doomed victim, but was of no
consequence otherwise.

If ever a literal policy of state aid for inter

nal improvements projects was needed, here was the time.

\ loan of

$3 ,000,000 might have saved the Nashville railroad, and the expenditure
o f such a large sum during the depression that followed the panic of
March, 1*37, could have served to ease somewhat the investment slump
accompanying tV' recession.
is it turned out,

But $517,500 was money thrown away.

the first installment of the state loan, amounting

to $200,700, was barely sufficient to pay the existing iebts of the com
pany, while + he money panic of 1337 pointed toward the eventual doom of
the largest railroad venture ever attempted in the southwest up to that
time.
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On March 21, the hew Orleans 3* , with "deep mortification,"

reported that "...the directors

:f the 'Jew Orleans and Nashville Rail

road, have been compelled to suspend operations, and to discharge, with
the except4 on of an assi start engineer
This policy of retrenchment
save the project

irid a few hands, all their force."

derided upon only as a last resort, to

from Bankruptcy.

"The limited aid extended by the state,

is alor.s sufficient to keep the company 1.. a normal state of existence,
without giving Impetus which won! 3 enjurundertaking."

The rai'>

th«

i, oedy completi «.u of ‘he

x\ itself had ''fen constructed v

far as the

town of Bath, where workmen under the supervision of a former engineer
of the Utica railroad, were engaged in bridging a canal near that town,

^ C o t t e r i l l , "Railroads in the Southwest," 324-345.
^9flaw Orleans Bee. 21 March 1337, p. 2.
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Perhaps the small amount of state aid granted in March of 1837 wight
have bolstered stockholder confidence in the railroad had not the finan
cial panic intervened.

In view of the effects of the panic, it was

almost inevitable that the railroad directors' February ruling, calling
for five dollar stock installment to be paid in April, 1837, should go
unheeded by the stockholders.

Thus, in the following June, the directors

cancelled the April installment, and called instead for three stock pay
ments of two dollars per share, in September and December, 1837, and in

March, 1838.

When September rolled around, the stockholders ^gain ignored

the call for stock payments.

But the stockholders were still interested

in the project, and early In October, they forced President Hoffraan to

call a stockholders' meeting for October 30*

The matters they wished

aired reflected a aeep dissatisfaction with the management of the com
pany.

The stockholders proposed to discuss possible changes in the

offices :>f President and Directors, to decide what action should be taken

regarding the stock installment due in December, and to petition the
Louisiana legislature for state aid.

In the meantime, relations between

the President, and Directors of the company had degenerated xnto petty
bickering over inconsequential Issues, and in October, 1837, Hoffman
resigned, although afterward he was active in company affairs.

5C

The immediate future of the New Orleans and Nashville railroad
remained uncertain throughout the remainder of 1837.

Although the company

managed to keep enough money in the treasury to sustain a labor force of

3ix to eight white mechanics, and thirty seven company owned slaves, the

^^£bid., 22 June 1837, P* 2; 28 September 1837, p. 2.; 23 October
1837, p. lj 26 October 1837, p. 2.
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future looked grim indeed.
the horizon.
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There was apparently one ray of hope on

Only $200,000 of the state loan had been turned over to

the railroad company.

If the directors could get their hands on the

remaining $300,000, the Nashville railroad could enjoy another small

spree of expansion.

In March, 1838, the legislature ordered the release

of this money to the company "...at the rate or in proportion of ten
thousand dollars per mi.1e . .. upon the fact of completion being made known
to..." the state treasurer.
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The New Orleans press was jubilant.

the Nashville railroad could proceed with "renewed vigor."

Now

There were

sufficient funds available "...to carry out the work to the pine woods
across the lake.

Should the road extend no further...," said the

Commercial Bulletin, the benefits to New Orleans would be immense, enough
to compensate for the construction costs.

"Citizens can have their

family residences in the bosom of the pine forest, and visit the city
every morrdng in time for the transaction of business-returning to
their homes at night."

To promote renewed interest in the project,

steamboat excursions were conducted to Pass Manchac, where railroad
enthusiasts could view the place where the railroad bridge would be
erected over it. 53
All went well with the Nashville railroad for the time being, but
$300,000 was only stop-gap aid, and even with this financial encourage
ment, the directors dared not call for stock installments.

Obviously,

5^-1bid., g November 1837, p. 1.
^Louisiana, Acts. 13 Legis., 2 Sess., 1838, p. 84*
^-'New Orleans (Sotanerclal Bulletin. 10 March 1838, p. 2; 14 March
1838, p. 2.
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the future of the railroad still rested with the state and the action of
the Louisiana legislature in its 1839 session.
amidst much pressure to aid the railroad.

The legislature net

If the attitude of the New

Orleans press could be taken as a guide, the popular appeal of internal
improvements and the idea of progress had not completely died away after
the panic of 1837* and the Nashville railroad stood out as a symbol of
progress.

The New Orleans press warned that Louisiana was not keeping

abreast of the progressive developments of the age, while one editor com
pared the state with backward Russia.

"Even Russia is marching onward...

and has now as £;reat an extent of railroad built as the enlightened and
opulent State of Louisiana," commented the Commercial Bulletin in January
o_' 1339.

"Unless our legislators bestir themselves and do something to

succor the Nashville railroad this winter, we expect Russia will out
strip us in another year. "5**
For the third successive year, the problem of the Nashville rail
road had been dumped into the laps of the legislators, and in 1839, as
in previous years, a bill to expedite its construction was introduced.
Since the state already possessed a mortgage on the railroad, there was
widespread opposition to extending state aid in the form of another loan,
or as one legislator put it, taking "...a mortgage on the work done with
the State's own money."

But this was not the only objection to a loan*

It seemed that ten individuals owned among them "...more than a million
and a half of stock on which they had only paid $16,000— one dollar on

5*1 bid.. 10 January 1839, p. 2.
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the hundred."

If state money was "...to be used to build the road for

these individuals...," some legislators would have preferred to "...see
the road burned and lost, than admit such a principle."

The charge that

large amounts cf railroad stock were concentrated in the hands of a few
Individuals was correct.

Nevertheless, when it was pointed out that

these people had taken the stock to save the charter, and now would
gladly "...surrender the stock to the state, if the state wished to take
the undertaking in hand, and prosecute it herself...,1* opposition to state
aid somewhat abated.
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The bill that finally passed the legislature provided for state sub
scription to railroad stock rather than another loan.
ized was $1,250,000.

The amount author

In return for state participation in the project,

the legislature provided for the appointment of a majority of the rail
road directors by the Governor, until individual paid-up stock holdings
exceeded those of the state.

Further, subscription books were to be

opened for the sale of stock, upon which a minimum of twenty dollars per
share should be paid each year.

To finance this new state aid, the legis

lature reported to the Tormer pre-pan?c methods of creating capital.

The

capital stock of the Exchange and Banking Company was to be increased to
$ 5,000,000, secured by mortgages on real estate, "...on condition that
said bank will assume the payment of the state bonds, issued for the stock
of the Railroad ."56

55House Journal, 28 February 1839, quoted In New Orleans Commercial
Bulletin. 1 Karch 1839, p. 2.
^^House Journal, 4 March 1839, quoted in New Orleans Commercial Ektlle—
tin. 15 March 1839, p. 2. House Journal, 6 March 1839, quoted in New
6rleans Commercial Bulletin. 7 March 1839, p. 2.
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Thl 3 railroad aid bill was passed in Whig legislature recently
swept into office by an overwhelming victory at the polls.

Their pro

gram, calling for internal improvements, a tariff, and centralised
banking, anticipated the national Whig program of 1840.

So also did the

actions of Whig Governor A. B. Roman, anticipate and parallel the later
betrayal of Whig principles by President Tyler.

Throughout his adminis

tration, Governor Roman vetoed many improvement company aid bills in addi
tion to bank legislation.

Among the casualities of the Governor's veto

was the Nashville railroad aid bill of 1839*

The Governor's veto of this

specific legislation brought dismay and chagrin to his party in the legis
lature, and it also signaled the eventual and final coup de grace of the
Nashville railroad.

Apparently, both political friends and foes were

at a loss to explain Roman's action.

The Commercial Bulletin observed

that there were no "satisfactory reasons" in his veto message "...to
account for the perfect fatuity that could have induced this extraordi
nary step."

By this action, had Governor Roman, only in the beginning

of his administration, "...inflicted a deeper and more serious injury on
the prosperity of New Orleans and the otate generally...than he can
57
possible remedy during the balance of his term," said the ikilletln.
The Governor had given no constitutional objections either, and his
"...raost intimate and long-tried personal and political friends..."
counseled against this veto.
abuse of the veto power."

"General Jackson was never guilty of a greater

The Bulletin claimed that Roman had been in

fluenced in this decision by one individual close to him, "...whose direct

^Neur Orleans Commercial Bulletin. 25 March 1839
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personal Interest in defeating the present bill was so great...as to
render it the more extraordinary that Mr. Roman should have allowed such
overwhelming influence to his opinion."
was net revealed.

The identity of this individual

But while the Governor had foolishly vetoed the Nash

ville railroad bill, he had also resorted to political trickery, charged
the Bulletin.

Knowing that the two-thirds vote necessary to override his

veto existed in each house of the legislature, Roman "...kept tack this
bill until a few hours previous to the adjournment..." while the members
of the legislature, "...believing the business of the season was done,
were daily leaving the city."

Thus, the number was so greatly reduced

"...that two-thirds of the whole number elected, would require nearly an
unanimous vote...
Four days after the Governor's veto, the railroad directors appealed
to the three municipalities to extend aid to the railroad in order to
save the $500,000 already invested by the city of New Orleans.

Although

a committee was appointed in the Second Municipality to confer with the
councils of ‘he other two, the political division of New Orleans at this
eg

time made any coordinated action almost impossible .'7 Meanwhile, the
railroad company set out to break up its large individual stockholdings
and remove all possible objections to extending public aid to the venture*
Former President Hofftaan became a committee of one to get the consent of
the large stockholders for redistribution of their stock.

They were asked

to surrender "...all stock over and above 100 shares,.,and that the amount,.,
paid thereon of one dollar per share..." should be considered "...as pay

5
Tbld,., 29 March 1839, p. 2.
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ment on the stock so retained..."
sell thi 3 stock to the public.

The directors also made provisions to

A committee was appointed for each muni

cipality to open stock subscription offices.

In promoting the sale of

stock, the directors told New Orleanians that "...by a subscription to
the stock of the Company, and a payment thereof of five dollars per
sharet.,," the railroad could be extended to the Tangipahoa River "... and
thus secure an immediate return on the outlay."
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Reorganization of the stockholdings was followed by the opening of
the road in May of 1339.

In spite of the blow dealt to the project by

Governor Roman's veto of the aid bill, the company had to keep face and
appear active if stockholders were ever to Ve attracted.

Also, the

Louisiana legislature, In its next session, must he presented with requests
for aid accompanied by visible proof of the vitality of the railroad com
pany.

The line at this time extended

outof New Orleans about twenty and

^ne-half miles, fourteen of which cro

sedthe prairie and was within

fifteen miles of Pass Manchac.^

theNew Orleans and Nashville rail

But

road project, that had ^o greatly s l i m e d the

imagination and enthusiasm

of citizens In four stater, had degenerated to a local New Orleans rail

road, depending upon meager revenues from passenger fares to pay its
expenses.

The New Orleans press began to call attention to the recrea

tional delights of riding the railroad, of'the fresh air and open country
to be enjoyed by the traveler who journeyed to the Prairie Cottage and
bath houses built by the company at the terminus of the line.
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^°Ibid.. 2 April 1339, p. 2.
6lTbid., 20 May 1839, p. 2; 25 Kay 1839, p. 2. Genate Journal, 12
June 184i, quoted in New Orleans Bee. 21 January 1841, p. 1.
°*New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. 29 May 1839, p. 2.
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company even went into the firewood business, putting its hands to work
cutting wood in the forests along the route, and then hauling it to the
New Orleans depot for distribution.^
The Nashville railroad was now existing on borrowed time. While the
revenue from the railroad remained pitifully small, the interest on the
state bonds fell due in the spring of 1840, with no money in the treasury
to pay them.

The supporters of the railroad in the legislature attempted

again to pass an aid bill that would enable the company to construct the
line as far as the Florida Parishes where it would touch the pine woods
area,

"If carried to the woods/' argued a railroad supporter, "it would

pay an interest by the reduction in the price of wood a l o n e . . . T h e
engineer's estimates that the cost for this extension would be nearly
|800,000 did not help the railroad's cause, while some legislators began
to wonder if these yearly appropriations would ever cease.
the wisdom of building to the piney woods.
large extent of lake navigation.

Others doubted

"They were connected by a

We are uniting that which is already

reached by a communication infinitely more lasting."

Even should the

route reach that far, the railroad would never produce a revenue, said
one critic, probably quite realistically.
and the pine woods thinly scattered."

"The country was very poor,
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In the final analysis, the opinion of the legislators had hardened
since the passage of the generous railroad aid bill of 1839.

Why should

ffifew Orleans Bee. 14 March 1840, p. 1.
k^House Journal, 5 March 1840, quoted in New Orleans Bfe. 6 March
1840. House Journal, 9 March 1840, quoted in New OrlwuSi Bee. 10 March
1840. House Journal, 10 March 1840, quoted In tfrew Orleans Bee. 11 March

1640.
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the state sustain internal improvements that the citizens themselves were
unwilling to support?

"The Nashville railroad was a mere catchpenny.

Truer words could not have been spoken under existing circumstances,
nevertheless, in spite of the general distaste for the Nashville rail
road, the legislators were forced to vote an appropriation for the pro
ject, although not in the form of aid.

The interest on the Nashville

railroad bonds was due in 1840, and the company could not pay it.

Thus,

the legislature, to preserve the credit of the state, passed an act
authorizing the Governor "...to borrow from any of the banks which are
bound to loan to the State, so much money as may be necessary to meet the
interest..." on the bonds which fell due during the next twelve months.^
The amount was $21 , 5 2 6 . ^
The Nashville railroad refused to die immediately, and continued
operating throughout 1840.

When the legislature met in January of 1841,

the company cculd report that their receipts from passengers and wood for
ten months in 1843, were $16,475.

is far as the wood trade was concerned.,

12,000 cords had been delivered to Mew Orleans at five dollars per cord.
These gross profits were offset by expenditures of $16,879., however, the
bulk of these expenses, $12,274, having been incurred for salaries,
$7,020, and "Negro expenses," $5,254-
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The financial report of the

railroad was accompanied by a message from the company's president, who

j?Ibid.
^"Louisiana, Acts. 14 Legis., 2 Sess., 1840, p. 125.
State Treasurer's Report, Senate Journal, 6 January I 84I, quoted in
New Orloans B e e . 18 January 1841, p. 1.
^ S e n a t e Journal, 12 January 1841, quoted in New Orleans .Bee. 21
January 1841, p. 1.

harped again on the familiar and frayed theme of state aid.

This time,

the c o m p a n y asked that the legislature trade its * 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 mortgage on
the railroad, for stock.

"If this course should be adopted, the other

or individual stockholders would contribute and. take an interest in the
construction of the road until it reaches Pass Manchac."

As things stood

at the time, the individual stockholders refused to make any advances on
thfir st.-k as long a » ther'* remained the danger of a state foreclosure
of the mortgage.

In fact, a recent call for two dollars per share had

been ignored by the atockholders.

The plan to carry the railroad to

Nashville should, for the time being, be suspended, said the president
in pathetic and belated recognition of a fait accompli, while the com
pany should con', entret >- on the more limited objective of serving only the
people of Louisiana.

But give the railroad a chance, and "...it can,

without further pecuniary aid fro-', the Legislature, from Its own resources
and operations,

reach the point mentioned ^Pass Manchac^ in lees than

f>9

two years."' 7
The optimism of the railroad president failed to impress the legis
lators.

From the viewpoint of the railroad company, there may have been

grounds for a little optimism, because it was almost a miracle that the
Nashville railroad, In Its existing condition, could report any earnings
at all.

Nevertheless, receipts failed to cover even the costs of opera

tion and maintenance, while the unpaid Interest on the railroad bonds
represented damning proof of the companyfs financial ineptitude.

Thus,
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the legislature began to consider ways of proceeding against the insolvent
railroad.

Even Senator Hoa of New Orleans, who previously had championed

the railroad's cause, now believed "...that the affairs of the company
were past all remedy.

Could they be serious in applying to the state again

for further relief, when the most trifling subscriptions were not paid
up?,"

asked the Senator incredulously.

Although various legislators pro

posed instituting a suit agninst the railroad, no action along these lines
was taken in the 1841 session.

The legislature did make provision, how

ever, for the annual payment by the state, of the interest on the bonds
until they were completely paid and cancelled.
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The following year, in March of 1842, the Louisiana legislature took
definite action against the New Orleans and Nashville .iailroad Company*
paving the way for foreclosure of the mortgage by the state.

The attorney

General received instructions to institute proceedings, 3eize the property,
and sell it under the most advantageous terms to the state,

71

and by

September, L 842, it was reported that the New Orleans and Nashville railroad had passed into the hands of the state.
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The property taken over

included, besides twenty two miles of railroad, nine slaves, three loco
motive engines,

seven passenger cars, five burden cars, cne steam engine,

three pile driving machines with steam engines, three common pile driving
machines worked by hand, seventy six pairs of wheels, fifty four springs
for car 3, and numerous miscellaneous items such as machine shop tools and

^^Louisiana, Acts. 15 Legis., 1 Sess., 1841* p. 44*
'^The Mexican Gulf and the Clinton and Port Hudson railroads were
included under the provisions of this act.
Louisiana, Acts. 15 Legis.*
2 Sess., 1842, pp. 458-462.

72Niis3' Weekly Register. Vol. Lilli (September 10, 1842) 32.
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railroad iron and bolts.
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The legislature in the spring of 1844 authorized the sale of the New
Orleans and Nashville r a i l r o a d . B y

this time, the legislators found

little on which to disagree about the railroad, although one attempted
amendment to the act was most interesting.

It will be recalled that

Senate President Felix Garcia did yoeman work in the legislature to keep
his own railroad, the Mexican Gulf, from being sold In sections, apparently
so that he and his business associates who held stock in the railroad
could buy it back for a fraction of its cost,

Along these same lines,

Garcia offered an amendment to the Nashville railroad bill, to the effect
that the railroad must be sold In block "...if the purchaser shall bind
himself to use the same in the extension of the Mexican Gulf Railway, to
Lake Borgne..."

In other words, the Senator proposed to give his asso

ciates the exclusive opportunity of buying the New Orleans and Nashville
railroad, and probably at their own price, since no individual bidder
could afford to purchase the railroad in block.

Although Garcia's

"block amendment" had passed in the bill authorizing the sale of the
Mexican Gulf Railroad, he failed in his attempt to force the sale of the
Nashville railroad in block also.

7K
^

On August 15, 1844, the Nashville railroad ended forever as an
economic Institution, when it was broken up and sold.

The railroad line,

with its i ron and sleepers, brought $34*600, the three locomotives with

7-3New Orleans B e e , 12 July 1644, p. !•
"^Louisiana, Ac t s . 16 Legis., 2 dess., 1844, p. 2.
753enate Journal, 11 March 1844, quoted In New Orleans Bee. 24
March 1844*
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cars and trriders, #10,Q0G, and the slaves,

The receipts from

the sale were reported at $53,530, while in addition, the state probably
reali/.ed several thousand dollars from the sale of various miscellaneous
7A

items belonging to the railroad company.'

In view of the selling price

of the New Orleans and Nashville railroad, it was obvious that Senator
Oarola's insistence on selling the Mexican Oulf railroad In block, cost
the state then sands of dollars.

Although this railroad wcs only slightly

shorter than the Nashville railroad, and possessed almost as much equip
ment, the Mexican lulf sold for only #15,000, compared with ,53,530
received for the Nashville railroad.

Hid iarcta's "block amendment" been

applied to the Nashville railroad, additional thousands would have been
lost tc the state as a result if the crafty maneuvers of this sly operator.
The demise of the New Orleans and Nashville project represented a
railroad failure that was all the more Ignominious, when compared with
the original lofty aims of the venture.

This project 3et out to do more,

hut accomplished less, than most rail tv.'ads built, in Louisiana during this
period.

In view of New Orleans’ frantic effort? to build railroads to

the west In the decade of the l ^ N ’s, however, the planners of the Nash
ville railroad possessed uncommon f^resight and vision.

They grasped the

realities of New Orleans’ position in the western trade fifteen years
ahead of most of their contemporaries, who were content to drift along
with the natural order of things.

Understanding the full implications of

the canal and railroad revolutions in the East, the Nashville railroad
planners set out to do something about the situation.

Nevertheless, they

^^New Orleans Bee. 12 July 1844, p. 2; 16 August 1844, p. 2.
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had not the means for such a gigantic task, and in the end, failed,
partly because of the lethargy of their own fellow citizens.
Another reality that the Nashville railroad promoters understood
was the importance of manufacturing and population centers to any rail
road system.

If New Orleans and south Louisiana lacked sufficient manu

facturing centers, why not do something about it?

If there was no impor

tant manufacturing town near New Orleans, create one.

Thus it was that

the promoters of the New Orleans and Nashville railroad entered upon one
of the most unusual projects in the history of early Louisiana rail
roading.

They adopted a colonization policy that attempted to encourage

the settlement of a manufacturing town on the Tangipahoa River, sixty
miles from New Orleans on the proposed route of the railroad.

The town,

they proposed to call by the quite ludicrous, but patriotic name of
'Uncle Sam,'

and the details of the project, as revealed to New Orlean

ians by the press during January of lf?37, shewed a certain amount of care
ful planning combined with many unrealistic suppositions as to the town's
merits.
The planning of Uncle 5am was probably the handiwork of Hoffman and
Vfoodruff, and the original motivation for its formation, to promote
manufacturing, was economically sound from the railroad’s point of view.
As Hoffman explained it, "...the Company preferred creating a source of
revenue from the travelling /stcj which would take place between this
city and Uncle Sam...,” and he might as well have 3dded, to create a
source of revenue from freight traffic also.

As to the location of Uncle

Sam, many reasons were given for that particular site, including the
health factor, the absence of mosquitos, and the pure water supply.

But
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the basic factor was the presence of the Tangipahoa River and the belief
that this stream could be utilized as a source of water power for factories.
Coupled with the water power attraction was the somewhat romantic idea
i

that New Orleans could have a "...populous Inland manufacturing town...”
the same as Boston had its Lowell, and London and Liverpool, their Man
chester, Birmingham and Sheffield.

In short, what the planners of Uncle

Sam anticipated w^s tr> transplant to the soil of Louisiana a facsimile of
the results of the industrial revolution in England.

Obviously, the

incubator conditions of Louisiana in 1837 were quite dissimilar to the
resource situation that produced England’s manufacturing towns.
Nevertheless, the Tangipahoa River might have provided one basic
ingredient, water power.

\fter examining the river above the site of

Uncle 3am, which was located at an elevation of eighty five feet above
T,ake Pontchartrain, "...it was discovered that by a dam 17 feet above low
water,

and a 'anal of four miles in length, a fall of 29 feet would be

had."

This drop of elevation would "...furnish a power equal to 3,000

horses...The dimensions of the canal will be such as to afford all the
power required for manufactures, and will be furnished by the company on
very reasonable ten's,"

Vlong the canal would be located the factories,

which could be operated "...at any point by returning the water to the
river..."

Around this power source, "...brickmakers, masons, carpenters,

cabinet makers, paper maker3, trunk makers, Joiner3, turners, and all
those working in iron, Irass and copper..." would take up residence.
There would also b.

u. opportunity to establish ".. .rdll3, grist mills

and factories for the manufacture of cotton..."

Perhaps a town based

upon the brick and lumber industries would have been practical, and cotton
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mills slightly less feasible, hut the development of metal works seemed
to be highly improbable.

The promoters of Uncle 3am planned to give the

town a good start by locating the railroadr3 principal machine shop there,
and also, it was planned to build a depot.
On the seventeenth and eighteenth of January, 1837, New Orleanians
were given the opportunity to purchase lots in Uncle 3ain, and the company
pledged ninety per cent of the proceeds of the sale toward Improvements
in the town.

Fifty per cent would be applied to the water power problem,

namely, the building of the Jam and canal.

In addition, the company

planned to build a Votel, a college ctpable of handling 100 students, a
bridge across the Tangipahoa River, and a cotton factory.

Ten per cent

of the proceeds of the sale was pledged to each of thjse ventures.

A

lot could be purchased by paying one-fifth of the price within six months
and the remainder over a period of four years, without interest.

Apparently

the results of the sale wer° fairly satisfactory, for a short time later,
the company announced that It would accept bids to bu Id the hotel, the
bridge, and the dam.

In the meantime, arrangements were being made to

contract for a four horse coach to operate between Uncle 3am and Coving
ton.^

The plans for Uncle 3am fell by the wayside as the prospects of

the railroad were dimmed by the company's worsening financial situation.
Unfortunately, the sale of town lots took on the aspects of a typical
speculation venture of the period, since land in Uncle 3am could be pur
chased for no down payment, with a long period in which

to pay the balance.

^ T h e factual details of the town of Uncle Sam appeared in the New
Orleans Bee, between December, 1836, and February, 1837* in the following
Issues: 24 December 1836, p. 1; 10 January 1837, p. 2; 13January 1837,
p. 1; 17 January 1837, P» 2; 10 February 1837, p. 1*

The end of the Nashville railroad, in a way, represented the end
of an era, and signaled a change in the economic philosophy of the state
government.

It was no coincidence that two other railroads mortgaged to

the state, the Clinton and Port Hudson and the Mexican Gulf, were included
in the provisions of the act of 1842, which ordered the seizure of the
Nashville railroad and Its property.

All three railroads filled to pay

the interest on their state bonds, a situation causing embarrassment to
the legislature, and necessitating special legislation to preserve the
credit of the state.
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In so doing, they unavoidably discredited the

large corporation and fixed upon the contemporary mind the idea that
government and business should be separate and distinct, an economic
philosophy that in later times was often clothed in a sanctity that
rivaled the laws of Moses.

There appeared it this time a changing atti

tude toward government aid to corporations, which was most strongly
phrased by Governor Alexander Mouton in his message to the Louisiana
1

cl it 'ire in 1344# recommending the sale of the Nashville railroad:
The general failure of the State in all the enterprises under
taken by her and the unpropitious results of all business or part
nerships with companies or individuals warn us to abandon schemes,
and limit government to its simple and legitimate objects, the
protection of persons and property, -mi the extension of the bless
ings of primary education to all our citizens.
Shades of Adam Smithi

Although general belief would have it that

this laissez faire outlook began Immediately after the Panic of 1837# there
was little evidence of this fact In Louisiana affairs immediately follow
ing that financial disaster.

The legislature voted aid to improvement

"Louisiana, Acts. 15 Legis., 2 Sess., 1842# PP» 458-462.
?9Louisiana, House Journal. 16 Legis., 2 Sess., 1844, pp. 2-3.

companies as late as 1839.

As for the Nashville railroad and its part

in preparing the way for laissez faire, the legislature itself could be
partially blamed, not for extending aid, but for failing to vote suffi
cient. aid.

The legislators were unwilling to go the whcle distance

necessary and become a partner in the venture.

Thus,

they voted money

in ineffectual, parsimonious driblets never sufficient to insure the

Nashville railroad's; success.
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APPWDH A
Railroad* Qhartarad In Louisiana batwaan 1830 and 1850
with thalr Capital Isatlea

Taar
Chartarat

1830

1831

Total
Railroad
*Pontehartrala
Original Capltallaatloa
Ineraaaa, 1831
Ineraaaa, 1835
I a o r M M ) 183^

"Hast Fallcli
Original Capltaliaatlc
Ineraaaa

Capltallaatloa
$

150,000

100,000

,

250,000

1 000,000

$ 1,900,000

150.000

100.000
250,000

1833

3t» Barnard
Alexandria A Cheneyrllle
Rapidaa
•Clinton A Port Hudson
Original Capitalisation
Ineraaaa, 1833
Inoraaaa, 1837

50,000
250,000
10,000
100,000
ADO,000
500,000

,

1 000,000
*8 aw Orlaans A Carrollton
Original Capitalisation
Inoraaaa, 1835

1835

Atohafalayn
*Rad Riser
% a v Orlaans A ■aehville
Original Capitalisation
Inoraaaa, I836
Ineraaaa, 1837

300,000
2,700,000

3,000,000
2,000,000
300,000

6,000,000
2,000,000
2,000,000

,

10 000,000

^Tha original route author!sad was ooapleted*
"This railroad was partially eoapleted.
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I«ar
Chartered

Railroad

Total
Capitalisation

1835

Plaquenine
•Hew Orlaans ft Carroll ton
Retailsion

1836

Baton Ronga ft Clinton
Lake Providence ftRad River
Springfield ft Liberty
Livingston
Iberville
^Pontohartrain Srtanslon

600,000
2,000,000
150,000
120,000
150,000

1837

Naxiean Gulf
ffatohitoohes & Sabina
Kadison ft Covington
Tldalia, Harrisonburg ft Alexandria
Louisiana ft Mississippi
Bath

1,000,000
600,000
150,000
500,000
500,000
125,000

1840

Jaffarson ft Laka Pontohartrain

$

20,000

100,000
$24,375,000

°Tha Haw Orlaans ft Carrollton Srtanslon to Bajou Sara was to ba
constructed by a newly oraatad company, the Nav Orlaans ft Carrollton
Railroad ft Banking Company, Its capitalisation was $3,000,000, tfclch
iSaludad the original capitalisation of the Nav Orlaans ft Carrollton
Railroad Company, Saa abova, 1833, Raw Orlaans ft Carrollton Railroad,
Increase, 1835.
^The Pontohartrain Railroad Extension was authorised in 1835, but
the large oapltal inoraasa was not enacted until 1836. This company
received banking powers• See p. 259, 1830, Pontohartrain Railroad,
Inoraasa, 1835, and Inoraasa, 1836.
*Thia railroad was partially completed.
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Manuscripts*

Burruss (John C.) Papers, 1825-1882
Butler (Family) Tapers, 1812-1866
Butler (Thomas) Papers, 1822-1910
Butler (Thomas and Family) Papers, 1822-1910
C a M M o Record Book N<:. 208/*, L<-uiaiana Historical Association, New
Or leans
Clinton and Port Hudaon Railroad Company Account Book, 1*51-1870
East Feli'iana Parish Archives Collection:

Clinton and

Port Hudson Rai1 road CompanyPapers, 1826-1852

Clinton and

Port Hudson Railroad Company Record Books,

Gurva y r 1.o Re ■*o r 1 ,

1821-1879

1791-1 3? 2

Thomas (Davit) Account looks, 1 ?37-1%5
Hamilton (i/1 H i .vn 3.) Papers, 1757-19"?, in the Iester (George) Col
lection
"11 ho-,rr.o (3. 3.

an! Hardly) Paper

HcCehf-e (j. Burrusr.) Papers,
MeCetiee (James Stewart;

1718-1931

I''! ''-1921

Parers, 1722-1929

Yarstan (Henry RR a1;.! Family) Papera, 1828-1737
New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company Collection, 1835-1896,
Tulane University A r c h i v e H o w a r d - T i l t o n Library, Tulane Univ* rsity
New Orleans Scrap Book, 1813-1865
Palfrey (Will 1am T, and George D.)

\ccour.t Book, 1732-1918

Pontohartrain Railroad Company, 'iinutes of the Meetings of the Jirectors, 1830-1836, Krv/ard-Ti lton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer
sity

■^Except when otherwise indicated, the manuscripts are located in
the Department of Archives, Louisiana it,ate Universal* .
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